

The interface of human and animal health: Identifying threats before they emerge.

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# Where is the frontline in the battle against infectious diseases?



**METABIOTA** 



Scanning for fever in response to swine flu, Singapore





HIV screening and counseling activities

Cameroon





Taiwanese hospital during SARS outbreak Centers for Disease Control and Prevention



#### Gorilla found dead



#### bushmeat






























16626 planes in flight 2005 Mar 19-

#### AIR NETWORKS IN 1933



## AIR NETWORKS IN 2005



## Human-Livestock-Wildlife Interface



Land Use Change & Human Population Growth

Livelihood Impacts & Economic Pressures

Increased Contact Between Humans, Livestock, & Wildlife


Health Risks to Humans, Livestock, & Wildlife

Enhanced Flow of Pathogens


- Majority of emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) in people are of animal origin (zoonotic)
- 75% of emerging zoonoses have wildlife origins
- Human activities at the interface linked to EIDs (Nipah virus, SARS, Ebola)
- Annual population growth among highest in buffers to protected areas near wildlife




## **Current Outbreak Detection and Response**




## **Effective Health Early Warning**



#### A successful EID outbreak alert and response system



#### PREDICT: Building a global early warning system for emerging diseases that move between wildlife and people


















## Where do we start?

How many species are there?



~9,000,000 'species'

Mora et al. 2011 PLoS Biology



#### **Developing a Targeted Surveillance Strategy**

for wildlife species of highest risk


Number of human EIDs from each taxonomic group primates Phylogenetic distance free Shrews, Colugos from humans rodents bats Carnivores Unquiates Marsupials Monotremes izards, Snakes Crocodiles Invertebrates





# **Developing a Targeted Surveillance Strategy**

Strategic selection of geographic locations for surveillance



Strategic selection of species for surveillance





# Risk-based Approach to Surveillance in hotspot regions around the world


- Sample along high risk disease transmission pathways
  - Hunted animals, animals in wildlife trade, (wildlife destined for human consumption, local and international trade)
- People have a high level of sustained and direct contact with pathogens from these sources





# Targeted Approach to Surveillance of wild caught free-ranging animals

- Sample wild caught freeranging wildlife in areas where disease emergence is promoted by:
  - landscape change,
  - land use,
  - anthropogenic activities,
  - sharing of limited resources, and
  - incursion of domestic animals
- Identify natural reservoirs for zoonotic pathogens





# **Key Sites**





Cameroon / China / San Francisco CA, USA / Sierra Leone / Washington DC, USA

#### Field & Lab Operations

Democratic Republic of Congo Gabon Indonesia / Kazakhstan Malaysia / Vietnam

#### Field Collection Partner

Cambodia / Laos / Madagascar



# Longitudinal Studies of Individuals Occupationally Exposed to Animals











**ID Guide for Central African Hunters** 



## **Active Collections from Wildlife**




Wildlife Sanctuary Work




Wild animal capture






#### **RESULTS AFTER 10 YEARS**



VIRUSES, INCLUDING RETROVIRUSES




COLLECTED >100k HUMAN & >50k ANIMAL SAMPLES



DOCUMENTED VIRAL
JUMPS FROM ANIMALS
TO HUMANS



#### **NEW AGENTS DISCOVERED INCLUDE:**



HTLV-3, HTLV-4 NOVEL STLV & SFV LINEAGES RETROVIRUSES – LIKE HIV



Plasmodium
NOVEL PRIMATE LINEAGES
MALARIA PARASITES



NOVEL CLADE OF EBOLA FILOVIRUSES



Various new/divergent paramyxoviruses, coronaviruses, adenoviruses, astroviruses, poxviruses, rhabdoviruses, etc.

# Adaptive Surveillance Strategy to identify situations requiring enhanced surveillance

#### Ongoing epidemiologic analysis of data

- To describe zoonotic pathogens in wildlife in each hotspot region
- Identify zoonotic disease threats that require further investigation
- Refine our sampling strategies

#### Digital feedback

- Use triggers that signal a high potential for zoonotic pathogen outbreaks
  - Unusual outbreaks in humans and domestic animals with zoonotic pathogens of possible wildlife origin

# **EPIDEMIC RESPONSE UNITS**













# PREDICT





























#### RESEARCH COLLABORATORS

- ACMS/PSI International Cameroon Program
- · Blood Systems Research Institute
- Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville (CIRMF)
- · Care and Health Program Cameroon (CHP)
- CARE International
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
- · Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of Guangdong Province
- Centre Pasteur, Cameroon
- · Columbia University
- Department of Orang Asli, Malaysia
- · Department for Veterinary Services, Malaysia
- EcoHealth Alliance (EHA)
- FHI 360
- Guangdong Entomological Institute (GDEI)
- Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN)
- Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)
- · Institut Pasteur, Cambodia
- Kinshasa School of Public Health (KSPH)
- Lola ya Bonobo Sanctuary
- Ministry of Health of Cambodia
- Ministry of Public Health of Cameroon
- Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China
- Ministry of Health of Democratic Republic of Congo
- · Ministry of Health of Gabon
- · Ministry of Health of Malaysia

- · Ministry of Health of Laos
- · Ministry of Health & Sanitation of Sierra Leone
- Ministry of Water and Forests of Gabon
- National Institute for Biomedical Research (I.N.R.B.)
- National Public Health Laboratory (NPHL)
- Naval Medical Research Unit -2 (NAMRU-2), Phnom Penh
- PERHILITAN (Malaysian Wildlife Department)
- Robert Koch-Institute (RKI)
- Smithsonian Institute
- · Stanford University
- · University of California, Davis
- · Tropical Medicine Research Program of Oxford University
- Tulane University
- · University of California, Davis
- University of California, Los Angeles
- · University of California, San Diego
- · University of California, San Francisco
- · University of Edinburgh
- · University of Massachusetts, Amherst
- University of Oxford
- US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
- US Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
- US Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- World Health Organization (WHO), Sierra Leone Country Office



#### **OUR MISSION**

To mitigate the risk of microbial threats



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