



Translating the IM behaviour of munitions to operational consequences

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Overview

- › Introduction

- › Case study in compound environment
 - › Mortar attack
 - › Detonation of ammunition storage

- › Sympathetic Reaction toolbox
 - › Case study: M107 155 mm
 - › Research mitigating materials

- › Conclusions



Introduction


- › Protection and Survivability of Compounds
- › Countermeasures
 - › Situational Awareness
 - › Concealment /Camouflage
 - › Distance
 - › Physical protection
 - › Munition storage






Case study

› Mortar attack at compound





Case study





Case study

- › 2 Scenarios:
 - › Mass detonation entire storage (4000 kg)
 - › Limited event: one load board (56 kg)

- › Setting the stage for R&D in the field of IM munitions
- › This is what it's all about!



Overview

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- › Case study in compound
 - › Mortar attack at compound
 - › Detonation of ammunition storage

- › **Sympathetic Reaction toolbox**
 - › **Case study: M107 155 mm**
 - › **Research mitigating materials**

- › Conclusions




Sympathetic detonation Toolbox

- › Effects external threat on donor
- › Effects detonating article on neighbouring articles
- › Engineering tools
- › Spreadsheet implementation

- › Ongoing work!




Outline Toolbox






Outline Toolbox





Outline Toolbox





Case study: Sympathetic detonation M107, 155 mm



- › Threat: effects from incoming mortar
- › Donor and Acceptor: M107, 155 mm, TNT filled



- › Three Mechanisms:
 - I. Acceptor in neighboring stack (10-100 cm's)
 - II. Acceptor in same stack: one-on-one
 - III. Acceptor in same stack: diagonal positioned



Three mechanisms



› Effects on acceptors vary with distance

20 mm distance



40 mm distance



70 mm distance





Results evaluation

› Summary of results

Mechanism	Relevant threat		Result
I	SDT		Highly likely for different fragments and impact angles
	Acceptor casing penetration		Highly likely for different fragments shapes and impact angles
	Blast		Critical shock pressure of the explosive fill exceeded < 2 m
II	Sympathetic reaction, one-on-one (homogeneous loading of acceptor)		No SDT, effect of deformation not evaluated
III	Sympathetic reaction, diagonal (homogeneous loading of acceptor)		SDT is highly likely


- › Results of the Toolbox evaluation guides the search for the right mitigating materials or structural solutions




Approach for barrier research

- › A barrier should:
 - › Stop Fragments
 - › Stop Secondary fragments (e.g. spall of container)
 - › Reduce (Blast) pressure
 - › No secondary fragments from barrier itself
 - › Reduce deformation acceptor

Pumice





Critical fragment arresting bars





Approach for barrier research – recent advances


- › Blast mitigating materials for situation of SD
 - › Based on damage assessment of acceptor
 - › Homogeneous load distribution due to intact casing
- › Tested materials (a.o.)
 - › Aluminium foam
 - › Polyurethane foam





Experimental set up

- › Experiment in bunker
- › 1 donor, 2 acceptors at different distances
- › Steel cylinders $D=70$ mm, $t=5$ mm
- › Semtex10 or sand-fill





Results

› 20 mm distance



No mitigation



PUR foam



Results

› 40 mm distance



No mitigation



PUR foam



Results

› 70 mm distance



No mitigation




PUR foam



Results

- › Both materials excellent fragment arresting capabilities
- › PUR and Al foam applied
 - › Live acceptors
 - › Autodyn simulations


	Distance [mm]		
Material	20	40	70
PUR foam	n.t.	Orange	Green
Aluminium foam	n.t.	Red	Green





Results

› Simulation of foam behaviour





Conclusions

- › Engineering tools in the sympathetic detonation Toolbox guide the search for the right mitigating materials or structural solutions
- › Substantial difference between effects mass detonation or limited event in compound environment
- › Quantification of consequences

Putting all the work on IM munitions in the right perspective sets the stage and should **motivate** and **challenge you** in your activities. These efforts protect the warfighter in their day to day business.

Questions?







Other TNO presentations today

- › Mr. Gert Scholtes: “ *AN EFP IMPACT IN COMPARISON WITH THE IM FRAGMENT IMPACT TEST*” , Wednesday, 2.50 pm, Session 7A
- › Mr. Wim de Klerk: “IMPROVED IM PROPERTIES OF AN RDX/TPE BASED LOVA PROPELLANT FOR ARTILLERY APPLICATIONS” , Wednesday, 4.30 pm, Session 8A





Numerical simulation foam behaviour






Numerical simulation foam behaviour






Numerical simulation foam behaviour






Outline Toolbox





Conversion to representative cylinder



Dimension		Type	
		CompB	TNT
Mass metal part	kg	35,0	35,0
Design explosive mass	kg	8,41	8,39
Total mass	kg	43,41	43,39
External diameter	mm	155,0	155,0
Internal diameter	mm	112,3	112,2
Thickness casing	mm	21,35	20,90
Length	mm	494,0	509,0

Mott fragment
distribution equations

Parameter		Type	
		CompB	TNT
Mott constant	$\text{kg}^{0.5} \text{m}^{-7/6}$	2,714	3,815
Fragment distribution factor	$\text{kg}^{0.5}$	2,00	2,75
Average fragment mass	gr	7,89	15,16
Heaviest fragment	gr	280	455
Design fragment mass	gr	36	68
Total number of fragments	-	658	346

