



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE

THE FRENCH I.M. POLICY 10 YEARS AFTER

NDIA/NIMIC - 2003 IM&EMTS



THE FRENCH I.M./MURAT POLICY 10 YEARS AFTER

Patrick Kernen & Patrick Lamy
DGA/INSP/IPE
(National Explosive Safety Authority)



SUMMARY

- **THE FRENCH MURAT POLICY**
 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
 - APPROACH & SPECIFICITIES
- **THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLICY**
 - THE LABELLED MUNITIONS
- **THE ADVANTAGES AND NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS**
- **THE WAY AHEAD**

THE FRENCH MURAT POLICY

- **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**
 - **GENERAL POLICY ESTABLISHED IN 1992**
 - **POLICY IN LINE WITH STANAG 4439**
 - **“MURAT/IM requirements shall be considered in all Munition design, development and replenishment activities”**
 - **“MURAT will have to be introduced into service at the appropriate level”**
 - **“New technologies have to be developed and considered for all new Programs”**

THE FRENCH APPROACH

- **WHILE S3 ASSESSMENT**
 - Refers to a specific use and life cycle
 - Is only valid for well defined environments
- **IM/MURAT ASSESSMENT SHOULD**
 - Improve Interchangeability/Interoperability
 - Help cross-procurements
 - Make extension of life duration easier
 - Increase the confidence level in the risk assessment

THE FRENCH APPROACH

- **MURAT ASSESSMENT**
 - **IS AN EVALUATION OF THE INTRINSIC SAFETY LEVEL (IMness) OF THE MUNITION, INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY SPECIFIC APPLICATION**
 - **IS BASED ON POSSIBLE REACTION MECHANISMS GENERATED BY MOST PROBABLE STIMULI/THREATS**
 - **SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT WORST POSSIBLE THREAT PARAMETERS ARE COVERED**

THE FRENCH APPROACH

- **MURAT SIGNATURE**
 - IS COMPARED TO REFERENCE IMness LEVELS FOR A POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT OF A “MURAT LABEL”
- **MURAT Labels (★, ★★, ★★★)**
 - Are defined to help common understanding
 - Allow an adaptation of requirements to
 - Required level of performance
 - Operational use and financial constraints
 - Available technologies

MURAT ★★★ LABEL

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
V	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
IV	Red	Red	Red	Green	Red	Green	Green
III	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green
II	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
I	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red

MURAT ★★ LABEL

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
V	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
IV	Red	Red	Light Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green
III	Red	Red	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Green
II	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Light Green
I	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Light Green

MURAT ★ LABEL

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
V	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
IV	White	White	Light Green	Green	Light Green	Green	Green
III	Red	White	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Light Green	Green
II	Red	Red	Red	Red	White	White	Light Green
I	Red	Red	Red	Red	White	White	Light Green

ASSIGNMENT OF LABELS

- **Assignment of MURAT LABELS is under the responsibility of the “Inspecteur de l’Armement pour les Poudres et Explosifs” (IPE) acting as NATIONAL (EXPLOSIVE) SAFETY AUTHORITY**

ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLICY

- **First MURAT developments were for munitions to be onboard the CVN Charles de Gaulle**



- **Since 1993/1994, MURAT goals are more and more considered in new programs**

ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLICY

- **Since 1998, IPE is also NATIONAL AUTHORITY for MUNITION SAFETY QUALIFICATION : validation of the good taking into account of safety in the Program**
- **For MUNITION SAFETY QUALIFICATION, MURAT requirements should be clearly defined and justified in the Program Mission Need Specification**


ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLICY

- **TO DATE, 6 LABELS WERE ASSIGNED BY IPE**
 - **155 mm Artillery Shell → MURAT ★**
 - **155 mm GP modular charge → MURAT ★**
 - **250 lb Penetrator Bomb → MURAT ★ ★**
 - **Explosive Reactive Armor → MURAT ★**
 - **VT1 M01 Air Defense Missile → MURAT ★**
 - **Apache Cruise Missile → MURAT ★**

155 mm ARTILLERY SHELL (GIAT ind.)

- Comp. XF 1353 (NTO 65%, TNT 35%), EIDS
- Configuration : 20 palletized without fuze/gun cartridge

Figure 1 (Shell)



155 mm ARTILLERY SHELL

- **Bullet Impact :**
 - 4 tests → 4 NR
- **Sympathetic Reaction :**
 - Tests and/or **(DYNA 2D) Modeling** config.


Shells separated by 15 mm	→ Type IV (670 MPa)
Shells separated by 30 mm	→ Type IV (727 MPa)
10 lb test vehicle separated by 50 mm	→ Type IV (770 MPa)
Shells separated by 85 mm	→ Type III (900 MPa)
Gap test (with PMMA)	→ Type III (1500 MPa)
Heavy FI on test vehicle	→ Type III (3460 MPa)
Nominal functioning	→ Type I (4460 MPa)

155 mm SHELL SIGNATURE → ★

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR			✕				
V		✕					
IV	✕						
III				✕			
II							
I							

VT1 M01 MISSILE (THALES)

- WH : 4.5 Kg HBU 88A (RDX 88%, HTPB 12%)
- RM : 31.5 Kg TPH 8313 (AP 82%, RDX 4%, Binder)
- Case : graphite epoxy



VT1 M01 MISSILE (THALES)

