

2010 NDIA T&E SYMPOSIUM OTA COMMANDERS' ROUNDTABLE

A Navy perspective on Information Assurance
-having systems that work when needed

2 March 2010

Bill McCarthy
Deputy Director
Operational Test & Evaluation Force



Common Challenges

- “Cyber” is still a relatively new warfare domain
- The cadre of truly experienced personnel is small and while growing, will take literally years to fully develop
 - We are all competing for the same talent pool
- The threat is ubiquitous and is rapidly evolving
- There are often expectation mis-matches – there is not necessarily agreement as to the goal or desired outcome of testing




Challenges in Acquisition Life Cycle

- Upfront definition of IA requirements is a prerequisite for integrated testing
- IA controls “inheritance” is not understood by the implementing Program Manager
- Program Managers often fail to consider
 - IA in RFP, PDR, CDR, Contracts, CDRLs
 - Supply Chain Risks
- Integration Challenges
 - Need for realistic operational environments with end-to-end test venues
- Current certification & accreditation process was not designed to support rapid software development
 - Process can be slow and inflexible
 - Process does not readily account for incremental changes
- System developers, certification & accreditation authorities, and testers need to collaborate and share IT test results
 - Program managers perceive they are paying several times for IA



IA in the Acquisition Life Cycle



- The Materiel Development Decision precedes entry into any phase of the acquisition management system
- Entrance criteria met before entering phase
- Evolutionary Acquisition or Single Step to Full Capability

Security Certification and Accreditation and DOD 8580.1 Activities



IA in the “Notional” Systems Engineering Life Cycle

SE Process


CONOPS

JCIDS
MAC/CL &
RFP

PDR

CDR

MS B
Contract



Sustainment

OT & E

IATT/ATO
DT

DIACAP

IA Controls



Navy Challenges

- ❑ Ships are inherently high demand - low density assets
- ❑ Most legacy platforms (ships, in particular) are an amalgamation of systems
 - Legacy hardware & software
 - COTS and open source code
- ❑ Individual platforms are limited in number and often rely upon a relatively small set of interface points to connect with the GIG.



Some thoughts...

- IA/CND test and evaluation requires a holistic approach that views contractor testing, government DT and OT as a continuum
 - Program Managers must work to integrate Government and Contractor Developmental Testing
- The evaluation strategy must be based upon sound architectural views that provide sufficient rigor
 - The OT&E community should support JFCOM efforts to improve the quality of net-centric architectural views
- New tools must be developed to support the collection of system performance data without unduly impacting the performance of the system under test
- A new paradigm for examining how we assess the ability of our systems to support combat operations in the face of cyber attack is needed



A Suggested Analytical Process

- Determine the *criticality* of the system and the security *required*

- Assess *non-physical* and *physical* vulnerabilities

- Consider susceptibility to *espionage, disruption* or *malicious manipulation*

- Assess threat capability and test using *the types of exploits likely to be encountered in the operational environment*

- Assess recovery and repair, (recognizing that unlike kinetic attack, *detection of the attack may not be obvious.*)



Proposed Analytical Process





Summary

- Challenges are similar, yet different:
 - Well defined requirements
 - CONOPS
 - Instrumentation
 - Skilled personnel

- Bottom line – we are confronted with a rapidly evolving warfare domain with associated risks and opportunities - we need to get this right!

Bill McCarthy
Deputy, Operational Test & Evaluation Force
Norfolk, VA
757.282.5546 Ext. 3900
William.mccarthy@cotf.navy.mil