



ASA(ALT) Office of Chief System Engineer

## ***Integrated Base Defense***

*Information Brief to*

*NDIA 14th Annual Systems Engineering Conference*

*26 Oct 2011*

Mr. Philip Hudner

ASA(ALT) Office of The Chief System Engineer



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
# OCSE Architecture & Analysis Team for Force Basing

The AATFB, an Army enterprise-level analysis team of the ASA(ALT) Office of the Chief System Engineer (OCSE), performs in support of the basing of Army and Joint Forces worldwide. Functional areas of ***Integrated Base Defense (IBD), Communications & Computing Infrastructure, and Base Infrastructure***





# Architectural Foundation




- Design Team sought to reuse existing IBD and related analysis to speed analysis efforts and take advantage of previous efforts. An example is the Joint Force Protection Reference Architecture that was used to support IUBIP analysis.
- The working group generated a series of views of the overall IBD Integrated Architecture to support its work, including:
  - **CV-1:** Vision and Overall Guidance drawn from IUBIP
  - **AV-2:** Defined terms unique to IBD
  - **OV-1:** Graphics for the major base variant types
  - **OV-2:** Graphical and architectural diagrams that defined the organizational structure for each base variant by use case scenario
  - **OV-3:** A list of information exchanges related to IBD
  - **OV-5a:** A list of operational activities related to IBD
  - **OV-5b:** Scenario specific activity diagrams that describe the actions the base operators would take to negate a threat.






# IBD Design Process Wiring Diagram



## IBD Design Team





# Requirements Analysis



**The requirements analysis working group was charged with the following tasks:**

- Identify and Manage JIBD Authoritative Sources and Documents
- Synthesize a set of JIBD requirements from requirements sources
- Trace requirements to authoritative sources

## Authoritative Sources

The Design Team is not a requirements generation activity. The working group used authoritative sources to understand required IBD capabilities, existing shortfalls, and operational metrics as a basis for developing a synthesized set of requirements. These sources included, but aren't limited to:

- Protection Joint Functional Concept, JUN 2004
- Protection FAA, JUL 2010
- Protection FNA Draft, DEC 2010
- IUBIP JCD, JUL 2007
- IUBIP FAA, MAY 2007
- IUBIP DAD FSA, May 2008
- IUBIP DAD ICD, Sep 2008
- IUBIP Interoperability Analysis Plan, Feb 2009
- IUBIP AoA, Mar 2010
- IGSSR-C CDD, draft OCT 2010
- GBOSS(E) CDD, draft SEP 10
- TSS CDD draft, APR 11
- IBDSS CDD, FEB 2005
- AR 190-13, Physical Security Program, SEP 1993
- DOD Directive 3224.3, OCT 2007
- FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, JAN 2001
- TRADOC Pam 525-3-5, Functional Concept for Protection, OCT 2010
- TRADOC 525-13, Force Protection Program, SEP 2008
- Unit Antiterrorism Officer Handbook, Sep 2010
- IMCOM Force Protection Operations Order #09-001,






# Threat Analysis



- The threat analysis working group compiled and integrated materials from multiple sources in order to create a single threat description that could be used as the threat reference source for the Design Team
- The working group focused on level I and II threats based on the USAFRICOM threat model, IUBIP threat analysis, and the 2009 Base Defense Priorities Assessment (BDPA). Primary doctrinal sources were: TRADOC Pam 525-3-5 Army Functional Concept for Protection and Joint Publication 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater.








# Installation and Base Variant Analysis



- The variant working group was tasked with defining a list of common base types across the Joint community based on the IUBIP definitions of fixed, semi-fixed, and mobile base types for both CONUS and OCONUS
- Additionally, the working group was tasked to define the states and modes an installation/base goes through during its lifecycle, such as operational, non-operational, etc.







