

# Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) Operational Controls and Their Relationship to Process Maturity


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#### The Basic Premise of This Presentation



 Proper preparation and planning makes later phases of the System Development Life Cycle easier to conquer.



NOTE: FISMA is used as a representative standard. Insert the security guidance document of your choice in the context of this presentation.



#### About FISMA



- The Federal Information System Management Act (FISMA)
- Consists of 17distinct families of security requirements
- Mandates quarterly vulnerability reporting and annual progress reports to GAO
- The framework for how to report is left to the interpretation of the parent agency



#### FISMA Control Families



#### **Management Controls**

- Risk Assessment
- Planning
- System and Services Acquisition
- Certification & Accreditation (C&A)


#### **Technical Controls**

- Access Control
- Audit and Accountability
- Identification and Authentication
- System and Communications
   Protection

#### **Operational Controls**

- Awareness and Training
- Configuration Management
- Contingency Planning
- Incident Response
- Maintenance
- Media Protection
- Physical and Environmental Protection
- Personnel Security
- System and Information Integrity


Controls are Complementary and rely on each other for fulfillment





# Relationship among controls







# Operational Controls



- People Oriented
  - Awareness and Training
  - Personnel Security
- Physically Oriented
  - Environmental Controls
  - Media Protection
  - System Integrity
  - Contingency Planning

#### Device Oriented

- Configuration Management
  - Software
  - Firmware
  - Hardware
- Maintenance
  - Routine
  - Emergency
- Incident Response
  - What is an incident?
  - Reactive v. Proactive actions
- System & Information Integrity
  - Is the data corrupted?
  - Is the system image valid?
  - Are they current/accurate?



# Device Oriented Requirements



- Harder to address later in SDLC
- Frequently neglected in development
- Reason:
  - It's hard enough to get the system integrated and working, planning for later operations is left to the student.
- In reality:
  - Planning ahead is the best way to maintain a proactive assurance posture



# Security Objective of Device Controls




- Define and maintain a known, secure state
  - At delivery and ongoing
- Systems are integrated products
  - Each vendor has their own set of quality and security processes
  - Monthly patches, quarterly patches, emergency patches
  - Options are:
    - Working system with vulnerabilities
    - Semi-functioning system without testing
    - Cross your fingers and hope!
      - Everything works with the patch and no testing
      - Nobody tries to exploit the problems before you fix them



#### In the Ideal World





# Process Integration: A Better Way



- CMMI processes already include configuration management and change management
- What they may not include is specific processes associated with security change management
- Risk must be addressed in the process





# Supplemental Guidance



- System Security Engineering CMM
  - Add security relevant functions to standard CMMI activities
  - Incorporation in an organization's standard process framework is an incremental change
- A Caveat:
  - An incremental change that involves careful component management
  - Accounting at a more granular level
    - All the component software entities
    - Protocols, reference standards, etc.

#### Mapping Goals, KPAs and FISMA:



#### **FISMA Control:**

Specifies what must be managed, what artifacts should be produced for the system. Control defines the compliance baseline.

Maps to CMMI KPA

CMMI KPA:
Basic process guidance & structure

Specific Guidance for Security Engineering

#### **SSE-CMM KPA:**

- Manage Configuration of Security Components.
- Assess security impact of change?
- Define change management process
- Assess risk associated with change?
- Document risk decisions



# *Implications*



- Augmentation to existing process means higher probability of organizational acceptance
- Does not imply use of automated techniques: although they are easier with larger systems and global deployments
- Areas for automation:
  - Asset inventory
  - Baseline configuration tracking
  - Vendor notification and update service
  - Deployment tracking



# Further Implications




- Starting process management at authority to operate is too late.
- The baseline is established by then.
- May not have been monitored and upgraded throughout development.
  - It's hard to develop code on a moving target
  - Vulnerabilities may be inadvertently used as part of the system feature set
  - Compromises need to be documented



#### **Basic Flow**



- FISMA families explain what has to be done (tangible product)
- CMMI provides the contextual framework for inclusion of FISMA families in an integrated set of engineering processes
- SSE-CMM defines specific process guidance that helps an organization develop the product





### In Summary




- Exact correspondence will vary:
  - Some organizations won't address all goals.
  - Compensating management controls can be traded against technical controls
- Goal is to define repeatable process:
  - Certification and accreditation required every 3 years
  - Ongoing monitoring requirements on an annual basis
  - Simpler to accommodate the requirements within existing processes
  - SSE-CMM and CMMI provide guidance and placeholders that can facilitate compliance

#### Conclusion



- Starting from a secure foundation is easier than trying to shore up an unsound one.
- Framework for security improvement is already there – but not applied.
- Process maturity dictates that we learn from our experiences and evolve.





#### For More Information



- FISMA:
  - www.csrc.nist.gov

- SSE-CMM:
  - www.issea.org

- CMMI:
  - www.sei.cmu.edu

