




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Assurance for CMMI[®]: A Toolbox for Multiple Cyber Challenges

9th Annual CMMI[®] Technology Conference
17 November 2009

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Agenda

- Setting the Stage
- Assurance for CMMI®
- Code Vulnerabilities
- Global Supply Chain
- Organizational Cyberspace
- Next Steps




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Today's Reality Requires Increased Confidence In Our IT Products and Services

- Dependencies on technology are greater than ever
- Possibility of disruption is greater than ever because software is vulnerable
- Loss of confidence alone can lead to stakeholder actions that disrupt critical business activities






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Gaps Exist In The Intended Audience For SwA Literature

Distribution of Literature

(Percentage of literature by Intended Audience)





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
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Assurance for CMMI® - A Place To Start



Project leadership and team members need to know where and how to contribute

Focus Topic: Assurance for CMMI® defines the Assurance Thread for Implementation and Improvement of Assurance Practices

<https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/processrc.html>



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Assurance Focus – Organizational Training

The purpose of Organizational Training (OT) is to develop the skills and knowledge of people so they can perform their roles effectively and efficiently. [1, p. 275]

Addressing an organization's assurance training needs increases the likelihood that qualified and appropriately trained resources are performing the necessary integrated assurance activities on the project.

The use of the Focus Topic as described throughout this document creates a natural inclusion of assurance activities for the following practices within the OT process area: SP1.2, SP1.4, SP2.1, SP2.2, and SP2.3.

SG 1. A training capability, which supports the organization's management and technical roles, is established and maintained.

SP 1.1 Establish and maintain the strategic training needs of the organization.

Understanding the capabilities needed to achieve the strategic business objectives of an organization provides the foundation for planning and executing the necessary assurance skills within the organization.

AF 1.1.1 Establish and maintain the assurance training needs of the organization [2, SP1.3,3]

Specialized skills are necessary to achieve project and organizational assurance objectives. Assurance objectives included in the organization's strategic business objectives and process improvement plan contribute to the identification of potential future training needs.

Examples of categories of training needs for assurance include (but are not limited to) the following:

- Assurance (general awareness, organizational considerations, stakeholder considerations, legal implications, missions needs, abuse/misuse analysis, secure coding, testing, etc)
- Workforce credentials and certification maintenance requirements (i.e. Project Management Professional (PMP), Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP))

Typical Work Products:

- Assurance Training Needs
- Assurance Assessment Analysis

Context of Assurance for the PA

Assurance practice aligned with existing CMMI® Specific practice

Supporting examples, sub practices, etc that clarify the Assurance practice

Typical Work Products



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


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Assurance Risks and Software Quality

- 64% of the vulnerabilities in NVD in 2004 are due to programming errors*
 - 51% of those due to classic errors like buffer overflows, cross-site-scripting, injection flaws*
- Probability of serious vulnerabilities is 52.3% (Capers Jones Overview of the US software Industry, April 2008)
- 27% of development effort is devoted to defect removal, repair, and rework (Capers Jones Overview of the US software Industry, April 2008)
- 67% percent of the attacks in 2007 were "for profit" motivated, ideological hacking came second (Web Application Security Consortium Annual 2007 Report)






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Secure Coding Roadmap





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Secure Coding Practice Implementation

SDLC Activity	Assurance for CMMI	BSIMM	TSP Secure *
Code Review Checklists	<p><i>OPD AF 1.1.1 Establish and maintain organizational processes to achieve the assurance business objectives.</i></p> <p><i>TS AF 3.1.2 Identify deviations from assurance coding standards.</i></p>	SR Level 1: Provide easily accessible security standards and (compliance-driven) requirements	<p>CERT SCI provides language specific secure coding guidelines for C, C++, and Java.</p> <p>To claim compliance with a standard, software developers must be able to produce on request documentation as to which systematic and specific deviations have been permitted during development.</p>
Static Analysis Tools	<p><i>IPM AF 1.3.1 Establish and maintain assurance of the project's work environment based on the organization's work environment standards.</i></p>	<p>CR Level 2: Enforce standards through mandatory automated code review and centralized reporting</p> <p>CR Level 3: Build an automated code review factory with tailored rules</p>	<p>Automatable guidelines are identified by WG14/N1393. Remaining guidelines are enforced through manual inspection. The CERT Source Code Analysis Laboratory certifies conformance to standards.</p>

* courtesy of Robert Seacord



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IT Risks from Supply Chain

- Deliberately embedded malicious functionality
- Theft to intellectual property
- Fake or counterfeit products
- Exploitable IT/software unintentionally produced by suppliers with poor security practices
- Lack of developer and acquirer awareness of associated risks

Increased Vigilance Is Critical To Reducing IT Risks From The Supply Chain



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Supply Chain Integrity Roadmap

Technology:
Automated Penetration
Testing Tools
Network Vulnerability
Scanners

People:
Project manager
Security analyst
Developer

Assurance for CMMI® Practice:

TS AF 2.1.1 Architect for assurance.
TS AF 2.1.2 Design for assurance.
TS AF 3.1.1 Implement the assurance designs of the product components.
VAL AF 2.2.1 Analyze the results of assurance validation activities.
VER AF 3.2.1 Analyze the results of assurance verification activities.