# Base Variant Modeling

## FOB Variant Definition

Forward Operating Base	FOB	<p>A <b>Forward Operating Base (FOB)</b> is a <b>large</b> evolving military facility of approximately <b>1,500,000 square meters</b> having a defined <b>5 kilometer</b> perimeter with established access controls supporting sustained military operations of deployed units operating <b>from several bases</b> and providing necessary support services and functions for approximately <b>2000 personnel</b>. The types and quality of facilities include:</p> <p><b>Life Support:</b> Containerized housing, field kitchen; showers, contract latrines, field laundry; medical clinic; containerized MWR facilities</p> <p><b>Infrastructure:</b> Large generators or local power w/ distribution; water</p>	Area of influence - 138 km <sup>2</sup> (6km beyond perimeter based on 107mm mortar max range 6,800 meters)	Area of Interest - 500 km <sup>2</sup> (12 km beyond perimeter plus any Heliport Approach Zone)
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
US Army Corps of Engineers – Afghanistan Engineer District open contract: Appendix 2-A, Sheet A3








# Use Case Foundation









# Overall Process



System Name	Accept?	Comment
ACT-E	no	theater intel asset
Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS)	no	AMD function
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM INTEGRATOR: AN MSQ 214	no	planning tool
Alternative Energy Research - Microgrids	no	grid management
CNET (wireless communications)	no	not for mobile comms
CPOF	no	Not for intel data
DSS	no	not application
ECP Control Station and Shelter	no	shelter
...	...	...
...	yes	sends threat data/IMADs entry requires update/fix
...	no	Not for intel data
...	no	air threat data in conjunction with
...	no	Not for intel data
...	no	Not for intel data




- System (BCS)
- Integrated Fire Control Station (IFCS)
- Integrated Ground Security, Surveillance and Resiliency (IGSSR-C)
- Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)
- Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)
- JTAGS IGC



SWDC Phase	ARCC Required capability (from BCCP)	Measure	Measure Score			
			1	2	3	4
DETECT	Automatically collect and store information on number, location, and intensity of attacks.	Does the system provide the automated ability to collect & store information on number, location, and intensity?	No automated capability	Automated collection of a single incident	Automated storage capability (passive to active)	Automated storage capability (passive to active)
DETECT	Provide 2 layers of surveillance capability to provide in-depth coverage	Does the system provide the ability to use a minimum of 2 layers of surveillance capability to provide in-depth coverage at least 24/7?	Only 1 layer of surveillance	Two layers with partial redundancy	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum
DETECT	Collect information via imperceptible means	Does the system provide the ability to collect information via imperceptible means?	Threat can visually observe presence and location, then use counter by TTP	Threat can visually observe presence and location, but cannot determine intention and counter by TTP	Threat cannot visually observe system	Threat cannot visually observe system
DETECT	Sense activity during degraded conditions (degraded or no satellite, no network, no weather, no power) and determine measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity during degraded conditions (degraded or no satellite, no network, no weather, no power) and determine measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Only operates in clear weather and flat terrain	Can operate in adverse weather and high terrain	Can operate in adverse weather and high terrain	Operates in all weather, all terrain
DETECT	Sense activity during degraded conditions (degraded or no satellite, no network, no weather, no power) and determine measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity during degraded conditions (degraded or no satellite, no network, no weather, no power) and determine measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Downtime in hours	Downtime less than 10 minutes	Downtime less than 10 minutes	Immediately reverts without downtime



# Overall Process- Technology Selection





Name	Accept?	Comment
theater intel asset	no	
Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS)	no	AMD function
ENSE SYSTEM INTEGRATOR: AN MSQ 214	no	planning tool
ive Energy Research - Microgrids	no	grid management
(wireless communications)	no	not for mobile comms
OP OF	no	Not for intel data
DSS	no	not application
ECP Control Station and Shelter	no	shelter
m	yes	sends threat data/IMADS entry requires update/fix
ir Defense Command Control and s (FAAD C2)	no	Not for intel data
s	no	air threat data in conjunction with
s	no	Not for intel data
and Missile Defense Battle Command	no	Not for intel data



- Review Use Case OV-2, OV-5, Use Case Steps
- Search IMADS for candidate technologies
- Determine applicability, technology readiness, fielding and funding.
- Document rationale for technologies not selected.

