



#### Machine Intelligence in Decision-making (MInD) Automated Generation of CB Attack Engagement Scenario Variants


Nadipuram R. Prasad Arjun S. Rangamani Timothy J. Ross M. M. Reda Taha Frank Gilfeather

BO05MSB070: Multivariate Decision Support Tool for CB Defense DTRA University Strategic Partnership Gold Team



#### New Orleans Scenario









- 1. Human decision-making is analogous to finding Order within Chaos
- 2. Order requires Structure
- 3. Structure requires Rules for preservation
- 4. Rules must be learned and applied
- New Rules are discovered as Information (Data) evolves



# Order in Scenario Generation



- Experts match the characteristics of the attacker with postulated attack characteristics to generate engagement scenarios that provide a basis to evaluate the consequences of the attack
- Base-Case Variants show the effectiveness of mitigating factors on the consequences including the cost of mitigation
- The set of Base-Case and Variant exemplars provide the means to develop appropriate cost models that can aid in evaluating S&T funding required to mitigate the consequences
- To preserve "order" in scenario variant generation, a set of Rules governing the relationships between the *CB* attack Base-Case and Variant exemplars must be "extracted" and "learned" so that many Variants can be generated for further analysis



## Basis For Automatic Scenario Generation




- Automatic scenario generation is based upon Bose-Einstein's Large Deviation Theory (LDT)
- The fundamental principle of LDT is founded in: "Exponential Asymptotics for Good Sets"
  - What this means is that all sets of new scenario variants must exhibit exponential asymptotic behavior, and satisfy all properties of compact sets






#### **Exponential Asymptotics**








## **Exponential Asymptotics**







#### **Exponential Asymptotics**





Exemplar Set of Base-Case Engagement Scenario and Variants

PERPETRATORS (X) MOTIVATIONS (M) MILLITARY FACILITIES (T) CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL AGENTS (A) DISPERSAL MECHANISM (D)			Islamist Terrorist Group   Tactical: Casualties   Education and Training   Sarin (GB) (moderate/high purity)   Improvised: Truck																								
														Proximity to Civilian <u>Infrastructure</u> Air flows			High										
																	South-Southeast										
															ERENT	Time of Attack	9:00 AM										
															TERISTICS.	Access to Offsite Medical											
	(B)		3																								
		Service(Scale of 0-5) Access to Civilian Hazmat																									
		response(Scale of 0-5)	3																								
2			Iteration 0	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3	Iteration 4	Iteration 5	Iteration 6	Iteration 7	Iteration 8	Iteration 9	Iteration 10														
		Type of detector.	N/A	C03	C03	C03	C4	C5	C5	C5	C6	C7	C8														
	10 20	Range of detection (m)	N/A	5000	5000	5000	5500	5500	5500	5500	10000	25000	40000														
	cal	Time Taken For Detection (Mins)	N/A	10	10	10	8	8	5	5	5	5	0														
	Chemical Agent Detectors	False positive rate(%).	N/A	5	5	5	7	5	5	5	5	0	0														
(M)	Chemi Agent Detect	False negative rate(%).	N/A	3	3	3	7	5	5	5	5	5	5														
	U Y H	No: of sensors.	N/A	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3														
	2 2	Presence of wall/fence.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES														
	Perimeter Protection	Presence of barricaded gates.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES														
s		No: of armed guards.	5	5	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15														
IABLE		No. or anneu guarus.			15	15	12	1.5	15	1.5	1.5	1.5	12														
		Positive Pressure Systems	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES														
AR	Personal Protection Equipment	Avbl of Masks (%)	0	0	50	50	80	100	100	100	100	100	100														
CB DEFENSE VARIABLES and SUB-VARIABLES (M)		Avbl of NBC Suits (%)	0	0	50	50	80	100	100	100	100	100	100														
		Wearability (Scale of 0-5)	0	0	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	5														
	P P P	% of personnel indoors	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80														
	Trained C	nsite Personnel(Scale of 0-5)	1	1	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5														
E E	Chemical Prophylaxis	Type of prophylaxis.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	PC4	PC5	PC6	PC6	PC6	PC7														
RIABL		Risk level of side effects.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	High	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low														
		Effectiveness.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Med	Med	High	High	High	High														
E VA		Max. no: of days safe to take continually.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	14	60	90	90	90	180														
FENS		No: of days before it becomes effective.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	1	1	1														
3B DE		Min. no: of days between pre- treatment cγcle.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	30	14	7	7	7	7														
0		No: of base personnel receiving it under normal conditions(%).	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10	80	92	92	92	96														
		Type of medicine.	MT3	MT3	MT3	MT3	MT2	MT4	MT4	MT4	MT4	MT4	MT4														
	Medical Treatment	Effectiveness(Scale of 0-5). Personnel covered by Antidote	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5														
		(%).	0	0	0	100	95	100	100	100	100	100	100														
87		Capacity to treat (Scale of 0-5)	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	4														
st)		man casualities	400-550	400-550	200-250	0-25	100-200	50-75	25-75	0-50	0-25	0-25	0-10														
Co	Remediation costs(in millions of US \$)		4	4	2.5	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1														
IMPACT and COST VARIABLES (C, Cost)		ys of mission disruption	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30														
		cal impact	High	High	High	Low	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low														
	Cost of S&T into CB defensive measures		0	0	0	0	600	750	1750	3000	3400	4000	7500														
	Cost of deployment (in millions US \$)		0	45	57	907	182	275	525	785	985	1335	1785														
	S & T Time (months)		0	0	0	0	60	60	72	96	60	96	120														
->	Deployment Time (months)		0	12	12	48	24	60	36	36	24	24	36														