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Software Supply Chain Integrity

- **Established Design Principles**

- **Chain of Custody:** The confidence that each change and handoff made during the source code's lifetime is authorized, transparent and verifiable.
- **Least Privilege Access:** Personnel can access critical data with only the privileges needed to do their jobs.
- **Separation of Duties:** Personnel cannot unilaterally change data, nor unilaterally control the development process.
- **Tamper Resistance and Evidence:** Attempts to tamper are obstructed, and when they occur they are evident and reversible.
- **Persistent Protection:** Critical data is protected in ways that remain effective even if removed from the development location.
- **Compliance Management:** The success of the protections can be continually and independently confirmed.
- **Code Testing and Verification:** Methods for code inspection are applied and suspicious code is detected.

The Software Supply Chain Integrity Framework Defining Risks and Responsibilities for Securing Software in the Global Supply Chain http://www.safecode.org/publications/SAFECode_Supply_Chain0709.pdf



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
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Stovepiped Assurance Efforts Miss The Dartboard





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Organizational Cyberspace

Technology:

Process,
Measurement, and
Artifact Repositories
Social Media

People:


Executive Sponsors
Project Managers
Project Teams

Assurance for CMMI® Practice

OPF AF 1.1.1 Establish and maintain the description of the assurance context and objectives for the organization.

OPD AF 1.1.1 Establish and maintain organizational processes to achieve the assurance business objectives.

OT AF 1.1.1 Establish and maintain the strategic assurance training needs of the organization





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
Assurance for CMMI® Provides the Framework to Connect Development Activities to Assurance Goals

"It is the policy of Motorola to offer security solutions designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and other assets appropriate to their value to Motorola, and to service providers (and their customers) using Motorola products." (source: Motorola Secure Software Development Model (MSSDM) Lessons Learned, Margaret Nadworny, August 10, 2007)

*Establish and maintain organizational processes to achieve the assurance business objectives.
Identify deviations from assurance coding standards.
(Source: Assurance for CMMI® March 2009)*

BSIMSR Level 1: Provide easily accessible security standards and (compliance-driven) requirements
Safecode Whitepaper - Fundamental Practices for Secure SW Development (section on Programming)

TSP Secure CERT SCI provides language specific secure coding guidelines for C, C++, and Java.
To claim compliance with a standard, software developers must be able to produce on request documentation as to which systematic and specific deviations have been permitted during development.





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SCAMPISM Is A Tool To Identify Assurance Process Institutionalization Risks

Plan and Prepare for Appraisal

Analyze Requirements

Obtain and Analyze Initial Objective Evidence

Develop Appraisal Plan

Conduct Appraisal

Examine Objective Evidence

Verify and Validate Objective Evidence

Report Results

Deliver Appraisal Results

Incorporate Assurance Focus Practices

Select and Prepare Appraisal Team

Prepare for Collection of Objective Evidence

Document Objective Evidence

Generate Appraisal Results

Package and Archive Appraisal Assets



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What can you do?

- Use “Draft Practices” to identify gaps in your assurance practices <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/procesrc.html>
- Measure and improve your assurance practices
- Share your lessons learned ([swawg-process @ cert.org](mailto:swawg-process@cert.org))



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References for Integrating Assurance

- DHS Software Assurance Working Groups
 - <https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov>
 - <http://www.us-cert.gov/swa/>
- IATAC /DACS
 - <http://iac.dtic/iatac>
 - <https://www.thedacs.com>
 - Enhancing the Development Life Cycle to Produce Secure Software
 - State of the Art Report on Software Security Assurance
- NIST
 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/>
- NDIA
 - [Systems Engineering Division](#)
 - [System Assurance Guidebook](#)
- SANS
 - <http://www.sans.org/>
- International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
 - <http://www.iso.org>
- Software Security Engineering
 - <http://www.softwaresecurityengineering.com/>
 - <http://www.amazon.com/Software-Security-Engineering-Project-Managers/dp/032150917X>



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