
Enabling Effective Decisions

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Tim Galpin - Business Area Executive, Infocentric Operations
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Outline

∠Purpose

- **∠Background**
 - **≪Key definitions**

ZJHU APL C2 Concept

- **∠** Features
- **∠**Advanced Situational Awareness/Knowledge
- **∠**Planning
- **∠** Execution

∠Summary



Why JHU APL Developed a Command Concept

- ∠ To inform and focus the Lab's research and development efforts
- **∠** To offer hypotheses for testing and experimentation



Key Definitions

- **∠**Command: The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.
- **∠Control:** ...the regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent.
- **∠C2** System: The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations.
- **∠Operational Environment: A composite of the conditions,** circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.

The operational environment is what it is, not what we want it to be—and it will change

- - **∠**Conventional warfare v. unconventional warfare

 - Centralized control v. decentralized control
 - **∠**Concentration of forces v. dispersion of forces



Conventional Warfare v. Unconventional Warfare

Conventional Warfare

- ∠ Linear battlefield
- **∠** Terrain objectives

Examples:

- ∠ Desert Storm, 1991
- ∠ Iraqi Freedom, 2003
- ...but each had unconventional components



Unconventional Warfare

- **∠** Irregular forces
- **∠** Undefined combatants
- **∠** Non-terrain objectives

Examples:

- ≤ Enduring Freedom, 2001
- ∠ Iraqi Insurgency, 2003-5

Desert Storm OIF Panama 89 Kosovo 99 OEF Iraqi Global War Insurgency On Terror


Conventional Unconventional



Hierarchy v. Anarchy

Hierarchical relationships

- ✓ Senior
- **∠** Supporting





"Anarchical" relationships

- ∠ Coalitions
- ∠ Liaison with central or local officials
- ∠ Ties with national or local religious or tribal organizations

Ø ...





Panama 89

Desert Storm

OIF

OEF

Iraqi Insurgency

Kosovo 99

Global War On Terror

Hierarchy


Anarchy

Centralized Control v. Decentralized Control

Centralized control

- **▼ TPFFD execution**
- **∠** Air Tasking Orders
- Air Defense Zones
- **Z** Rules of Engagement


Ø ...



Decentralized control

- **∠** Commander's intent
- **∠** Areas of Operation

Ø ...



Concentration of Forces v. Dispersion of Forces

Concentration of forces

- **∠** Focus combat power
- **∠** Seize key objectives



Examples:

Dispersion of forces

- **∠** Reduce target profile



Examples:

- ▲ Afghanistan, 2001
- **∠Iraqi Insurgency**




Knowledge v. Ignorance: Decision Makers Must Act with Imperfect Information

Knowledge

- Drawn from credible information about
 - **∠** Friendly forces
 - **∠** Enemy forces
- **∠** Acquired from many sources

Examples from OIF:

- **∠** Enemy weapons
- **∠** Enemy tactics
- **∠** Weather forecasts



Ignorance

- **∠** Unacquired information
- ∠ Incorrect information

Examples from OIF:

- ∠ Hussein's location
- Absence of WMD
- ∠ Persistence of Baath militias and irregulars
- ∠ Delays caused by sand storms





Decision Makers at Different Levels Face Both Common and Different Considerations

- ∠ Achieve national objectives
- **∠** Direct ISR capabilities

- **∠** Resources
- **∠** Operational environments
- **∠** Time frames










Decision Makers At All Levels Must Direct, Manage, and Exploit Their Information Sources

- Exploit information through timely execution








All Decision Makers Must Instill a Common Understanding Among Subordinates

Mission and objectives

∠Operational environment

Intent

...appropriate to the level of operations and local conditions






All Decision Makers Must Be Able To Integrate or Collaborate With Other Organizations

- **∠**Defense organizations
 - **EX** Combatant Commands
 - ✓ Services
 - **∠** Defense agencies
- **∠Other departments and agencies**
 - **∠** Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security


 - **CIA**
 - Ø ...
- **∠**Coalition partners
- **Munited Nations**
- **∠**Non-governmental Agencies
- **∠**Local governments and police





The Operational Environment is Dynamic; Command Must be Dynamic

- **∠** C2 is influenced by the operational environment
- ∠ C2 varies over time and levels of war



The C2 Concept

Salient Features

The JHU APL C2 Concept:

