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- Jeff Brown, CISO Information Security, Raytheon
- General Charlie Croom (Ret.), VP Cyber Security Solutions, Lockheed Martin
- Eric Guerrino, CIO, Bank of New York Mellon
- Pradeep Khosla, Dean, School of Computer Sciences, Carnegie Mellon U
- Lawrence Dobranski, Security Manager, Nortel
- Mark Anthony Signorino, Chief Technology, Nat. Assoc Manufacturers
- Joe Buonomo, President, Direct Computer Resources Inc.



## **Our Partners**





Integrate technology with economically practical business considerations and public policy to create a sustainable system of cyber security



#### Business Services

 Integrating Information Security into the Business Plan (NASDAQ Conference)

 ISAlliance Integrated Security Services Program

E-Discovery

Outsourcing Risk Management

Security Breach Notification

Security Incident Handling

Auditing

High Profile Speaking and Article
 Placements

 Preventing and Detecting Insider Threats

Best Practices Development

Senior Managers Guide to Cyber Security

Small Businesses Guide to Cyber Security

Home Users & Mobile Executive Guide

 Cyber Insurance Discount Program for Best Practice Compliance (up to 15%)

Exclusive Annual Privacy Policy
Trends Report

 Contracting for Information Security, Model Commercial Agreements Guides

IT Risk Management Quarterly
Work Group

#### **Technical Services**

 Weekly Webinars from Carnegie Mellon University on Emerging Info Security issues

 Continuing Education Credit Program in Information Security

 ISAlliance/ANSI Model Terms for Certified ISMS featuring ISO/IEC 27001

 ISAlliance/ANSI Model Commercial Agreements featuring ISO/IEC 17799

 ISAlliance/ISSA Guide to Model Terms for Commercial Agreements

SQUARE Methodology and Tool

 Online Assessment Tools and Insurance Discounts

Exclusive Annual Software
 Assurance Report

 Participation in Critical Infrastructure Protection Planning with U.S. DHS

 Placement of Membership Articles in Professional Journals

> Fixing Cyber Security Problems

 Daily Threat and Vulnerability Briefings from US-CERT

### Legal & Policy Services

 Comprehensive Solutions for E-Discovery

 Interaction with Senior Policy Makers

Congress

Department of Homeland Security

US Department of Commerce Economic Security Working Group

National Infrastructure Protection
Plan

IT Sector Coordinating Council

 Member Speaking & Writing Opportunities

Cutter IT Journal

 Market Incentives for Cyber Security

> Market Incentives White Paper

Congressional Staff Briefings
 Defense Issues

IT & Telecommunications Issues


Insider Threats

International Issues

- Exclusive Annual Privacy Policy Trends Report
- Privacy Quarterly Work Group



# National Risk Continuum





- 1. Create a Cyber Security Social Contract between business and government to provide market incentives for improved security
- 2. Develop Best Practices for financial risk management of cyber incidents
- 3. Create a framework for managing conflicting legal structures and unified communications tech.
- 4. Develop standards to secure the VOIP platform



- 18 months long (start fall 07)
- Focus on firmware
- Carnegie Mellon University and Center for Cyber Consequences Unit
- 3 conferences
- 100 Gov., Industry and Academic participants
- Results are strategy and framework provided to USG for NSC
   60-day review of cyber policy



- 1. Globalization of IT Supply Chain will increase
- 2.USG reliance on IT will also increase
- 3. Threat from IT supply chain significant for USG
- 4. "USG-only" solution impractical
- 5. Attackers will be fluid and creative so fixed policies will be ineffective long term
- 6. Need a flexible framework of solutions

## Framework: Danger of Malicious Firmware

- Serious danger of infiltrating the supply chain
- Altered circuitry to transfer control over info systems
- A logic bomb could lay dormant then activate at the worst possible moment
- A weapons system could be shut down when needed, or even turned against the owner
- Virtually impossible to detect
- Domestic sole sourcing is

## Framework: Economic SECURITY ALLIANCE ISSUES

- Supply chain attacks are very difficult and expensive
- Almost always cheaper and more effective to use more traditional cyber attacks
- NATION STATES CAN AFFORD AND MIGHT BE WILLING TO INVEST IN SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACKS
- Some criminal conspiracies might also be willing to conduct supply chain attacks
- Malicious firmware is a serious

## Types of Supply Chain SECURITY ALLIANCE Attacks & Remedies

- 1. Interrupt Operation: Maintain alternative sources and continual sharing of production across chain
- 2. Corrupt Operation (e.g. insert malaria): strict control of environment where key IP is being applied, logical and physical tamper proof seals/tracking containers
- 3. Discredit the operation (undermine trust or brand value): logging operation and responsibility
- 4. Loss of information: Versioning as a



- 1. Design Phase
- 2. Fabrication Phase
- 3. Assembly Phase
- 4. Distribution Phase
- 5. Maintenance Phase



	REMEDIES			
STAGES				

## Framework: Legal Support SECURITY ALLIANCE Needed

- 1. Rigorous contracts delineating security measures
- 2. Locally responsible corporations
  w/long term interest in
  complying
- 3. Local ways of overcoming agency problems and motivating workers and executives
- 4. Adequate provision for verifying implementation of security
- 5. Local law enforcement of



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