# Anatomy of an Award Winning Safety Program: A Case Study of the SSGN OHIO Class Conversion Safety Program

Mike Parulis (for) Thomas Cook




**Ricky Milnarik** 



## SSGN

#### **Ship Characteristics**

Length	560 ft
No. of SOF Personnel	66 to 102
No. of VLS Missiles	Up to 154
DDS/ASDS Capability	Dual
Speed	20+ knots




154 Strike Missile Tomahawk/TACTOM

Dual Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) and Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) Capability

66 Special Operations Forces

Joint Task Force Connectivity

- 154 TOMAHAWK Missiles
- 66 Special Operations Forces (SOF) for more than 60 Days
  - 2 Dry Deck Shelter / Advanced SEAL Delivery System
    - 8 Modular SOF Storage Canisters
      - Battle Management Center:
- Joint Connectivity and Organic Command & Control Capability
  - Communications suite has double the antennas of an SSN
    - SOF Habitability & Training Facilities
    - SEASUB Lock-In/Lock-Out, Ordnance Package






### **SSGN Conversion**



# A NAVSEA (Program Office) Perspective




Mike Parulis for Thomas Cook NAVSEA PMS398T12G

#### Introduction


NAVSEA assembled multi-disciplinary teams that developed and implemented ESOH management programs whose goals were to incorporate life cycle ESOH compliance into design and construction





<sup>\*</sup> ADHOC - Participants as necessary (i.e., NOSSA / WSESRB, Legacy, Shipboard Shock, Packaging, Handling and Transportation)







- MIL-STD-882D requirement
  - Allows flexibility
    - Multiple Government Agencies
    - Prime Shipbuilder Contractor
    - Several other Contractors
  - Each organization has own safety plan
    - All are in accordance with program office plan
    - Each organization plan is tailored for specific "way of doing business"



- Integrated Product Team (IPT) Process
  - Not exactly an IPT process, but encompasses the open communication
    - Open expression of ideas (safety and process)
    - Members encouraged to voice concerns
    - Seeks consensus on programmatic issues and processes
  - Buy-In by the program office, Principal for Safety, and the individual (contractor or government) identifying the Hazard
    - Identification at least three signatures
    - Acceptance at least four signatures



- Performance based Specification instead of detailed requirements
  - As Principal for Safety
    - Insist on end-results
      - Hazards/Impacts identified openly (i.e., don't suppress)
      - Hazards/Impacts mitigated in a consistent manner
        - » Each organization follows the same MIL-STD-882 logic for severity and probability (Initial & Final)
    - Do not dictate manner to reach end-results
      - Analyses conducted by each organization as per their processes



## **NAVSEA Summary**

- Program Support
  - Continuous funding
  - Adequate safety manning
- Safety IPT Independence
- Contributing organizations staffed by experience safety engineers
  - Strategic Systems Programs (e.g., TRIDENT)
  - Naval Undersea Warfare Center
  - Naval Air Systems Command
  - Electric Boat Corporation
  - Numerous Sub-Contractors







## **Electric Boat Corporation**

Electric Boat has been building submarines for the U. S. Navy for over 100 years.

In 1900 Electric Boat delivered the U. S. Navy's first submarine, the USS Holland.



## Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD)

- First used at Electric Boat extensively on the VIRGINIA Class Submarine program in 1994
- Before the IPPD process, a serial approach to submarine design-to-construction was taken.
- The dynamics of the IPPD process is made possible through the use of the Computer Aided Three-Dimensional Interactive Application (CATIA) software design tool to develop electronic mockups.




## Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD)

- Methodology consists of activity-based product management and concurrent engineering Design Build Teams (DBTs).
- Team assignments are structured in accordance with program development and manufacturing needs.



## **Design / Build Teams**

#### A typical DBT makeup is shown below





## **Design / Build Teams**

DBT functional managers / technical leaders have direct management and control of their specific functional areas.







SYSTEM INTEGRATION TEAMS





- Prior to SSGN, System Safety Engineering and Environmental Engineering groups at Electric Boat were not merged into a single Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH) group.
- System Safety and Environmental Engineering were separate parallel processes.
- System Safety and Environmental engineers were in separate locations 7 miles apart.



#### In support of the VIRGINIA Class IPPD process:

- System Safety Engineering conducted traditional MIL-STD-882 hazard analysis reports on identified ship systems.
- Environmental Engineering conducted Design/Build Environmental Analyses (DBEA) on identified ship systems.

