
NPIR

#### 2009 HOMELAND SECURITY S&T STAKEHOLDERS CONFERENCE WEST

PUTTING FIRST RESPONDERS FIRS



### **Explosives Trace Detection**

Susan Hallowell, Ph.D. Director Transportation Security Laboratory Science and Technology Directorate Department of Homeland Security

**"Putting First Responders First"** 



Homeland Security Science & Technology

## **Explosives and Weapons Detection** 'Bulk and Trace' Programs





Homeland Security

### $\leftarrow$ Bulk $\rightarrow$







Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

## **Trace Detection**

- Can be solid (particulate) or gas (vapor) phase.
  - ppm, ppb, or even ppt
- Identifies explicit composition








### Explosives Detection Overview *Trace Detection* – Chemistry Approaches



Detection of trace (<ng/ppb)


vapors resulting from

levels of explosive particles and



C-4 particle on cloth at 400X





Vapor signature



contamination

Vapor molecule of TNT Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

## **Trace Detection -What are we finding?**

- 1-100 Nanogram of residue
- On the Concealment (BOMB)
- On the Latches, Handles, etc (bags, cargo, vehicles, people, ...)
- On the Interior of the Surfaces
- On the Exterior of the Surfaces




# Where does the Traces of Explosives Come From ?

- Contact with the Bulk Explosive
- Aerosolized Explosive
- Secondary Fingerprints
- Contact with Contaminated Hands (gloves)
- Contact with Surfaces Tools & Workplace



### **Explosives Detection Overview Classification of Explosives**



Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

## **Explosives**

### **Standard Explosives**

- TNT
- RDX
- PETN
- Nitroglycerin (NG)
- Ethylene Glycol Dinitrate (EGDN)

### Plastic Explosives

- 💠 C-4 (RDX)
- Detasheet (PETN)
- Semtex (RDX + PETN)


### Improvised Explosives

- ANFO (Ammonium nitrate + fuel oil)
- Urea nitrate
- Triacetone triperoxide (TATP)




Homeland Security

## **Explosive Compounds**



Vapor Pressure, at <u>Room Temperature</u> ...



## **Trace Detection:** Three processes

- Collect the sampling process...Front-end collection / preconcentration...
- Separate provides selectivity of threat...
- Detect provides sensitivity for the threats of interest...




Homeland Security

## **Particle vs. Vapor Sampling**

- Most threats only provide spread via particles...
   \* exceptions newer homemade threats...
- Particle hard, solid surfaces; contact swiping
  soft surfaces, air jet or vac. sampling
- Vapor High and low volume air collection.
- Today need for both, simultaneous...




### **C-4 Fingerprint**





### **X-RAY MAPPING OF C-4**



### **SEM of C-4 on Muslin**

X-ray Nitrogen Map



## **Particle Sampling**

- How to remove from surfaces;

- First, need to know physical and chemical properties of the threat of interest ... particle size, stickiness, binding forces, vapor pressure, etc.

- Sample Swiping method - efficiency of collection; careful selection of material, collection via hand wiping or sampling wand, area per collection and pressure to be applied, etc.

-Enviromental effects; dry vs. wet surface (vs. type of sample swipe), clean vs. dirty surfaces, etc.





Reference herein to any specific commercial products, processes, equipment, or services does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or any of its employees or contractors.



### **Commercial Trace Sampling Wands**





### Explosives Detection Overview *Trace Detection* – Deployed Particle Equipment





#### Smiths Detection IonScan 400B



#### GE-lon Track Itemiser<sup>2</sup>

Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

## **Vapor Sampling**

- How to collect from surfaces;
- First, need to know physical and chemical properties of the threat of interest ... vapor pressure, sublimation rate, etc. ---->>>
- Sample method efficiency of collection; careful selection of collection via low volume or high volume sampling, distance to suspect item critical, etc.
- -Enviromental effects; temperature (range of temp), clean vs dirty surfaces (amount of other non-threat vapor), etc.



## **Sampling for Explosive Vapors**




#### **Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes**

$$\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial x_i} = 0 \qquad \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial t} + U_j \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial x_j} = -\frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial x_i} + \frac{1}{Re} \frac{\partial^2 U_i}{\partial x_j \partial x_j} - \frac{\partial}{\partial x_j} \overline{u_i u_j} + \delta_{i3} \frac{Gr}{Re^2} \Theta$$



Homeland Security



### Explosives Detection Overview *Trace Detection* – Vapor Detection Equipment



#### GE – IonTrack VaporTracer2



Smiths Detection Sabre 4000

Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

### **Explosives Detection Overview Trace Detection** – Whole Body Screening



### Explosives Detection Overview <u>Trace Detection – Canines</u>












nuary 14, 2008

## **Vortex Sampling System**



Axial cyclone with return flow designed to generate an artificial tornado and pick up vapors of explosive materials without physical contact with a surface.

Sampling distance is  $\frac{1}{2}$ "-13 $\frac{1}{2}$ ".





