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Combatant Commands Needs to Capabilities

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
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Department's Needs to Capabilities in 20 minutes or less






Defense Capabilities Enterprise: Diversified Force Generation Roles, Diversified Force Employment Needs



Organize, Train & Equip



Operationally Employ




...with increasingly, complex operational partners: NGB, inter-agency, coalition, NGO



Aligning the Domains: Defense Engine for Capabilities



All three domains must be aligned & engaged to deliver capabilities



The challenge for Combatant Commanders:

- ◆ They exist in the authority domain of **Military Needs & Operations**
 - ◆ Joint force needs are predominantly expressed through CJCS
 - ◆ Only US Special Operations Command and US Transportation Command have force development **acquisition authorities**
- ◆ They rely on **Services** for preponderance of force capabilities
- ◆ They rely on Services for HQ resources through legacy Executive Agency provisions
- ◆ They have limited manpower to participate in **needs**, **acquisition** & **funding** processes



Observations – Military Needs/Operations

Services Resurgent in Force Definition



No real reduction in need of military capability



Services reasserting basic role of Joint Staff: support Military Chiefs/CJCS/VCJCS

Evolving Capability Gap Assessment emplaces framework of strategy and Chairman's Risk Assessment on examination of CCDR need submittals



Diminishing size of CCDR staffs portends reduced ability to interact in all JROC/Joint Capability Integration & Development System

Continued reliance on Service-generated force structure in absence of a consolidated joint force construct mutes CCDR influence on tailoring forces to deployed missions



Observations – Developmental Capabilities

CCDR-Service Partnerships Essential



- Discretionary resources for CCDR-initiated developmental capabilities shrinking
- Fundamental changes in experimentation and demonstration reflect shift to centralized conceptualization to leverage reduced resource base
 - Services must make hard decisions on priorities – there are no ‘discretionary’ funds

CCDRs must work to establish

- Coherent, consistent, compelling message matching threat to needs
- Confederation with other CCDR staffs on common pursuits
- Flexible, persistent engagement with internal Service force formulation processes
- Sophisticated understanding of strategy/policy framework and balanced authority domains: military needs – resources – Acquisition

***Key to CCDR success with tailored capabilities:
Proactive/accountable advocacy with Services by CCDR Component Commands***



Observations – Technology Provider Strategies

Industry Insight & Comprehension Essential



Develop enduring relationships with Service/SOCOM research, development & engineering centers

- Press Service/SOCOM partners for understanding of path to force integration for envisioned improvements – tailor products to Service conventions
- Understand pivotal role of Component “resource sponsors” and develop partnership with RD&E to expose potential advantages of advocated improvements

Work with Service Component Commander staffs to understand demands placed on deployed units and find opportunities to experiment “in the field”

Heed CCMD-expressed “military needs” as market demand signals, but recognize profit limitations of direct marketing to CCMD end users

Leverage IRAD – aggressively pursue Service/SOCOM partnerships leveraging “banked” R&D resources – yours or those of a strategic partner



If you're not hiring veterans, you won't understand potential military customers



Backup Slides



21st Century: Evolving Second Decade Model

Combatant Commander Consumers



- Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
- Coalition Warfare Program
- Foreign Comparative Testing Program
- Joint Test & Evaluation Program
- Strategic Capabilities

CJCS/Joint Chiefs allocate Service-generated force elements to limited number of OPLANS/CONPLANS

CCDRs determine achievable functional/theater end states for allocated forces

DoD-sponsored programs focus on enhancing baseline Service capabilities in generic mission sets

- Comprehensive Joint Assessment & the tie to the CRA makes pragmatic projection of risk areas to be addressed
- Constrained resources focuses investment in core Service capabilities
- Services focus on functions/theaters representing greatest military risk in formulating force structure/capabilities
- Joint Staff/OSD-funded capability enhancements shift from joint to Service partnerships (eg Air-Sea Battle) in CENTCOM/PACOM AoRs vice worldwide balance



Requirements Process



CGA Process



**CCMD
Component Commander
thru
Service and JCIDs process**



Observations – CCDR Coping Strategies



More important than ever to leverage CCDR – Component Commander teamwork

- Key to influencing force structure/capabilities is CompCom advocacy of CCMD needs inside of Service processes
- Closer coordination required between Global Force requests/allocations and desired capability enhancements for deploying military elements

Senior civilian officials (SD/DSD/USDs) remain committed to CCDRs as “tip of the spear” customers for military forces

Plan ahead and be postured to levy specific requirements in response to emergent operational situations, to resource availabilities, and development capability opportunities



21st Century: First Decade Model

Combatant Commander Customers



- Annual Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) aired major CDR mission capability needs; stimulated Joint Staff-brokered remedies for force capability shortfalls
- Dependent on ample incremental DoD funding driven by extended overseas conflicts
- Over time, DoD-sponsored programs pursued Service partnerships to improve transition of innovative/responsive concepts to integrated force capabilities
- Service partnerships hampered bold innovation; shifted focus to cooperative, incremental force enhancements to reduce transition risk



Observations – Resources



“Support the POM” is Pentagon commitment to live within Defense budget limits

- No “unclaimed” funding in the Defense budget
- Old habits die hard – PBR14 issue submissions still proposed large expenditures
- Senior officials advocate diet suppression – theoretically willing to cash in mature programs while bankrolling mission critical initiatives – with uncertain “savings”

Sequestration is a fact – but all of the bills aren’t on the table yet

- Six months of Continuing Resolution funding likely, and more constraining
- Army, OCO bills will require wide-ranging “contributions”

When the budget constricts, Services retreat to core missions

- “Joint” often viewed as elective/sacrificial surplus, not path to efficiencies
- New Service challenges surfacing to executive agency for CCMDs
- Legislative professional staffers strongly influenced by Services, not CCMDs


“Affordability” is recurrent theme

- JROC endeavors to establish better cost-benefit/affordability analytics
- Affordability is a major consideration in acquisition & requirements reviews



Three Requirements “Lanes”

“Keep right, except to pass”



- **Deliberate Requirements**

- Driven by Service or Defense Agency
- Traditional route for capabilities that require significant tech development and/or are not urgent or compelling in nature

- **Emergent Requirements**

- Driven by senior joint combatant commanders
- Supports accelerated acquisition of capabilities needed for an anticipated or pending contingency operation
- Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) verifies, Joint Capability Board or JROC validates

- **Urgent Requirements**

- Driven by senior joint combatant commanders
- Urgent and compelling to prevent loss of life and/or mission failure during current operations
- Require little tech development and can be resolved in less than two years
- J-8 Deputy Director for Requirements (DDR) validates