SEPARATE PARALLEL PROCESSES



- System Safety Engineering identified potential hazards.
- Environmental Engineering identified potential environmental impacts.

SEPARATE PARALLEL PROCESSES



- System Safety Engineering tracked hazards in an Hazard Tracking List database.
- Environmental Engineering tracked environmental impacts in a DBEA database.

SEPARATE PARALLEL PROCESSES



### **SSGN Conversion**

- In 2001 the SSGN Conversion Program provided an opportunity to eliminate duplication and integrate System Safety and Environmental Engineering into an effective ESOH group
- Leveraging off the lessons learned from the VIRGINIA (SSN 774) Class Submarine Safety and Environmental programs, the SSGN Conversion program allowed Electric Boat to implement an ESOH program per DODI 5000.2



A single integrated ESOH Program Plan was developed. Key features included:

- Making ESOH the responsibility of the DBT.
- Integrating experienced Safety & Environmental engineers into DBTs.
- Define the ESOH hazard analyses for all Electric Boat SSGN Conversion cognizant systems.
- Establish an audit trail of identified ESOH issues (safety hazards/environmental impacts).




#### Key features included continued:

- The system safety engineering group was co-located with the environmental engineering group.
- An ESOH Program Integrator was assigned to the program.
- A single report format that would satisfy the needs of both a DBEA and MIL-STD-882 hazard analysis was developed.
- An integrated database was developed to track both system safety hazards and environmental impacts.



## **ESOH Hazard / Impact Database**







## **ESOH Hazard / Impact Database**

The hazard / impact database is capable of accepting both system safety hazards and environmental impacts on a single unique Hazard/Impact Identification Form.



## **ESOH** Hazard/Impact Identification **Form**



	/IMPACT IDENTIFICATION] rds		_ 8 2
SSGN PROGRAM ENVIRO HEALTH (ESOH) HAZARD	ONMENT, SAFETY, AND OCCUPATIONAL / IMPACT IDENTIFICATION FORM	Hazard / Impact ID Number	
System:		<u> </u>	
Subsystem:			
Hazard/Impact Title:			
Hazard/Impact Description:			
Categories of Items Relating	to Hazard / Impact: (Check one or more.)   HARDWAF	RE   FIRMWARE   SOFTWARE	
ls hazard/impact related to	Ordnance/Weapon System? No 💌		
Is hazard/impact related to	Special Operations Forces? No 💌		
Type of Hazard / Impact	☐ NEPA ☐ ESOH COMPLIAN		
(Check one or more.)	POLLUTION PREVENTION HAZ MATERIAL		Ŀ
Life Cycle Phase (Check one or more.)	☐ MANUFACTURE ☐ TEST_EVALUAT ☐ INSTALLATION ☐ OPERATION	ION MAINTENANCE DISPOSAL	
Initial Mishap Severity	Mishap Probability of Occurrence     Mishap Probability of Occurrence		
	ction or Rationale for Accepting without Mitigat		
ntocommentate magation A	out of National of Procepting Walloat Integrat		
		2 10 1	
Does mitigation either affect	t existing procedures or require new procedure		
Does mitigation either affect Projected Final Mishap Severity	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha	ap Risk Assessment Value 0	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity To preview the IDENTIFICAT.	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap FORM, click on button. To print the form, c	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 I	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Final Mishap Severity  To preview the IDENTIFICATE the print icon on the preview	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha  Mish	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 I	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Final Mishap Severity  To preview the IDENTIFICATE the print icon on the preview	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap FORM, click on button. To print the form, c	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 I	_
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha  Mish	ap Risk Assessment Value 0   click on PREVIEW ID FORM  CLOSE	_
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity  To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha  Mish	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table No. PREVIEW ID FORM CLOSE  S IDENTIFICATION FORM.	-
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity  To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  Fill out AFTER Identifits System Development I	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha  ION FORM, click on button. To print the form, coveren.  MBASE opening screen, click on button  FTER SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT MANAGER SIGN.  Contain Form has been signed by SYSTEM DEVEL  Manager Name and Activity  Da	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 value 10 val	_
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Misha  ION FORM, click on button. To print the form, coveren.  MBASE opening screen, click on button  FTER SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT MANAGER SIGN.  Contain Form has been signed by SYSTEM DEVEL  Manager Name and Activity  Da	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Val	_
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit System Development Identifying Hazard/Imp	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Probability of Occu	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Value 10 Val	_
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity  To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development I Identifying Hazard/Imp  Click on the "NEXT AC ACTION TOWARD HAZ	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition  Mishap P	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Tellick on PREVIEW ID FORM  CLOSE  S IDENTIFICATION FORM.  LOPMENT MANAGER.  the Hazard/Impact entified:  on the "NEXT ng to this NEXT action.	_
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition of Occurrence  Manager Name and Activity  Davact:  CTION INPUT" button and fill out the information  CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertainitime, denote Status of Hazard/Impact as "Prelinitime, denote Status of Hazard/Impact	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 value 10 val	_
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition  Mishap P	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 value 10 val	_
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this PROCEED AS FOLLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit Identifit Impact ACTION TOWARD HAZARD HA	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mashap Sepening Screen, click on button  Mashap Sepening Screen, click on button  Manager Name and Activity  Davact:  Manager Name and Activity  Davact:  MISHAP DEVELOPMENT MANAGER SIGN:  Cation Form has been signed by SYSTEM DEVEL  Mishap Sepening Screen, click on button  Manager Name and Activity  Davact:  MISHAP DEVELOPMENT MANAGER SIGN:  MISHAP DEVELOPMENT MAN	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Tellick on PREVIEW ID FORM  CLOSE  SIDENTIFICATION FORM.  LOPMENT MANAGER.  the Hazard/Impact entified:  On the "NEXT typ to this innary."  NEXT ACTION INPUT  ENTIFICATION FORM.	_
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this PROCEED AS FOLLOWS 1 Fill out AFTER Identifity In Toward Impact of the Proceedings of th	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Property of Occurrence  Mashap State of Mishap Property of Occurrence  Manager Name and Activity  Datact:  CTION INPUT" button and fill out the information  CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining time, denote Status of Hazard/Impact as "Preling of Mishap Property of Mishap Prop	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 PREVIEW ID FORM  CLOSE  SIDENTIFICATION FORM.  LOPMENT MANAGER. tet Hazard/Impact entified:  on the "NEXT ig to this innary."  NEXT ACTION INPUT  ENTIFICATION FORM.	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact ACTION TOWARD HAZ hazard/impact. At this PROCEED AS FOLLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit Program Office Concur	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition  Manager Name Signed by SYSTEM DEVEL  Manager Name and Activity  Day  Manager Name and Activity  Manager Name and Activity  Day  Manager Name and Activity  Manager Name and Activity  Manager Name and Activity  Day  Manager Name and Activity  Man	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table Inches of the Inches of t	
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact ACTION TOWARD HAZARD/IMPACT ACTION TOWAR	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Proposition of Occu	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table Assessment Va	
Does mitigation either affect projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifit System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact ACTION TOWARD HAZARD/IMPACT ACTION TOWAR	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Probability of Occu	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table Assessment Va	
Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 System Development I Identifying Hazard/Imp  Click on the "NEXT AC ACTION TOWARD HAZ hazard/impact. At this  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity Program Office Concerning the proceed this time. To do so, click on the "NEXT AC CLICK ON THE CLICK OF	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Property of Mishap Property  Manager Name and Steven Stand by SYSTEM DEVEL  Manager Name and Activity  Date:  CTION INPUT" button and fill out the information  CARD.IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining time, denote Status of Hazard/Impact as "Prelin"  SAFTER PROGRAM OFFICE (PMS398) SIGNS ID  Catton Form has been signed by PROGRAM OFFICE  Trence of Hazard/Impact plu (Name):  Sting procedures or requires new procedures, intures must be entered into the Procedure Action if the organized data  CTION INPUT" button and update the information  CTION INPUT" button and update the information  CTION INPUT" button and update the information	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table Assessment Va	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this PROCEED AS FOLLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity Program Office Concurring the proceed this time. To do so, characterists and ACTION TOWARD HAZ ACTION TOWARD HAZ and office Concurring the proceed this time. To do so, characterists with the content of	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mashap Separation Serven, click on button  Manager Name and Activity  Davact:  CTION INPUT" button and fill out the information  CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining time, denote Status of Hazard/Impact as "Preling  SAFTER PROGRAM OFFICE (PMS398) SIGNS ID  Cation Form has been signed by PROGRAM OFFICE  Trence of Hazard/Impact ID (Name):  Davisting procedures or requires new procedures, includes on "PAIL" button and enter the required data	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 Table Assessment Va	
Does mitigation either affect Projected Mishap Severity Final To preview the IDENTIFICAT the print icon on the preview To close and return to DATA  PROCEED AS FOLLOWS A  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity System Development Identifying Hazard/Impact. At this PROCEED AS FOLLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity Program Office Concurring the proceed this time. To do so, characterists and ACTION TOWARD HAZARD TO SELLOWS  1 Fill out AFTER Identifity Program Office Concurring the proceed this time. To do so, characterists with the Toward ACTION TOWARD HAZARD ACTION TOWARD HAZARD TOWARD	t existing procedures or require new procedure  Mishap Probability of Occurrence  Mishap Roman Screen, click on button  Manager Name and Activity  Manager Name and Mill out the information CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining time, denote Status of Hazard/Impact as "Preling SAFTER PROGRAM OFFICE (PMS398) SIGNS ID Cation Form has been signed by PROGRAM OFFICE (PMS398)  Mishap Procedures or requires new procedures, infures must be entered into the Procedure Action is incided on "PAIL" button and update the information CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining the Procedure Program of Partaining the Procedure Action is incident on "PAIL" button and update the information CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining the Procedure Program of Partaining the Procedure Action is incident on "PAIL" button and update the information CARD/IMPACT CLOSURE INPUT FORM" pertaining the Procedure Action of Pail and Partaining the Procedure Action is incident of the Procedure Action in the Procedure Action is incident of the Procedure Action in the Procedure Action is incident.	ap Risk Assessment Value 0 value 10 val	

