



# The Quest for Practical DFSS (Design-for-Six-Sigma) Tools

## PGMM Case Study

Doug Storsved and James Kalberer  
ATK Advanced Weapons Division

NDIA Systems Engineering Conference  
26 October 2006  
San Diego, California

# PGMM Precision Guided Mortar Munition



PGMM Overview

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## XM395 PGMM

Precision Guided Mortar Munition



- **Swift, ballistic flight to target** – no midcourse guidance – laser guidance in terminal phase
- **Few moving parts** – high reliability in high-G gun environment
- **Accurate** – simple, responsive thruster control
- **Lethal** – large warhead overmatches all PGMM targets




# PGMM Cartridge – Simple, Rugged, and Precise



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
- **Modular Design**
- **Simple Interconnect**
- **Few Moving Parts**
- **Mature Subsystems**

# PGMM Operational Elements



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PGMM Incapacitates Personnel Protected by:  
Masonry Structures,  
Earth/Timber Bunkers, or  
Light Armor Vehicles

# PGMM Video



PGMM Overview

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
★ [Click Here to Play Video](#)

# Wisdom for a Quest



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The Best Design  
is the Simplest  
One That Works

Plan what is difficult  
while it is easy;  
do what is great  
while it is small.

Excerpted from *The Art of War/Sun Tzu*,  
Copyright 1991 by Thomas Cleary, Shambhala




Peter F. Drucker

“**Effectiveness** is the foundation of success – **efficiency** is a minimum condition for survival after effectiveness has been achieved. Effectiveness is doing the right things. Efficiency is doing things right.”

“Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service, to improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs.”

Excerpted from *Out of the Crisis*, Copyright 1986 by the W. Edwards Deming Institute



# Six Sigma & Lean Enterprise Model for PGMM



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DFSS,  
CDOV

Lean Design,<sup>TM</sup>  
DFA

Improve  
Effectiveness

Improve  
Efficiency

Lean  
Manufacture



Avoid  
Problems

Fix  
Problems

Six Sigma,  
DMAIC

DFSS: Design For Six Sigma  
 DFA: Design for Assembly  
 CDOV: Conceive, Design, Optimize, Verify  
 VOC: Voice of the Customer  
 DMAIC: Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control

# Design for Assembly (DFA)



Design for Assembly

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


## Design for Assembly



Analyze and penalize any non-value added process

Aggressively eliminate unnecessary parts or processes at the earliest stages of the design




Penalize

Penalize

Penalize


### Pre-DFA Workshop

>2000 Parts



### Current PGMM Design

470 Parts



## Benefit: 20% Reduction in Product Cost

“Companies that implemented some form of DFA report significant savings. Part count is typically reduced **10-40%**, bringing down material and inventory costs with it. Assembly time falls **20-90%** and thus labor costs also come down. Reliability and servicability improve. Total costs fall by at least **20-50%**.”

*Design for Competitiveness, Advance copy by Bart Huthwaite*

“DFMA survey by Galorath Inc. discovered that more than half of the respondents say **10 to 20%** savings when they used DFMA at the design stage.”

*Design News, 16 August 1999*





## Objectives

1. Vigorously apply several DFSS tools to the PGMM (Precision Guided Mortar Munition) program
2. Refine and evaluate the tools (provide lessons learned, resource planning guides)
3. Support timely execution of major PGMM program milestones (SRR, SDR, PDR)


DFSS Tool	Status	ATK Technical Excellence Standard
Stakeholder Analysis	Complete	2. Data Based Decision Making
Operational Crosswalk	Complete	3. Consideration of System-Level Issues and Interactions
Requirements Discovery and Management	Complete	1. Requirements Defined and Tracked
QFD (Quality Functional Deployment)	Complete	3. Consideration of System-Level Issues and Interactions
FMEA (Failure Modes Effects Analysis)	In-Process	3. Consideration of System-Level Issues and Interactions
System-Wide Defects Tracking	In-Process	2. Data Based Decision Making
Producibility Scorecard	In-Process	7. World Class Process Control at ATK and our Suppliers