System (BCS)  
 Integrated Fire Control Station (IFCS)  
 Integrated Ground Security, Surveillance and Resiliency Capability (IGSSR-C)  
 Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)  
 Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)  
 JTAGS IGC



- BCCP 1
- BCCP 2
- BCCP 3
- ...
- BCCP 10

DOWR Phase	ARCC Required capability (from BCCP)	Measure	Measure Score			
			1	2	3	4
Detect	Automatically collect and store information on number, location, and intensity of attacks.	Does the system provide the automated ability to collect & store information on number of attacks, location, and intensity?	No automated capability	Automated collection of a single incident	Automated storage capability at a system level (example AMOWS)	Automated storage capability passed to RCT, primary database
Detect	Provide 2 layers of surveillance capability to provide in-depth coverage	Does the system provide the ability to use a minimum of 2 layers of surveillance capabilities to provide in-depth coverage at least 24/7?	Only 1 layer of surveillance	Two layers with partial redundancy	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum
Detect	Collect information via interceptable threat	Does the system provide the ability to collect information via interceptable threat?	Threat can visually observe presence and location, then use counter by TTP	Threat can visually observe presence and location, then use counter by TTP	Threat cannot visually observe system	Threat cannot visually observe system
Detect	Sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstructions, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstructions, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Only operates in clear weather and flat terrain	Can operate in adverse weather and high terrain	Can operate in adverse weather and high terrain	Operates in all terrain
Detect	Sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstructions, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstructions, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Down time in hours	Down time approximately 10 minutes	Down time less than 10 minutes	Immediately rears without downtime




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
# Overall Process- BCCP Development



System Name	Accept?	Comment
ACT-E	no	theater intel asset
Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS)	no	AMD function
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM INTEGRATOR: AN MSQ 214	no	planning tool
Alternative Energy Research - Microgrids	no	grid management
CNET (wireless communications)	no	not for mobile comms
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System Name  
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 Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)  
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 JTAGS IGC



- Determine C4I system options in place by FY'15: SGS/ FAADC2, COSFPS as a stand-alone, SGS/FAADC2 integrated with COSFPS.
- Build BCCPs with technologies that are interoperable with C4I.
- Build into the BCCPs the ability to address the four use cases.




BCCP 10

DOWR Phase	ARCC Required capability (from BCCP)	Measure	Measure Score			
			1	2	3	4
Detect	Automatically collect and store information on number, location, and intensity of attacks.	Does the system provide the information on number, location, and intensity of attacks?	No automated capability	Automated collection of a single incident	Automated storage capability as part of a system load (example ARDC)	Automated storage capability passed to ACD, primary database
Detect	Provide 2 layers of surveillance capability to provide in-depth coverage	Does the system provide the ability to use a minimum of 2 layers of surveillance capability to provide in-depth coverage at least 24/7?	Only 1 layer of surveillance	Two layers with partial redundancy	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum
Detect	Collect information via imperceptible means	Does the system provide the ability to collect information via imperceptible means?	Threat can visually observe presence and identification, then act counter by TTP	Threat can visually observe presence but cannot determine identification and counter by TTP	Threat cannot visually observe system	Threat cannot visually observe system and passive measures that cannot be detected by ESM/IR
Detect	Sense activity through digital conditions regardless of terrain, weather, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity through digital conditions regardless of terrain, weather, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Only operates in clear weather and flat terrain	Can operate in adverse weather	Can operate in adverse weather and high terrain	Operates in all terrain
Detect	Sense activity through digital conditions regardless of terrain, weather, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity through digital conditions regardless of terrain, weather, and weather. Sense passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation?	Downtime in hours	Downtime approximately 10 minutes	Downtime less than 10 minutes	Immediately reinit without downtime