## Trace Explosive Detection Technologies

#### Electronic/Chemical: Picogram sensitivity

- Ion Mobility Spectrometry : Widespread use: Separates and Analyzes in seconds
- Chemiluminescence: Extremely sensitive, need to separate explosives from other compounds
- Electron Capture Detection: Sensitive, but needs separation step
- Surface Acoustic Wave: Trade off between specificity and sensitivity
- Thermo-Redox: Sensitive, needs separation step
- Mass Spectrometry: Requires high vacuum, is fragile but very sensitive
- Colorimetric (Chemical): Sensitive only to micrograms to nanograms
- Biosensor
  - K-9s: Sensitive, versatile, must train to application
  - Antigen Antibody: Very sensitive, but very specific



## Technology Requirements

- Meet Detection Specification for Sensitivity and Selectivity for Specified Threats.
- Very Low False Alarm Rate
- Very High Probability of Detection
- Minimal Decision Making by Human
- Automated
- Robust
- Can Be Operated by Screeners (Not the Ones That Have a Masters Degree in Physics)
- Not Too Expensive (ETD, consumables, etc.)
- Privacy Concerns Addressed



## **Deployed Trace Detectors**

#### BARRINGER

- Technology Ion Mobility Spectrometry
- Approved models IonScan Models 400 and 400B

#### IONTRACK

- Technology Ion Mobility Spectrometry
- Approved models Itemizer-DOS & Itemizer-W

#### THERMODETECTION

- Technology GC/Chemiluminescense
- Approved models EGIS Models 3000 & II










### ION MOBILITY SPECTROSCOPY (IMS) •Substrate heated to



## •Substrate heated to vaporize particles

Molecules are ionized by a weak radioactive source and drift through a weak electric field
Particle time of flight is a distinct fingerprint, enabling detection

### **Applications:**

Explosives detection on both luggage and people
Detection of narcotics




### **Technical Barriers:**

- •Dependent on screener sampling
- •Susceptible to atmospheric changes
- •Calibration requirements
- •Saturation possible



Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

## ITMS Detector How It Works





Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

### Simultaneous, Dual-Mode Detector





### **Challenges to Trace Detection**

#### **Interferential Only**

An alarm does not necessarily mean a bomb if sampling for particles but you need a good reason to be contaminated! If you see vapor, YOU HAVE A BOMB!

#### **Sampling**

True vapor and particle sampler does not exist

Its about getting the sample!!

Currently highly dependent on skilled operator

#### **Selectivity/Sensitivity**

- A wider range of threats (cross-applications) needs to be addressed and developed for Trace Detection, eg. Chemical agents, transparent Extremely sensitive explosive detectors exist, but ability to detect more compounds, lower false alarm rate needed.
- Operational alarm rates are "reasonable" for many of the current applications; but are prohibitively high in others.



## Explosive Trace Detectors The Future ...



### Near – term ETD's . . . and improvements to sample collection . . .



## MicroHound III






Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008



### **MicroHound™** Concept



## Microsensors

**Requirements for Detection of Explosives for First Responders** 


- **Small and portable**
- Specific to one or more explosives
- Array of Sensors provides full threat coverage, and Improved alarm statistics.
- **Sensitive (and Selective).**

### Low cost



### Micro-electromechanical System (MEMS) Cantilever






Ref: T. Thundat et al, ORNL



Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008

### Micro-electromechanical System (MEMS) Cantilever



*Ref: Coatings NRL & ORNL* 

ATF /TSA uCantil. Progm.




## Micro-electromechanical System (MEMS)

Is based on miniature micromachined silicon cantilevers (a few hundred  $\mu m$  long and 1  $\mu m$  thick) that can detect tiny forces caused by heat-induced nano-explosions. The silicon material absorbs the explosive vapor, which is heated and undergoes tiny explosions that are detected by an optical beam. Scanning the temperature of the cantilever allows detection of various explosives, according to their temperature of deflagration.


Sensitivity: 10-30 ppt of RDX and PETN (femtogram range) Homeland Security

### Cantilever detection system



Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 20 T. Thundat et al., Ultramicroscopy, 97, 433, 2003

## Mass Spec on a Chip/MEMS



 R&D of a front end Chemical sensor for the MEMS based MS on a Chip (and support of MS development project).

### MS on a Chip

- Partnership with NG/ARL/DARPA
- Report with evaluation of one type of front end chemical sensor (gas centrifuge separator).




### What analyte is a detection dog signaling on?






## **Semtex H Headspace Analysis**


#### Abundance




## The Future of Trace?

- Automated Samplers: The key is the front end!
- Trace Explosives and CW/BW Sensor Development, Metal Detection, etc.
- Embedded Detectors in containers/walls.
- Nanotechnology: sources and detectors







CNT – nano explosives Det.

CNT – nano wire sensor

Nano detection on micro systems



Homeland Security Effort with NASA Ames Research Cntr.

Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. January 14, 2008



## **Future Prospects**

- Novel Collection/Sampling Systems, New ETD's including other technologies like MS, Spectroscopy (THz, CRDS, ...), etc.
- □ Microsensors/electronic noses as Array Detectors.
- Nanotechnology will become the major driver for microsensors, and certainly a long-term future development.



### Conclusions...

- Today/Future need to efficiently sample both vapor and particle at same time...
  - Automated to eliminate or reduce human training and human ability to sample.
  - Non-contact (if possible) to reduce interaction with surfaces and eliminate wiping of surfaces (manual sampling issues, cost of consumables, etc.).
- Ability to detect threats with Trace Explosive Detection is a combination of Sampling and Detection...both critical processes.





Susan F. Hallowell, Ph.D. Transportation Security Lab Science and Technology Email: <a href="mailto:susan.hallowell@dhs.gov">susan.hallowell@dhs.gov</a>



# Homeland Security



Homeland Security