- Acknowledges the complexity and diversity of conflicts/crises the interaction of opposing considerations within unique operational environments
- **Contemplates the full spectrum of military activities**
 - **∠** Presence, peacekeeping, and armed conflict
 - **∠** Coalition and interagency operations
- Assumes that future C2 must integrate emerging operating concepts with emerging technologies in four key areas:
 - **Advanced Situational Awareness/Understanding**
 - **∠** Decision Making
 - **∠** Planning



Situational Awareness: Decision Makers Will Want to Manage It

- **Current concepts assume:**
 - **∠**That a common picture translates into common understanding
 - That common understanding is always a good thing
- **∠**Decision Makers will want to manage the picture they develop for their subordinates and superiors
 - **∠** For reasons of time and efficiency
 - **∠** For reasons of operational security
 - **∠** For the purposes of deceiving the enemy
 - For coalition and interagency operations that demand discretion and lower levels of classification
- ∠Depending upon how it is implemented, a "common operating picture" will influence concepts of authority, command, and organizational structure



The Concept for Advanced Situational Awareness/Understanding

- - **∠**Shared awareness of the battlespace
 - **∠** Enable users to rapidly develop a clear understanding of the situation in the battlespace

∠Leverage information

- **∠** Find, and fuse relevant information
- **∠** Reduce or eliminate poor-quality data
- **∠** Characterize the confidence level of the data portrayed
- **∠**Present the right information to users at the right time
- **∠**Visualize information at multiple security levels
- **≤** Support derivation of situational understanding




The Concept for Advanced Situational Awareness/Understanding (Cont'd)

- **∠Compress into fewer, tailorable displays what is currently provided on multiple devices**
 - Adaptable to the specific user's environment (e.g., fighting position, cockpit, headquarters,...)
 - **∠**User-selected or tailored formats and media
- Exploit a cognitive interface between commanders at all echelons



Guiding Principle: Decision Authority Must Match Access to Relevant Information



Matched:

Decision Authority has access to relevant information

Example: Allocating theater air power based on theater-level ISR

Mismatched:

Decision Authority does not have access to relevant information

Example: Allocating close air support without knowing current tactical situation

Example: Late reaction to levy breech in New Orleans



The Concept for Decision Making

- **∠Foster distributed, collaborative decision making across echelons, services, agencies and coalitions**
- Adapt to individual decision-making styles ("stylized" decision aids)
 - ∠Utilize a profile of the user's behavior and cognitive process, based on their demonstrated information requirements, as well as their specification of criteria and preferences to facilitate the development, selection, and presentation of options
 - ≤ Support diverse user environments and operating conditions



The Concept for Decision Making (Cont'd)


- ∠Provide a very rapid means for conducting the assessment component of the decision-making process, a process that includes a comparison of the current situation to the expected state and the projected state of both friendly and enemy forces iteratively throughout planning and execution



Planning and Execution: Decision Makers Must Be Both Reactive and Proactive

Proactive

- Used against an easily anticipated enemy
- ∠Normally requires information superiority



Reactive

- Used against an enemy that defies templating
- A sound approach when information is scarce
- **⊘**Often the precursor to or successor to proactive measures

DECIDE - DETECT - DELIVER

DETECT - DECIDE - DELIVER

A dynamic Command Concept must not default to one or the other...but facilitate both



The Concept for Planning

- ∠Define Command relationships dynamically, based on changing circumstances: who is supported, who is supporting, ...
- **∠**Analyze and predict the consequences of courses of action
 - **∠**Rapid means to quantify potential outcomes
 - **∠**Perform sensitivity analysis
- Reduce manpower requirements for routine bookkeeping tasks



The Concept for Execution

- Enable the regulation of forces and operating systems
 - Exploit functionality common to entities (maintain situational awareness, receipt of instructions, formulation of instructions, dispatch of instructions, etc.)
- **∠**Foster dynamic communities of interest
- **∠**Incorporate both the control of sensors and the integration of sensor output as part of C2 capability
- **∠**Anticipate and adapt to changing conditions
 - Forecast and report changes in friendly, enemy, or environmental conditions
 - **∠**Identify variances in performance from the Commander's concept of operation
- **∠**Degrade gracefully (maintain essential functionality)



Summary: Empower Decision Makers

Future C2 systems must support the ability to:

- **∠Gain and maintain Situational Awareness/Understanding**
- Enable decision making in diverse operational environments
- Enable distributed, collaborative decision making across echelons, services, agencies and coalitions
- ∠ Define relationships dynamically, based on changing circumstances
- **∠**Support the interaction of dynamic communities of interest

