



DoD Research Challenges for the Next Decade

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Key Technology Enablers for the Evolving Threat Space

Preparing human terrain

- **Social/cultural dynamics modeling**
- **Automated language processing**
- **Rapid training/learning methods/aids**

Ubiquitous observation

- **Day/night all-weather wide area surveillance**
- **Close-in sensor and tagging systems**
- **Soldiers-as-sensors**


Contextual exploitation

- **Mega-scale data management**
- **Situation dependent info extraction**
- **Human/system collaboration**

Scalable effects delivery


- **Consequence-modeled decision making**
- **Information ops**
- **Time critical fires**
- **WMD mitigation**

Computer: Yesterday and Today




- Computation of static functions in a static environment, with well-understood specification
- Computation is its main goal
- Single agent
- Batch processing of text and homogeneous data
- Stand-alone applications
- Binary notion of correctness
- Adaptive systems operating in environments that are dynamic and uncertain
- Communication, sensing, and control just as important
- Multiple agents that may be cooperative, neutral, adversarial
- Stream processing of massive, heterogeneous data
- Interaction with humans is key
- Trade off multiple criteria

Today's World



Ubiquitous communication, cheap computation, overwhelming data, and scarce human resource

Technology Research Challenges




Environment

High tempo
Enormous data loads
Civilian clutter
Deep hide threats

Wicked problems
Unstructured environments
Cultural interaction
High consequence

Challenge 1: *Human-like Interfaces*




- Interacting with computation should be as natural as interacting with people.



- **Human-like interfaces need to be:**
 - modality-opportunistic
 - modality-agnostic
 - non-distracting
 - symmetrically-multimodal
 - mixed-initiative
 - multi-lingual

Human-like Interfaces Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond



Today

individual modalities

controlled environments

pre-specified language

pre-specified multimodal interactions

understand structured language

3-5 years

selected combinations

noisy environments

learn new vocabulary interactively

opportunistic use of multimodal interaction

understand conversation

5-10 years

multimodal interaction

uncontrolled environments

learn new vocabulary by example


adapting opportunistically to modalities available

non-distracting interaction with a teammate

Challenge 2: Operate in Foreign Cultures and Coalitions



- ... current and future military operations will require enhanced capability to understand social and cultural “terrains” as well as various dimensions of human behavior.
- Developing broader linguistic capability and cultural understanding is critical.
- The DoD has gaps in software tools and decision aids that will allow U.S. commanders to better understand different cultures.
- The Department must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Chinese. Source: 2006 QDR



Jews Praying at The Wailing Wall





Muslims Praying at the Dome of the Rock




The Ascension of Muhammad

The Binding of Isaac
The Covenant

Key Research Elements



Social & Cultural Operations Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond



Today

Limited ability to understand natural language

Retrieval based on keywords - low precision

Significant gaps in tools for modeling culture

Phraselator

Drill exercises

3-5 years

Robust natural language understanding of topic structure

Retrieval based on semantics - high precision

Models of key stories of culture

Two way translation

Activity translation

5-10 years


Robust understanding of causal structures

Continuously evolving models of culture, values, motivations, preferences

Full dialogue

Immersive, story and dialogue based interactions

Challenge 3: Make Net-Centric Systems Secure and Survivable



Software glitches leave Navy Smart Ship dead in the water

In 1995, the U.S. Navy, on advice from the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC), started a program to research labor and manpower saving ideas. The results of this program, deemed the Smart Ship, are being tested aboard the USS Yorktown. The Navy quickly deemed the program a success in reducing manpower, maintenance and costs. In September of 1997, however, the Yorktown's propulsion system failed. The ship had to be towed to a Naval base at



“Combat information capability” is a **critical defense weapon system.**

- Commercial information technology architecture presents **critical information assurance challenges.**
- ... The system and its capabilities will always be under attack and, as a result, will be **operated in degraded or compromised mode.**
- There is ample evidence that U.S. adversaries have recognized this potential vulnerability and are now aggressively developing doctrine, tactics and technology to **attack this soft underbelly.**



White House Spy Probe Shows Computer Vulnerability

Oct. 6, 2005

The proliferation of computers and network technology has made it a lot easier to create and share vital information. Sometimes, too easy.

