



Quadrennial Defense Review Results

SO/LIC Symposium
March 15, 2006

Introduction

- ❑ A wartime QDR: conducted during 4th year of a “long war”**

- ❑ 20 year look – must prevail in current war and also prepare for wider range of challenges**


- ❑ Twin imperatives of review:**
 - Continue reorientation of capabilities to address asymmetric challenges (more irregular, catastrophic and disruptive in character)...
 - ...while changing the Defense enterprise to support and accelerate that reorientation

- ❑ Interim product in continuum of transformation**

Fighting a Long War – Lessons Learned

- ❑ **Capitalized on lessons learned from operational experiences of the past 4 yrs in an age of uncertainty and unpredictability**
- ❑ **“Long war”**
 - Prolonged irregular conflict (Afghanistan and Iraq)
 - Wider irregular operations “long war” (Philippines, Horn of Africa, Georgia, Pan-Sahel, elsewhere)
 - Humanitarian (tsunami, Pakistani earthquake) and anticipatory actions (Haiti, Liberia)
 - Operations in support of civil authorities at home (9/11, Katrina)
- ❑ **Key lessons from these operations informed QDR – importance of**
 - Uncertainty and unpredictability
 - Building partnership capacity – indirect approach and enabling others
 - Early anticipatory measures
 - Unity of effort

QDR Objective – Shift in Focus



Continuing the reorientation of military capabilities and implementing enterprise-wide reforms to ensure structures and process support the President and the warfighter

Implications

- ❑ **Irregular Warfare**
- ❑ **Special Operations Forces**
- ❑ **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)**
 - From “Find – Fix – FINISH” to “FIND – FIX – Finish”
- ❑ **Achieving Unity of Effort**
 - For complex interagency operations abroad

Implications: Irregular Warfare

- ❑ General purpose forces will take on many tasks that Special Operations Forces currently perform (e.g., foreign military training missions)
- ❑ Reorganizing Army combat and support forces into modular brigade-based units will increase breadth and depth for the long war
 - Increased capabilities to conduct time-sensitive operations by fusing intelligence and operations at the tactical level
 - Increased numbers of Joint Tactical Air Controllers to achieve greater ground-air integration
- ❑ Greater emphasis on language and cultural understanding
- ❑ Converting four SSBNs to stealthy SOF platforms

Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat



Implications: Special Operations Forces

- ❑ **Key initial investments in greater SOF capabilities and capacity starting in FY07**
- ❑ **Grow overall SOF components by 15%, with targeted increases:**
 - **Increase Army Special Forces battalions by one-third**
 - **Expand PSYOPS, Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel (33% increase)**
- ❑ **Increase SEAL Team force levels to conduct direct action missions**
- ❑ **Establish a SOF UAV squadron to provide organic capabilities to locate and target enemies**
- ❑ **Establish a Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with 2,600 personnel**

SOF will increase their capacity to perform more demanding and specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect, and clandestine operations in sensitive environments and denied areas



Implications: ISR

- ❑ **Shifting emphasis: From “Find – Fix – FINISH” to “FIND – FIX – Finish”**
- ❑ **Expand capabilities and capacity of defense human intelligence to penetrate terrorist networks**
- ❑ **Increase MASINT and to identify enemy WMD and their delivery systems**
- ❑ **Increase investments in UAVs: double current orbit capacity**
 - **Identify and track moving targets in denied areas**
- ❑ **Implement a new imagery intelligence approach focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities**
 - **Investments in moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar capabilities, including Space Radar**

The ability of the future force to establish an “unblinking eye” over the battle space through persistent surveillance will be key to conducting effective joint operations.



Implications: Achieving Unity of Effort

- ❑ **Enabling complex interagency operations abroad**
 - **Many USG agencies possess skills needed to perform critical tasks, but they are often not chartered or resourced for deployability**
 - **Department of Defense tends to be the *default responder***
- ❑ **QDR recommendations....the Department will:**
 - **Support increased resources for State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability**
 - **Support broader Presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the best-suited agencies to respond**
 - **Strengthen DoD's mechanisms for interagency coordination**
 - **Improve DoD's ability to assess security cooperation activities and enable resource allocation decisions**
 - **Strengthen DoD Regional Centers in support of overall USG outreach**

Other agencies' capabilities and performance often play a critical role in allowing the Department of Defense to achieve its mission



Back-up: Refined Force Planning Construct

Construct for shaping the future force


- ❑ **Steady-state & surge operations**
 - Homeland Defense
 - Irregular Warfare
 - Conventional Campaigns

- ❑ **Tailored Deterrence**
 - Advanced military competitors, rogue states, terrorist networks
 - Strengthened deterrence against opportunistic aggression/coercion

- ❑ **Two-war capacity**
 - Varying levels of effort
 - Stress-on-the-force elasticity

Steady State

Surge



Sizing Variables:

Frequency	Number	Scale / Intensity
Concurrency	Ops Risks	Duration
Policy	Environment	Partner Capabilities

Way Ahead

- Applying QDR strategic direction to FY08-13 future year defense program**
- Managing implementation – 100+ action items under direction of DSD/VCJCS**
- Execution Roadmaps**
- Outreach efforts and consultative agenda**
 - Put in place capabilities for next generation of leaders