

Facebook Profile



AMADOR Formula

INU: 422365 AUTH: 020552 \$26.86 BASE TOTAL



Bottom Line Up Front




- Navy committed to future MCM capability transition
- MIW resources are a small piece of the shrinking budgetary pie
- We can help with near-term initiatives but can't do everything
- We need to prioritize getting the right capability to the fleet soonest



Mine Countermeasures Roadmap





Right Mix of Man and Technology For Effective Operations



vs.

Transition Challenge: Competing Requirements





MH-53E, MCMs, AQS-24A, SQQ-32 (HFWB)





MH-60S, LCS, ALMDS, AC 5-204, COBRA, UUV w/ LFBB, RMS, W/ 18 UUV



NEUTRALIZE

MH-53E, MCMs, EMNS, EOD, Marine Mammals



MH-60S, JABS, CMS, LCS, AMNS



SWEEP

MH-53E, MCMs, Mk-105, Mk-104, IAAG, AAG




MH-60S, LCS, USV, UISS, OASIS





Transition from Legacy to Future





MCM program maintains current capacity without MCM-1 ELSP and supports LCS-based MCM to relieve forward deployed forces by 2020.



MCM + Mining = Mine Warfare



- The Mine Warfare Branch is responsible for both Mine Countermeasures(MCM) <u>and</u> Mining.
- Responsible for maintaining the current maritime mines in the Navy's inventory.





 Actively exploring future offensive mining concepts to use mines in offensive, protective, and defensive roles.





Current Resource Environment



- PB12 is currently on "The Hill"
 - CR until 18NOV and No New Starts
- Navy PB12 TOA is \$161.4B increase of \$0.8B from FY11
 - N85 slice of the pie is \$6.2B 4% of overall budget
 - N852 budget is approx \$400M of N85's budget
- Overall Mine Warfare budget is \$722M
 - Includes current readiness and manpower accounts
 - 0.6% of Navy TOA LCS SCN account excluded
 - BMD budget is approximately five times larger*
 - ASW budget is approximately four times larger*

• Still have the "Super Committee's" decision to deal with




N2/6 - Info Dominance


PB-12 Fiscal Overview




(Represents Funding Reported in FY12 MCM Certification Plan)

WPN





MIW Funding APPN Breakout



APPN	\$M
RDTEN	254.6
OPN	113.5
WPN	12.2
OMN	190.8
S&T	87.6
APN	63.6
Total	722.3



Near Future MCM Challenges



- Sensor and Processing False Alarms
 - High False Alarms mean longer PMA & higher False Classification by PMA Operator
- Single Pass Detect to Engage
 - High False Alarms requires multiple passes to identify
- Computer Aided Detection(CAD)/Classification(CAC) Improvements
 - Potential for real-time algorithms in the MCM Community
 - Fast and accurate CAD/CAC capability needed for all PMA
- Reliability
 - System Reliability needs to meet requirements
 - Meet Operational Availability (Ao)
 - Improve Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF)
 - Require modular, open architecture systems that are supportable long term
- Mining
 - Stand-off delivery of mines
 - Remote Command and Control of mines
 - Distributed network of sensors in support of command and control



The Big Question: How good is good enough?



- How much better is the reduced performance future systems over present fielded systems?
 - Likely Performance of Future vs. Present Performance of Legacy
- Analyzing the present performance MCM MP systems to determine if they support Overarching LCS MCM MP KPPs.
 - Many Future MCM system requirements (ORDs) written well before LCS Concept—are they aligned?
 - Huge Effort, reliant on modeling (NMWS)
 - IF we are falling short in KPPs, namely Area Coverage Rate Sustained (ACRS), WHERE do we make improvements?



Summary



- The mine threat is <u>real</u> and <u>not</u> getting easier.
- The transition to LCS-based MCM is challenging...and innovative.
- Decreasing TOA makes TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST a key driver
- But.....system suitability and effectiveness still most important

Got a solution?


Contact CAPT Rios at mark.rios@navy.mil





MCM System Investments







MIW Far-Term Vision



- Stop doing things "the old way"
 - Increased passive MCM through ISR, satellites, and IPOE
- Utilize Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)
 - Comms, endurance, and power generation/management issues inherent with UUVs/USVs must be resolved
 - Flexible, adaptable, open architecture design. Stovepipes removed.
 - <u>Idea</u>: A common powered-section that can be fitted with a mission-specific "front end" (e.g., minehunting, neutralization, or even minelaying)
 - <u>Idea</u>: Air-dropped UUVs for rapid reaction. Need robust design while adhering to weight & aircraft/helo integration
- Multiple, networked UUVs/USVs operating autonomously in suspected mine danger area
 - Full Detect-to-Engage capability in a single pass

Far-Term => Autonomous, Networked UUVs and Advanced Underwater Weapons



Major PB-12 Adjustments



Program ADDS	Prog	gram TAKES		
RMS Add to OSD CAPE Estimate	\$ 101.7	MCM MP Reduction	-\$	166.1
EOD UUV (MK 18 UUV)	\$ 76.0	AMNS WPN Reduction (EMNS)	-\$	110.1
AMCM SDLM Add	\$ 38.4	RAMICS Vertical Kill	-\$	82.1
ALMDS Add (Field Inc.1, Dev Inc II)	\$ 31.7	CMS WPN Reduction	-\$	54.9
AMNS Add (RDTEN & OPN)	\$ 31.2	EMNS Vertical Kill	-\$	49.8
		SMCM UUV Reduction	-\$	32.9

- Aligns resources (LCS ships and MP system)
- Slowed procurement and quantities of CN's
- SMCM was bill payer for other MCM programs