Leandro Aragoncillo, a former White House staff member, was arrested last month for allegedly using his top secret security clearance to download

Talk Back


- + Tell us what you think
- + Add new facts
- + Talk straight to the news

Sandia Red Team hacks all computer defenses

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Over the past two years, a group at Sandia National Laboratories known informally as the Red Team has, at customer invitation, either successfully invaded or devised successful mock attacks on 35 out of 35 information systems at various sites, along with their associated security technologies



Comin' at you — Sandia's Red Team




Why Is This Hard?

Harsh Environments




Capable and dedicated opponents


Figure 2.2: Number of Reported Attacks



Source: Defense Information Systems Agency.



Source: Department of Defense.




Mobile and distributed components



Heterogeneous systems




Key Research Elements




1. A highly secure and sustainable computer architecture
2. Model-based self checking and self-healing frameworks
3. Information flow control
4. New algorithms for dynamic distributed systems
5. High performance embedded networked security monitor
6. Abstractions and compilation for emerging multi-cores
7. End-to-end certification of critical infrastructural systems


Secure and sustainable computing
Using hardware enforced integrity




Model based self-checking &
information flow control



High performance
network security
monitor



Secure and Survivable Systems Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond



Today

All COTS systems are vulnerable

Isolated components, serious problems with dynamic distributed systems

No ability to assess overall exposure, low confidence that deployed systems have worked correctly

3-5 years

Modest survivability provided by hand-crafted solutions at single level

Data tagged with provenance and credibility; accountable flow of information.

Reasonable confidence that systems have worked correctly


5-10 years

Systematic survivability, defense in depth

Auditable assurance cases, formal methods and self-checking software and hardware together

High confidence that failures and security attacks have not and will not occur

Challenge 4: Smart Autonomous Surveillance (SAS)



Mexico City



NGA's High-Resolution Terrain Information (HRTI) Test Range



Predator



Global Hawk



Avg. 6 people needed to interpret data from 1 Predator



Avg. 24 people needed to interpret data from 1 Global Hawk



Smart Autonomous Surveillance: from Forensic to Prediction Tools




- Computational cameras
- Coded aperture sensors
- Queuing sensors


- Power and content-aware networking.
- Fusion across modality, time, place, and source

- Change detection
- anomaly alerts
- contextual analysis, integration with historical data,
- prediction

Challenge 5: Robotics for Real



- **Military “robots” today lack autonomy**
 - Currently, many soldiers operate one robot
 - Want few soldiers working with a *team of agile robots*, to achieve *force multiplication* even in *harsh* environments
 - Put fewer soldiers in harm’s way





RQ1-Predator GCS

- **Better robots for monitoring**
 - *Enable* soldiers w/ persistent and pervasive ISR, including from hard to reach places (e.g., inside buildings/caves/bunker networks)
- **Better robots for logistics**
 - *Replace* soldiers in the supply chain with capable autonomous robots and vehicles



Supply-chain task

Key Research Elements



Perception and Awareness

Planning and Reasoning

Manipulation and Control

Communication and Coordination

Vision
Speech
Gesture
Localization
Surround awareness


Uncertainty
Dynamic world
Scale
Prediction

Grasping
Rolling, legged,
flying mobility

Teaming
Coordinated motion

← **Enabling Technical Areas** →

Robotics Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond



Today

Tele-operated, unmanned vehicles used effectively by special forces

Supply chain implemented by human pilots/drivers and loaders/unloaders

Humans interact with robots through joystick interfaces

3-5 years

FCS vehicles in common use, but still require teams of trained personnel

Robotic ground vehicles perform routine supply runs in friendly areas

Humans interact with robots using restricted speech and gesture commands

5-10 years

Autonomous vehicles require minimal supervision, and outperform the best human pilots

Robotic supply chain improves efficiency and surge response, greatly reducing the danger to humans

Humans interact with robots as partners and capable team-mates

Summary

- We are in a much more challenging threat environment
- Success will depend on operating;
 - in high tempo unstructured environments
 - against asymmetric adversaries in deep civilian hide
- A new set of research challenges are before us:

