

Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center



A Review of The Insensitive Munitions Design Technology Workshop



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40th GARM Annual Symposium



Contents

Introduction:

MSIAC
Insensitive Munitions

Workshop Outline
Summary Of Final Output

Key Factors

- General IM Technology Status
- Conclusion

















40th GARM Annual Symposium



Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)

MSIAC (formerly NIMIC): a NATO Project funded by its member Nations

Answers to Technical Inquiries

Software & Databases

Technical Reports

Focused Training

Workshops & Tech. Meetings

Internet

50,000+ reports, journals, references, STANAGS; POC's

Range of munition safety related topics

Topics of interest, reviews, tutorials

Example: Short courses for Finnish services

Reaction mechanisms, testing, implementation...

E-groups, Open website, secure website



Insensitive Munitions: Why?

Bien Hoa AF Base – 1965

Da Nang ASP – 1969

Roseville, CA

1973

4 US Navy Aircraft Carrier Accidents: 1966 - 1981



Killed: 251/99 (if IM) Injured: 985/226 (if IM)

Camp Doha – 1991

IM Cost savings: US\$ 2,340 M (FY-2004)




AC Insensitive Munitions: Recent Headlines

Allied Munitions Storage in Afghanistan - 2003



US Aircraft Carrier Deck: Armed Aircraft - 2003



155-mm Harbour Stowage in the Al Jubayl

MSIAC Insensitive Munitions: Recent Headlines

32 killed, 70 injured



Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, 28/06/02 – Attack



Fallujah, Iraq 19/10/03 – RPG Attack


6-14 killed, > 50 injured

Supporting Munitions



Zaafaraniya, Iraq, 26/04/03 – Attack

USAF Base, Kirkuk, Iraq 02/06/04 – Rocket Attack





NIMIC IMDT Workshop





- The NIMIC IM Design Technology workshop was held between 29th September and 2nd October 2003 at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, UK
- The UK DOSG provided sponsorship
- 92 Participants.



IMDT Workshop Final Output

MSIAC Restricted Document L-101: Report on the State of the Art of IM Design Technology

Key Factors


Common & Specific


General IM Technology Status


Payload

Delivery Systems: Rocket Motors & Gun Propellant Charges Auxiliary Explosive Devices Packaging System Integration

MSIAC Limited Presentation: IM SoA version 1.4 – Compendium of 29 "IM" Systems









Payload: IM Technology Status




Technology

C=In Container/Stowage Configuration

- Explosives: Cast & Pressed Cast PBX (RDX, HMX, NTO, AI, AP)
- Design/Mitigation: Intumescent paint, venting, internal liners
- **Technology deployment: HIGH**
- Shortfalls

- Explosives with lower shock sensitiveness





Technology


*In carrier shell; C=In Container

- Explosives: Cast & Pressed PBX (RDX, HMX), Melt-cast (DNAN, Wax, NTO/TNT)
- Design/Mitigation: Cook-off resistant boosters, Fusible fuze adaptors (Guns & Mortar Ammunition)
- Technology deployment:
 - Guns/Mortar = LOW; Submunitions = MEDIUM;
- Shortfalls
 - **FI/SCJ resistant explosives**
 - Guns/Mortar: Lower cost explosive filling (process/EM).

40th GA



Delivery Systems: IM Technology Status



Technology

MSIAC

Supporting

C = In Container

- Propellant: Less sensitive nitrate esters, Reduce/eliminate sensitive nitramines, unfilled EMCDB
- Mitigation: Case deconfinement (CFRP, SSL, KOA, Bonded end closures, Shear pins, Shape memory metal joints), Preferential insulation

Technology deployment: MEDIUM


Shortfalls


- FI low shock sensitivity propellant with suitable performance
- SCO mitigation devices
- SCJ mitigation.












Delivery Systems: IM Technology Status



Technology

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- Propellant: HTPE/Butyl-NENA binder, Partial replacement of AP with AN, Eliminate nitramines
- Mitigation: Case deconfinement (CFRP, SSL, KOA, Bonded end closures, TIVS), Preferential insulation

Technology deployment:

- Reduced Smoke = HIGH
- High Performance = LOW
- Shortfalls
 - SCO mitigation devices
 - BI, FI & SCJ mitigation.












Delivery Systems: IM Technology Status



Technology

- Propellant: Composite propellant (LOVA, LOVA/CAB)
- Mitigation: Fusible parts in container, Combustible case
- Technology deployment: LOW
- Shortfalls
 - Low cost-lightweight packaging materials
 - Progression of next generation LOVA type propellants
 - SCJ mitigation
 - Reduced vulnerability high performance propellants (esp. direct fire).





C = In Container



- Considerable progress in IM technology; wide range of materials available
- Technology deployment: HIGH
- Shortfalls
 - Suitable lightweight inexpensive materials (for low cost munitions)
 - Assessment of candidate materials
 Materials to mitigate SCJ.















Conclusions

Technology is <u>sufficiently mature</u> for the design of IM compliant (or near compliant) solutions for most munition types

> Acceptable technical risks Acceptable costs Acceptable performance

Many munitions have been introduced into service that are IM compliant (or near compliant).



Questions?



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