





# ***ASSURING HUMAN CONTROL AUTHORITY OVER AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS***

JEN NARKEVICIUS, PHD JENIUS LLC

AND

STEVE HARRIS, RATIONAL LLC

# AUTOMATION OVER TIME




<http://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2011/04/01/135018381/on-apples-birthday-a-brief-history-of-computing>

<http://erricous.free.fr/Electronique/Projets/thermost/THER005.JPG>





<https://ir.kaist.ac.kr/board/newsView.do?guid=c922692d-870d-e511-9407-2c44fd7df8b9>

# HUMAN-SYSTEM FUNCTION ALLOCATION




- Note that we have not specified the human or machine components in this depiction of closed-loop control, only the functional requirements
  - induction and deduction
  - internal representation (simulation)
  - estimates of missing parameters


# COMPLEXITY AND CONTROL



Process taxonomy



# CONTROL THEORY




# MODEL OF USER-DEVICE INTERACTION\*

Information Management & Display  
*Help user gain situation awareness*

Events, incidents and alerts  
*Ways users organize their thinking about the system under control.*

Decision support  
*Help user understand what the options are for action.*

Architecture Functional Requirements



\*After diagram by Robert A North, PhD, Human-Centered Strategies, LLC, based on FDA UPCARE model

# EMERGENT FAILURE MODES



<http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories/s2015.htm> ; <http://whotv.com/2014/09/26/all-chicago-flights-halted-by-fire/>  
[https://www.google.com/search?q=super+bowl+power+outage&source=Inms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=0CAkQ\\_AUoA2oVChMI5MK7kLDRyAIVyCgeCh0TPwSX&biw=1366&bih=628&dpr=1.71#imgrc=XiOWIVhrFNqFsM%3A](https://www.google.com/search?q=super+bowl+power+outage&source=Inms&tbn=isch&sa=X&ved=0CAkQ_AUoA2oVChMI5MK7kLDRyAIVyCgeCh0TPwSX&biw=1366&bih=628&dpr=1.71#imgrc=XiOWIVhrFNqFsM%3A)



Department of Defense  
**DIRECTIVE**

NUMBER 3000.09  
November 21, 2012

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Autonomy in Weapon Systems

References: See Enclosure 1

1. **PURPOSE.** This Directive:

a. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned platforms.

b. Establishes guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements.

2. **APPLICABILITY.** This Directive:

a. Applies to:

(1) OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Joint Staff (CJCS), the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the Defense Activity, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to as "Components").

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000

June 5, 2015

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Director of Defense Science and Robotics for Support Functions

The Department of Naval Operations (DON) is on the forefront of artificial intelligence (AI)

research. Recent operational examples of the DON's application of AI and robotics technology include: Ghost Swimmer, an unmanned underwater vehicle that mimics a Bluefin tuna; the X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System that can autonomously land aboard an aircraft carrier; and the Swarmboat unmanned surface vehicle that can sync with other unmanned vessels to swarm and interdict enemy vessels.

The private sector is investing heavily in AI and robotics automation for decision-making and physical implementation tasks. The DON could benefit from considering how to adapt recent private sector advances in fields such as machine learning, natural language processing, ontological engineering, and automated planning for mission execution.

To accelerate the exploration of these opportunities, the DON will:

shall:



2. APPLICABILITY. This Directive:

a. Applies to:

(1) OSD, the Military Departments, the Staff and the Joint Staff (CJCS), the Combatant Commands, the Defense Acquisition and Administration Organization, and other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to as "Components").

(2) The design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.

(3) The application of this Directive to semi-autonomous weapon systems.




4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.

(2) Consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of control of the system to unauthorized parties, physical hardware and software will be designed with appropriate:



(a) Safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and information assurance in accordance with DoD Directive 8500.01E (Reference (a)).

(b) Human-machine interfaces and controls.





# REQUIREMENT: DESIGN A CYBORG

- Implied goal of Human-System Integration (HSI)
- More than the sum of its parts (hence  $\times$  not  $+$ )
  - Emergent capabilities
  - A new entity



# Model of User-Device Interaction





# INTELLIGENT CONTROL THEORY CONFRONTS THE EFM PROBLEM

- *Intelligence* is required/demonstrated when the internal representation (model, simulation) has more parameters than observables
  - *Something* is required to identify and estimate the parameters
  - Missing parameters are not deducible from sense data
  - There is no single “correct” solution – this is currently the only viable answer
- Theory of simulation meets the need for a theory of internal representation
- Graph theory is the mathematical

# ASSURING HUMAN CONTROL AUTHORITY

- Analysis shows EFM are unpredictable and nearly inevitable in complex systems (including SOA/SoS)
- We must design systems so human and machine components can work together as seen in both experience and policy
- We set out to identify the necessary, if not minimum necessary, and sufficient features of systems to meet the DODDIR requirement
- Solutions will arise from focusing on representing where the human – machine entity is, relative to its goal
  - Apportioning control processes to human and machine components to exploit human strengths to detect, diagnose and redress emergent failures
  - Assure that proposed system design conforms to Intelligent Control Theory process architecture