

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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*Integrity - Service - Excellence*

## **Applying Systems Engineering during Pre-Acquisition Activities**

**NDIA 10th Annual  
Systems Engineering Division Conference  
San Diego, CA  
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# Outline

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- **Need for Early SE**
- **Defining Early SE**
- **SMC Pilot Program**
- **Policy Initiatives**
- **Challenges**
- **Way Forward**



# Why?



***“Systems Engineering is broken; go fix it.”***

*Attributed to SecAF James Roche, spring 2002*

**Lack of systems engineering has been cited as the cause of major defense acquisition program failures**

Cost overruns, schedule slips, mishaps, external criticism, instability in requirements and funding, poor acquisition strategies



# The Need

- **RAND Project Air Force study: “Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing?”**

*“... despite the many acquisition reforms and other DoD management initiatives over the years, the development cost growth of military systems has not been reduced.”\**

- **This, however, does not indicate we are necessarily doing badly ...**

*“There is no doubt that the systems developed in each successive decade are more complex than those of the prior decade. The ever-increasing complexity of technology, software density, system integration complexity, and the like make estimating a total system's development cost ... an ever-increasingly challenging endeavor.”\**

- **Increasing complexity has kept stride with increasingly improved acquisition**

\* Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing, 2007, RAND



# Why It's Needed -- Early Decisions Are Key Life Cycle Cost Drivers

## Cumulative LCC

### Cost to Fix

100%

10000X


1000X

100X

10X

X

-  Percent of Baseline LCC Incurred
-  Percent of Baseline LCC Committed
-  Cost to Identify & Resolve a Defect, and Incorporate Change



*Adapted from Boeing study on ICBM Life Cycle Cost, 1973*





# *Defining Early SE*

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## ■ **What it is:**

- **The systems engineering (SE) tie between JCIDS and the AoA ... and beyond**
- **A disciplined process for scoping capability needs and developing concepts**
- **The process required to do the necessary work for a successful AoA**
- **A means to identify candidate technologies and assess the realism for transition**
- **An actual pre-acquisition effort**

## ■ **What it is *not*:**

- **An AoA**
- **"Gaming the system" to favor a solution**



# Pre-Acquisition “Systems Thinking” Boundary Conditions

Pre-Acquisition SE efforts, like those throughout the rest of the life cycle, are essentially an “integrating function”

■ Pre-A SE mainly occurs in two domains, each with set boundaries

➤ The first SE domain spans the period from JCIDS initiation of a need to AoA entrance:

$$\int_{\text{JCIDS}}^{\text{AoA Entrance}} F_1(\text{SE})d\text{SE}$$

➤ The second domain continues the SE functions after the AoA until formal program handoff:

$$\int_{\text{AoA Exit}}^{\text{Program Initiation}} F_2(\text{SE})d\text{SE}$$

■ The SE functions in both domains are fundamentally similar, but there are attributes unique to each



# *Pre-Acquisition Example*

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**Capability need: “Get people and equipment across a body of water”**

- **First pass asks key questions:**
    - What does “water” mean? (Solution sets will be very different for Piscataway Creek, the Potomac River, and the Pacific Ocean.)
    - Are there any obvious constraints? (Sensitivity to water exposure? Time-in-transit limitations?)
  - **Initial analysis should yield various methods, and a cost / risk summary for each**
    - Airlift
    - Bridge
    - Catapult (unsuitable for people)
    - Drive across (depends on depth, current, etc.)
    - Drive around (depends on total distance, thus time)
    - Ferry
    - Helicopter
    - Tunnel
  - **Analysts should also be able to quickly rule out candidates that don't meet constraints**
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




# Pre-Acquisition Example (cont)

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
- Parametric trades **within a method** (bridge, tunnel, etc.) consider how relevant factors (depth, width, current, etc.) affect a baseline candidate solution
  - “A mile upstream the channel is narrower. The shorter span means ~30% less material cost, but road access and construction staging are difficult.”
  - “A mile downstream the current is slower. The longer span means ~20% more material cost, but you can complete construction earlier.”
- Once the AoA looks at **families of candidates** and concludes that a bridge is the best solution, a similar process is employed to determine the optimum type (cantilever, suspension, pontoon, single- or two-span draw, etc.)
- Pre-AoA measures are high-level programmatic / operational parameters (cost, schedule, vehicle capacity, etc.)
- Post-AoA measures have a more traditional design and execution focus (EVM, weight, material durability, etc.)