- **Bullet Impact :**
 - **Friability** → **17 MPa/ms**
 - **Test on (more confined) test vehicle**
→ **9/10 Type III**
- **Sympathetic reaction :**
 - **Test with 4 AUR (without igniter) and 2 inert**
→ **TNT eq 8 Kg => no SR**

VT1 M01 MISSILE



VT1 Missile SIGNATURE → ★

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR							
V							
IV	✕	✕					
III			✕	✕			
II							
I							


APACHE MISSILE (MBDA)

- 10 KRISS sub-munitions
 - WH : 7.1 Kg B 2211 / V 350
 - RM : 7.8 Kg TPH (AP 68%, Al 20%, Binder 12%)
 - Metallic Case : NCDV16
-
- Analogy with MAGIC Missile
 - 10 lb test vehicle testing
 - No SD of sub-munitions within a Missile
 - No SD of sub-munitions of adjacent Missiles

APACHE MISSILE



APACHE MISSILE




APACHE Missile SIGNATURE → ★

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR							
V							
IV	✕						
III	■	✕	✕	✕			
II	■	■	■	■			
I	■	■	■	■			

250 lb BOMB (MBDA/SNPE)

- B 2214 (NTO 72%, HMX 12%, Binder 16%)
- Booster : HMX 86%, Binder 14%
- Intumescent coating / venting systems
- Without fuze

Figure 3 (Palettized bombs)



250 lb PENETRATOR BOMB

- **Bullet Impact :**
 - 5 tests (AUR, sections) → 4 NR, 1 Type V
- **Sympathetic Reaction :**
 - No diagonal effect
 - H.F.I. on AUR (2000 m/s) → Type V
 - S.D. Testing on 100 lb Test Vehicle → Type III

	<u>Test Veh.</u>	<u>BOMB</u>
Distance between munitions	0.5	> 0.2
Weight ratio HE/Metal	1.01	0.93
Fragment Velocity (Gurney)	1730	1675
Shock Pressure (in the HE)	106 Kbar	99 Kbar
Shock Duration (in the HE)	2.6 ms	2.3 ms

250 Ib BOMB SIGNATURE → ★★

	FH	SH	BI	SR	Light FI	Heavy FI	SC JI
NR							
V	✕	✕	✕				
IV	■	■					
III	■	■		✕	✕	✕	
II	■	■	■	■	■	■	
I	■	■	■	■	■	■	

ADVANTAGES & NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS

- **OBVIOUS BENEFITS OF I.M. IN TERMS OF**
 - **INCREASING PLATFORM SURVIVABILITY**
 - **DECREASING LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS**
(Handling, Storage, Maintenance)
- **MILITARY USERS WANT TO QUANTIFY THOSE BENEFITS**
- **MUNITIONS DESIGNERS NEED CLEAR REQUIREMENTS**

MILITARY USER EXPECTATIONS

● STORAGE

- **NEED** : - define specific HD and QDs according to IM signature
 - allow the “mixing” of various I.M. in the same magazine
- **☞** : difficulties to evolve national regulations
- **☞** : specific rules should be established by NATO for field storage

MILITARY USER EXPECTATIONS

- **BENEFIT OF UNIT RISK :**

I.M. → TYPE III to F.H., S.H. and S.R.

- **BLAST (1.1) Hazards**

- QD based on NEQ of only 1 munition

- **FRAGMENTS (1.2) Hazards**

- QD based on NEQ of only 1 munition

- **THERMAL (1.3) Hazards**

- QD based on total NEQ of stored munitions

In France, QDs can be calculated taking into account the greatest of the 3 distances

MILITARY USER EXPECTATIONS

● OPERATIONAL USE

- **NEED** : increase operational capabilities by :
 - decreasing risks due to accidental or hostile threats
 - increasing interoperability/interchangeability within national and international Forces
- **☞** : standard requirements and assessments need to be internationally defined
- **☞** : standard signature should be defined for generic uses

MILITARY USER EXPECTATIONS

● EXAMPLE 1

250 lb penetrator bomb and Apache missile

- were developed for French Navy according to S3 requirements for the CVN C. de Gaulle
- because of their MURAT characteristics, both meet French Air Force S3 requirements and no additional assessment was necessary

MILITARY USER EXPECTATIONS

- **EXAMPLE 2**

**Transportation of Army weapons onboard
Navy vessels**

**Emergency landing of allied aircraft on CVN
Charles de Gaulle**

- **possible without further assessment if MURAT
signature shows no unacceptable risks for the
platform**

MUNITION DESIGNER EXPECTATIONS

- **WELL DEFINED REQUIREMENTS**
- **SIMPLE AND WELL DEFINED ASSESSMENT TOOLS**
 - **TESTS, INSTRUMENTATION, PASS/FAIL CRITERIA**
- **TO HAVE THOSE REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENT TOOLS INTERNATIONALLY AGREED**

THE WAY AHEAD

- **Within UN, Nations agreed to classify articles using standard procedures and a very simple protocol.**
- **From such a simple assessment, clear rules were defined for Transportation and Storage depending on :**
 - **probability and gravity of risks (HD)**
 - **type of risks (compatibility groups)**

THE WAY AHEAD

- **Such a classification and associated rules should be established by NATO for Munitions based on their IM Signatures**
- **This should be a major challenge for the new NATO CASG (CNAD AMMUNITION SAFETY GROUP)**