# Traditional Approach to Product Development



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## \* Studies at TRW:

- 54% of all defects are detected after development testing
- 45% of these defects are requirement defects

## Recent Program at ATK

- 44% of defects were detected after subsystem testing
- 62% of all defects were requirement defects

*Design for Competitiveness, Advance copy by Bart Huthwaite*

1

Slide 10

Project

**CONTRACTOR**


# New Approach to Product Development



Project Approach

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*DFSS/Lean Six Sigma  
Initiatives/Project*



# Interdisciplinary Cross-Functional Project Team



Project Approach

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## Team of 19 Peers

- Planned the Project
- Reviewed Approaches
- Participated in Exercises
- Evaluated Process

## ATK Cross-Functional Engineering Team

ATK  
PGMM  
Program  
IPT Leads

US Army  
IPT Leads

PGMM Technical Director  
Systems CPT Lead  
Analysis, Software, Simulation IPT Lead  
Nose Assembly IPT Lead  
Midbody Assembly IPT Lead  
Tail Assembly IPT Lead  
Systems Software, HIL  
Weapon Integration, Logistics IPT Lead  
Munition Integration & Test CPT Lead

ARDEC – System Performance Specification  
OPM Mortars – Test & Evaluation  
ARDEC – Test & Evaluation

	Systems Engineering	Analysis & Simulation	Systems Design	Mechanical Design	Software Design	Electrical Design	Manufacturing	Business Development	Subcontracts	Project Advisor	Project Advisor
ATK PGMM Program IPT Leads											
US Army IPT Leads											
PGMM Technical Director											
Systems CPT Lead	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Analysis, Software, Simulation IPT Lead	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Nose Assembly IPT Lead	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Midbody Assembly IPT Lead	Green	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Tail Assembly IPT Lead	Green	Green	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Systems Software, HIL	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Weapon Integration, Logistics IPT Lead	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
Munition Integration & Test CPT Lead	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
ARDEC – System Performance Specification	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
OPM Mortars – Test & Evaluation	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
ARDEC – Test & Evaluation	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

ATK Technical Standard

Peer review process

# Stakeholder Analysis



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
Database Information	Database Example
Interest Category	Seeker Subsystem
Organization	US Industry
Stakeholder	BAE Systems
Location	Nashua, NH
Role	SAL Seeker Supplier
Motivation	Expand SAL Seeker Product Base
Level of Support [+3 For, -3 Against]	3
Level of Influence [+5 High, +1 Low]	2
Stakeholder Effect	6
Strategic Action	--

## Lessons Learned

- This tool has utility for Program Managers, Business Development teams, and Engineering leadership
- Database protects against knowledge base turnover
- Helps to ensure that no stakeholder's interest is ignored – develops complete set of stakeholders



## P Diagram



ATK Technical Standard

Data-Based Decision Making



## Light Forces

## Heavy Mechanized Forces

- MFCS – Mortar Fire Control System
- MMS - Mortar Mission Setter
- Mortar Extraction Tool
- LRRS \_ Loose Round Restraint System
- Helicopter Transport
- Vehicle Weapon Racks
- Autoloaders/Breechloaders

FCS NLOS-M  
(Future)

Stryker  
BCT-MC  
Soltam Vb  
(Current)

Dismounted  
M120 Mortar  
(Current)

Dismounted  
M120 Mortar  
(Future)

M1064A3  
Mortar Carrier  
M121 Mortar  
(Current)

Palletized  
Mortar Rounds

# Requirements Discovery




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# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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




# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Developer's  
Capability**

**User's  
Need**

**Requirements Bridge  
the Gap Between the  
User's Need and  
Developer's  
Capability**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Which  
Conflicting  
Requirement  
Takes  
Precedence?**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Incomplete  
Requirements  
Can Leave You  
Hanging**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Unwanted  
Features Can  
Creep Into a  
Design**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Unnecessary  
Requirements  
Add to Product  
Cost and Risk**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Challenge  
Unnecessary  
Design  
Constraints**

# Requirement Discovery Process – An Allegory



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**Clear, Concise,  
Consistent  
Requirements  
Support a  
Product That  
Exactly Matches  
the User Need**

**Developer's  
Capability**

# Performance Requirements Walkthrough



Requirements Discovery

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Requirements Walkthrough

Consolidated Walkthrough Review

## 3.3.5.2 KPP 2 - Lethality

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Verbatim from Customer Performance Specification



Verbatim from Customer Performance Specification





# Performance Requirements Walkthrough



Requirements Discovery

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Requirements Walkthrough

Consolidated Walkthrough Review

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Information Capture Directly from Customer

Information Capture Directly from Customer

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Feedback To Customer From Contractor

Notes to Formulate Action Plan

# Requirements Walkthrough Statistics



Requirements Discovery


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Customer Priorities	129 Non-ENV REQ	70 ENV REQ	199 Total REQ
Mission/Safety Critical	39	52	91
Useful	85	18	103
Desireable	5	0	5
Non-Negotiable	89	68	157
Negotiable	39	2	41
Flexible	1	0	1
Unlikely to Change	118	72	190
May Change	7	0	7
Most Likely to Change	2	0	2


## Criticality

2/3 Non-Critical


129 Non-Environmental Requirements



70 Environmental Requirements






199 Total Requirements






## Tradeoffs

3/10 Negotiable




## Stability

8% May Change



## Contractor Feedback (64 Issues)



- The PGMM Performance Specification was very well written by OP-Mortars, USAIC, and ARDEC
- Only 64 issues ( 32% of 199 requirements)
- The 64 issues spawned 58 Actions (9 of which were critical).

# Clear, Quantitative Requirements

## Earth And Timber Bunkers [Req-Id = 13708-2]

The cartridge shall defeat earth and timber bunkers (collapse) or incapacitate (30-second defense casualty criterion) a two-man, randomly located team within a structure as defined by TM 30-78 given a two-round or less engagement.

*Rationale: The ability to efficiently defeat the threat soldiers protected by bunkers allows the maneuver commander to keep his soldiers from defeating this threat using traditional direct fires systems. The precision effects from the PGMM will significantly reduce the large numbers of HE mortar rounds/field artillery rounds being fired as stated in the PGMM AoA which reduces the logistical resupply requirements dramatically. PGMM will reduce collateral damage due to the decrease of actual mortar and artillery rounds required to accomplish the same mission using HE.*

## Maximum Range [Req-Id = 13717-2]

The cartridge shall engage targets from the mortar system as far as 7200m (gun-to-target line impact measurement per TOP 3-2-825) in nominal weather defined by standard meteorological data at sea level (temperature = 15°C; pressure = 1013 millibars; no precipitation; no wind; no humidity; and air density = 1225 grams per cubic meter).

*Rationale: Current mortar munitions have a maximum range of 7.2 km. Giving the PGMM the ability to reach 7.2 km allows the force commander to accurately engage targets throughout the area of operations at current range capabilities without changing current tactics and procedures to accommodate shorter-range munitions.*

## MFCS Link [Req-Id = 15280-2]

The cartridge shall link to the MFCS Commander's Interface via the Mortar Mission Setter (MMS).

*Rationale: The current and Future forces will depend heavily on digital systems to integrate and control fires in support of the maneuver commander. The future MBCs, MFCSs, and UA FCS network will be digitally linked for situational awareness (SA) and fire support information. The PGMM may receive target information directly from those systems without additional user input.*


- Excerpted from PGMM PIDS
- Managed in Teamcenter Requirements

# Requirements Discovery - Results


REQUIREMENTS DISCOVERY

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## Resource Planning Hours per Specification



Hours include: Requirements Discovery, Flowdown, Development, Management and Audits up to PDR where the specifications were baselined and put under formal configuration control.



## Potential Benefits

- Fewer Revisions to Specifications during the requirement development phase
- Clear understanding of the customer's requirements and rationale
- Eliminates unneeded requirements

## Lessons Learned

- Publish and Maintain an Operational Concept and System Diagrams
- System Requirements should be 90% mature by SDR
- Rationale statements expose bad assumptions and improve requirement quality
- A requirements management tool reduces requirement development time
- Have a configuration management process in place by SDR
- Conduct requirements audits before specifications are released to formal configuration control

ATK Technical Standard

Clear Requirement Understanding

# Accomplishment - Requirement Reduction



REQUIREMENTS DISCOVERY

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## Reduced Customer Requirements

- 199 "SHALL" requirements in US Army SPS (System Performance Specification)
  - Deleted 17 requirements (8.5%)
  - Relaxed another 5 requirements (2.5%)
- } 11%

## Significance

- **Eliminated** requirement to meet safety and reliability performance for one environmental requirement (unnecessary)
- **Relaxed** a second environmental requirement to be met in an in-package, un-powered condition rather than in an un-packaged, powered condition
- Avoided fuze redesign cost of ~\$300K to safely reset after exposure to the second environment
- Avoided special testing at government facility to verify redesign
- Eliminated the second environment potential non-compliance from risk register


# PGMM Requirements Audit and Defect Tracking



REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT

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## Process




## Results


- 946 System and subsystem requirements audited
- 46% had at least 1 potential defect
- 87% of potential defects realized a change to the requirement

### PGMM System and Subsystem Requirements Audit

Percent of Requirements with Defects by Type



Requirement Defects	Examples
Incorrect Information	Incorrect Test Standard Incorrect Paragraph Reference Incorrect Environmental Levels
Omissions	Missing Test Standard Missing Requirement Missing Verification
Ambiguities	More Than One Interpretation
Poorly Written	Multiple Subsystems in One Requirement Spelling and Grammar Requirement Not Clear
Misplaced	Requirement in Wrong Section Requirement Applied to Wrong Subsystem



Requirements  
Discovery

[SRR]

[SDR]

ATK Technical Standard

Early elimination of deficiencies

Requirements  
are Understood

Design Reflects  
Requirements

Re  
Data

# Quality Functional Deployment (QFD)



Quality Functional Deployment

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House of Quality  
Exercise Completed  
27 Jan 2005

~42 x ~150 = ~6300 Evaluations

**9** Mission/Safety Critical

**3** Useful

**1** Desirable or Deleted

**9** Critical Subsystem

**3** Necessary Subsystem

**1** Helps Satisfy Requirement

System Performance Requirements

Critical Subsystem for Meeting Requirement or Requirement Drives Subsystem Design

Seq	Category	Paragraph	Priority	Title	Requirement	Length	Weight	Extraction Feed	Cartridge	Package Cartridge		FWD	SAL	SEU	GAC	GAC SW	New Protocol	MM	Washed Any	CTM	Tumbukin	Boat/Bloom Any	Fire Acc	Oblaster	Ignition Cartridge	Propellant Charge	Motorpack	Nose Damage	Propellant Charge Cover	Pallet	Pallet Adapter	Pallet Damage	IM Damage	Mission Settle H/W	Mission Settle SW	MFC5 HW	MFC5 SW	
										Fuel	SAF																											SA
1	1	Liberty	3.3.5.1	9	KPP 1 - Precision																																	
1	2	Liberty	3.3.5.2	9	KPP 2 - Liberty		9		9																													
2	4	Range	3.3.5.3	9	Minimum Range																																	
2	7	Range	3.3.5.3	9	Maximum Range																																	
2	8	Range	3.3.5.3	9	Range Overlay																																	
3	9	Compatibility	3.3.1	9	XM205 Design																																	
3	10	Compatibility	3.3.3	9	XM205 Firing Procedures																																	
3	11	Compatibility	3.3.4	9	Lower Compatibility																																	
3	12	Compatibility	3.3.5.4	9	KPP 4 - Compatibility																																	
3	13	Compatibility	3.3.5.1	9	Maximum Chamber Pressure																																	
3	14	Compatibility	3.3.5.2	3	No Damage to Motor / Tube																																	
3	15	Compatibility	3.4.11.4	3	Compatibility with Material Handling Equipment																																	
3	16	Compatibility	3.5.10.1	3	Special Tools																																	
3	17	Compatibility	3.5.10.2	3	Maintenance and Support Equipment																																	