# *SE Applied to a Product or System*

## *Transforming Requirements to Design*





# SE Applied to a Capability “Requirements Engineering”






# ***SMC Pilot Program***

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- **Modeled after test case developed for a relatively cheap, ill-defined launcher**
- **Study commissioned by SAF/AQR**
  - **Objective: Develop and validate a concept development systems engineering process & guide**
  - **Identify barriers to success in concept development**
- **Used standard systems engineering tenets as a baseline**
- **Modified for future concept development efforts**
- **Currently validating and documenting**



# SMC Concept Development Process V-Chart





# ***NRC Pre-A SE Study***

## ***Co-Chairs: Dr Kaminski, Gen (ret) Lyles***

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### **TASKS**

- **Assess the contribution of pre-A SE on Air Force programs**
- **Determine level of pre-A SE required for program success**
- **Determine current barriers to pre-A implementation, both on concepts leading to an AoA and for the post-AoA selected alternative(s)**
- **Develop a framework/methodology for developmental organizations to ensure proper pre-A SE is accomplished**
- **Recommend changes to enable adequate pre-A SE, and the means for seamless transition from need identification through program office standup**

### **STATUS**

- **Study committee received approx 30 formal briefings**
- **Committee members currently conducting analyses and writing assigned sections of report**
- **Anticipate start of peer review Jun 07**
- **Public release of final report anticipated Nov 07**



# *AF Early SE Policy Initiatives*

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
**“Nothing in the world is more important than policy!” \***

- **“Fixing” SE in the pre-Acquisition world requires a two-pronged approach**
  - Acquisition policy -- DoD 5000.2, 63 series AFIs
  - Requirements policy -- JCIDS, AFI 10-601
- **Current policies *encourage* acquisition and requirements to coordinate, but do not have hooks to *force* working together**
- **Islands of success exist, but tend to be personality/ experience driven**
- **Opportunities exist to slip early acquisition community SE involvement into the requirements process**

*\* Lt Col Mark Wilson, Policy Branch Chief, 19 Oct 07*



# SE and Technical Planning in Pre-Program Concept Development








# Challenges

- **Begins with a “R”, rhymes with “forces”**
  - Experience “bathtub” (lots of folks with <5 or >20 years, not much in between)
  - Not a very deep bathtub
- **Minimize project- and personality-dependent MAJCOM/ COCOM coordination**
  - Field users drive most pre-A capability definition efforts in all four domains (air, space, weapons, C2)
  - User community for C2 products is very IT-savvy; things in the IT world tend to happen very quickly
  - Immediate solutions preferred over rigorous process
- **Understanding of architecture/SoS concerns**
  - Scope is somewhat dependent on domain (more significant for space and C2, less so for aircraft and weapons)
  - Frequent unintended life cycle consequences of “IT now”
- **On the plus side, early SE is not broken -- our people are excellent at what they do**
  - Above challenges dilute effectiveness



# Program Success Factors

*(it ain't all SE's fault!)*



- 50% Politics
- 40% Budget
- 10% Technical & Operational Analysis
  - “50% Politics” translates to “Nothing happens without an acceptable political compromise”
  - “40% Budget” ... pretty much a fact of life
  - “10% Technical & Operational Analysis” can appropriately inform (and influence) the other 90% of the trade space
    - *If* the right team is engaging with the broader stakeholder community
    - *If* those community members are sufficiently objective
  - Concept Development personnel/ organizations must be politically astute

*Courtesy Chris Leak, ASC/XRS*



## *Way Forward*

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- **Complete SMC, ASC pilot programs**
- **Socialize draft policy/guidebook throughout AF product centers (in progress)**
- **Develop forum for 4 product center CD shops to meet/exchange ideas, tools, personnel**
- **Create more stable funding environment for CD efforts**
- **Continuing working with OSD and AF Requirements communities on incorporating early SE into broader policy**



# ***Backup***