#### Adaptive Network Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS)



- ANFIS is a set of fuzzy inference rules written in a neural network structure.
- Rules are extracted from exemplar data and learned.
- The resulting fuzzy-neural structure can be used to identify the effectiveness of mitigating factors on the consequences of *CB* attack scenarios.



## Scenario Variant Generation



- Exemplars of scenarios provided by *CB* Experts are used to train ANFIS rule-based structures and provide the means to generate hundreds and thousands of interpolated scenario variants.
- Large numbers of variants provide the means to Rank the effectiveness of mitigating factors on minimizing the overall consequences, and in identifying the total cost of additional S&T funds required.



#### **Relative Effectiveness Between Base Case Engagement Scenario and Variants**



R<sup>RC</sup> 20

V2


V2

Time

Time

R<sup>≈</sup> 21


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




## Evolution of Possibility Trees & Engagement Scenario Variants

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






#### Scenario Variant Generation Using FIRM









#### Learning Systems

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




# Spectrograph of Variant Evolution



Plot of the error of each individual through the populations in the genetic search process





#### Cost Model




 $[\theta_1, \theta_2] = f[Eff_1, Eff_2, Eff_3, Eff_4, Eff_5, Eff_6, t_1, t_2]$  $\theta_1, \theta_2$  are the Cost of S & T and the Cost of Deployment  $Eff_i|_{i=1}^6$  are the mitigating factor effectiveness  $t_1, t_2$  are the time required to achieve the desired effectiveness

This is a nonlinear mapping for which a Radial Basis Function Neural Network with dynamic allocation of neurons has been applied



#### S&T Cost to minimize Human Casualties based solely upon Expert generated Engagement Scenario exemplars







#### Advances in *CB* Attack Analysis



More .....

- It is shown that a "**rule-based**" inferential method with ability to "*learn*" CB attack scenarios and consequences, and "*evolve*", is necessary for machine intelligence in decision-making (*MInD*) where multitudes of scenario variants can be generated on demand
- The structure of *MInD* is explored within an evolutionary framework to emulate Human-like learning and decision making for *CB* attack analysis
- A fuzzy-neural system embedded in the Fuzzy Inferential Rule-based Model (FIRM) exhibits learned decision-making abilities to predict the effectiveness of mitigating factors on consequences



## Advances in *CB* Attack Analysis



- An evolutionary structure (E-FIRM) allows the examination of multitudes of mitigating factor variants using FIRM as a kernel to yield a desired set of consequences
- The evolutionary structure allows the formulation of appropriate neural network-based Cost Models that provide a basis for ranking alternatives and for optimizing on the cost of S&T funding and cost of deployment over the desired time horizons



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Ram Prasad Associate Professor, E&CE Director, *RioSoft & Rio*RoboLab New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003 Email: <u>ramprasad@msn.com</u>