# Overall Process- Scoring Use Cases




System Name	Accept?	Comment
ACT-E	no	theater intel asset
Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS)	no	AMD function
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM INTEGRATOR: AN MSO 214	no	planning tool
Alternative Energy Research - Microgrids	no	grid management
CNET (wireless communications)	no	not for mobile comms
CPOF	no	Not for intel data
DSS	no	not application
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...	no	Not for intel data
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 Integrated Fire Control Station (IFCS)  
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 Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)  
 JTAGS IGC



- Determine weights for Use Cases and ARCIC Capabilities from SME panel, 16-19 Sep.
- Develop scoring criteria (1-4 Scale) for each ARCIC capability per use case.
- SE panel scores BCCPs.
- Use scores to run iterations to revise BCCPs.






# BCCP Performance Attribute Assessment



## Hierarchy for Use Case 1



$W_i$ : ARCIC Use Case Weighting

$V_{ik}$ : ARCIC Capability Weighting

$X_{ik}$ : Measure Score for a BCCP

### Measure Scales

SASOP Phase (DCS)	ARCIC Required capability (from BOP)	Measure	Measure Scale			
			1	2	3	4
Detect	Automatically collect and store information on number, location, and intensity of events	Does the system provide the automated ability to collect & store information on number of events, location, and intensity?	No automated capability	Automated collection of a single incident	Automated storage capability of a system level (through ARCIC)	Automated storage capability processed by BCT's primary database
Detect	Provide 3 layers of surveillance capabilities to provide in depth coverage	Does the system provide the ability to use a minimum of 3 layers of surveillance capabilities to provide in depth coverage at user-defined sites?	Only 1 layer of surveillance	Two layers with partial redundancy	Two layers with complete redundancy in same spectrum	Two layers with complete redundancy in more than one spectrum
Detect	Collect information via imperceptible means	Does the system provide the ability to collect information via imperceptible means?	Threat can visually observe presence and intentions, then can be countered by IFF	Threat can visually observe presence that cannot determine countermeasures by IFF	Threat cannot visually observe system	Threat cannot visually observe system even passive measures that cannot be detected by IFF
Detect	Sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstacles, and weather. Provide passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to sense activity during degraded conditions without performance degradation?	Only operates in clear weather and flat terrain	Can operate in adverse weather	Can operate in adverse weather and harsh terrain	Operates in all weather, all terrain
Detect	Sense activity during degraded conditions regardless of terrain, obstacles, and weather. Provide passive defense measures in all environmental conditions without degradation	Does the system provide the ability to respond to detection requests without performance degradation?	Downtime in hours	Downtime approximately 30 minutes	Downtime less than 10 minutes	Immediately react without downtime

BCCP Scoring

- BCCP 1
- BCCP 2
- BCCP 3
- ...
- ...
- BCCP 10

### Additive Value Model Calculation

$$\alpha_{BCCP, i} = \sum_k X_{ik} * V_{ik}$$

BCCP PAA score for Use Case i

$$\alpha_{BCCP, all} = \sum_i W_i * \alpha_{BCCP, i}$$

BCCP PAA total score across all Use Cases


- $\alpha_{BCCP}$  => performance for each BCCP
- $i$  => Use Cases
- $k$  => Measure for Use Case
- $W$  => Priority of Use Case
- $X$  => Score of the BCCP against the measure
- $V$  => Priority of ARCIC Capability for Use Case





# AATFB: FY12+ Actions and Deliverables

- Increase scope beyond FY11 to include fixed site, CONUS, Joint Service and coalition bases
- Develop Objective Architecture for
  - IBD - Fixed Site, Joint Service, Coalition
  - Base Infrastructure
  - Army Enterprise Comms and Computing Infrastructure
- Manage the materiel baselines and supporting architectures







# Questions?



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