## **ESOH Hazard / Impact Database**

The hazard / impact database can generate and print:

- ESOH Hazard/Impact Identification Forms
- ESOH Hazard/Impact Closure Forms
- ESOH Hazard/Impact Status Reports
- ESOH Program Progress Reports

Additionally, the database has the capability of generating customized reports that satisfy the needs of both the system safety and environmental communities.



## **Success Recognized**

#### DoN 2006 Special Recognition for Excellence in Safety in the Field of Acquisition





"The program emphasizes the integration of safety and environmental engineers into the design/build teams to add the element of objectivity into hazard analyses. This team exemplifies the benefits of the early integration of safety concerns into the acquisition process."



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220-1000

September 6, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR PROGRAM MANAGER, USS OHIO CLASS SSGN PROGRAM

SUBJECT: Special Recognition for Excellence in Safety in the field of Acquisition

The Department of the Navy 2006 Special Recognition for Excellence in Sufety in the Field of Acquisition is presented to the USS OHIO CLASS SSGN Program (PMS398) in recognition of its accomplishments as a leader in promoting acquisition excellence through effective risk management processes and hazard recognition and correction.

In calendar year 2005, the OHIO Class Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH) System Sufety Integrated Product Team, including participants from Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, General Dynamics. Electric Boat Corporation; and Strategic Systems Programs distinguished itself by providing early identification, elimination, and effective control of system safety hazards and environmental impacts associated with the SSGN Conversion Program.

In 2005 the team closed four Weupons Systems Explosive Safety Review Board (WSERB) findings and completed sixteen analyses and reports in support of a time-compressed program that will provide exceptional capability to the Fleet. In recognition of their exemplary performance the team was nominated for the prestigious David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award in the category of supporting Secretary of Defense goals, including safety. Accomplishments include:

- Making Safety the responsibility of the design/build teams to ensure application of cognizant engineering expertise;
- Integrating experienced safety and environmental engineers into the design/build teams to add the element of objectivity into hazard analyses;
- Defining applicable safety hazards and environmental impacts and defining and the methods of elimination or mitigation used for resolution; and
- Incorporating SSBN experienced engineers into the design/build teams to identify and resolve any existing safety issues and to implement methods of mitigation in the design and manufacturing of the SSGN.

The USS OHIO CLASS SSGN Program established itself as a leader in making safety an integral part of its organizational culture, and its accomplishments are in keeping with the Department of the Navy's goals and objectives for professional excellence.

Congratulations on a job well done!