ATK Technical Standard


System-Level Interactions



# QFD, DFA Flagged Nose Protector

Quality Functional Deployment

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- QFD characterized nose protector as a net liability in meeting requirements.

Spec	Requirement	Customer Priority	Nose Protector		
			Protect SAL Window	Survive Environments	Aero-dynamically Separate After Launch
3.5.11.4	Training	3	1		
3.3.2	Weather Conditions	9	1		
3.6.5	Corrosion, Sand, Dust, Fungus	9	1		
3.3.6	Finish (non-reflective, corrosion resistant...)	3	3		
3.5.11	Visual Identification	3	3		
3.6.8	Temperature (operating, transport, storage)	9		(1)	
3.5.7.4	Propellant Burning Embers	3		(1)	
3.6.2	Safe to Handle & Fire - Temperature	9		(9)	
3.5.8.2	Short Rounds	9			(9)
3.5.8.3	Cartridge Parts Separation	3			(9)
			39	(93)	(108)
			<b>Overall Effect</b>		<b>(162)</b>

- Two DFA Sessions tried to eliminate this ugly baby
- Finally, optical window testing at supplier characterized SAL sensor performance with smears and scratches typical of handling – confirmed low risk in elimination
- Cost Avoidance:** Aerodynamic flight testing at Yuma to confirm separation ~\$100K

# Quality Functional Deployment (QFD) - Results

Quality Functional Deployment

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
## Potential Benefits

- Check for Extraneous Design Features
- Identify Critical Features
  - Satisfies multiple requirements
  - Satisfies critical requirements
- Relate Conflicting Requirements
- “Voice of the Product” Feedback
- Demonstrates Design Compliance
- Organization for Requirement Flowdown
- Communicates Design to Whole Team

## Lessons Learned

- Most of the benefits are realized with construction of the first HOQ
- Need to map key requirements to key features
- Size to a manageable HOQ matrix
- Mapping to subsystem is too coarse
- Early application can help direct concept trades

## Key Subsystems



## Resource Planning

- QFD Cost ~100 contractor engineering hours
- Average ~ 1 hour per 6x10 evaluation

ATK Technical Standard


System-Level Interactions

# Design for Six Sigma Tool Phasing



Project Summary

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# Quest for Practical DFSS Tools Summary



Project Summary

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**Objective:** Vigorously apply DFSS tools to PGMM, refine and evaluate them, establish metrics for defect tracking

**Approach:** Interdisciplinary cross-functional project team for framing approach, burden project funding; applied ATK Technical Excellence Standards with good results.

- ☑ **Project Objectives Met:** Tools applied, lessons learned, planning guidelines defined, defect tracking established
- ☑ **Major PGMM Program Milestones Met:** SRR, SDR, and PDR were held on schedule, within budget, and with high quality
- ☑ **Simplification Achieved:** Eliminated or relaxed 11% of US Army system performance requirements; cost avoidance well over \$450K
- ☑ **Forged Strong Customer Relationship:** DFSS Tool application facilitated communication across the design team



# Questions?



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