NDIA #19693: Program **Management in HPCMP-CREATE™** (A Family of Largescale, Physics-based, Systemof-Systems, Software **Development Projects)**

An Application of Risk-based Management Practices in Software Development



Richard P Kendall, Ph.D. with D.E. Post, L.G. Votta, P. A. Gibson, L. A. Park and S.M. Sundt October 2017



Program Management in CREATE

- If you were starting a new
- distributed,
 - physics-based,
 - system-of-systems
 - HPC-capable

DoD software development project

How would you manage it for long-term success?

... based on the CREATE experience



Program Management in CREATE

Why should you have confidence in the staying power of CREATE?

Start by Recognizing that Software **Development is a Risky Enterprise**



who Killed the Virtual Case File? - IEEE Spectrum COMPUTING / SOFTWARE FEATURE « Foodstamp Use Breaks Record Who Killed the Virtual Case File? ow the FBI blew more than \$100 million on case-management software it will he early 1990s, Russian mobsters partnered with Italian Mafia families in Newark, N.J., to s e eany 1990s, russian moosers parmereu win isanan mana lammes in rewars, russi ko s Pal and New Jersey state gasoline and diesel taxes. Special Agent Lamp Depew set up an al and new Jersey state gasonine and dieser taxes. Opecial Alleni Lany Lepew set up an allon under the direction of Robert J. Chiaradio, a supervisor at the Federal Bureau of Inve taxes and the set of the collected reams of evidence from wiretaps, interviews, and financial transactions over the v conecteo reams or evidence nom wiretaps, interviews, and intercial transactions uver interviews. In the contract of the cont Ins. Unortunatery, the Poli courdin's provide nim with a diastuase program that would interval tion, so Depew wrote one himself. He used it to trace relationships between telephone and the policy and retaining that to only one instant interval to the policy of the pol tion, so Depew wrote one miniser, ne used it to trace relationarity's service interprint can ince, and interviews, but he could not import information from other investigations that the service of a surgest one of a surgest to a surgest to be available to the state of a surgest of the service of a surgest of the service of a surgest of the service o Ince, and interviews, but ne could not import intrimuted interview over investigations that training in wasn't until Depew mentioned the name of a suspect to a colleague that he obtained a bit to a colleague that he obtained a bit to be a support of the support ened it up, it was a treasure trove of information about who's involved in the conspiracy, in intervent report in the excession works of information about write a information in the components, it listed percentages of who good hup no denivore minute and to be to sense of an and the sense of the s supposed to pay, the number of gallons, it became a central piece of evidence. Crepter in at the FBI's New Jersey Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory, in Hamilton, where he is I picked up the phone and called that agent, I never would have gotten it." Depew's need to share information combined with his do-it-yourself database skills and a s Departs a need to share information comoined with his dont-youtsen database skills and its sor. Chiaradio, would land him a job managing his first IT project-the FBfs Virtual Case Fil ment to the FBI's VCF team was an auspicious start to what would become the most highly nent of Defense spends tens of billions of dollars annually creating software that is rarely reused and difficult t y threats. Instead, much of this software is allowed to become the property of defense companies, resulting in ament to the Fols VUF team was an auspronuus siant to what wound versione when there in the interview of the team of team In majory. The vice was supposed to automate the hors paper-based work environment, and analysis to share vital investigative information, and replace the obsolete Automated Cases anaryses to snare vital investigative information, and replace the ouscient Automation view lead, the FBI claims, the VCF's contractor, Science Applications International Corp. (SAL) coherent set of policies and regulations for the DoD's intellectual property has eroded the U.S. military tvantage, leading to compromised missions and lost lives. Improvised explosive device countermeasure eea, the proliciality, the vors contractor, octative Applications International Corp. Loword, 00 000 lines of code so bug-ridden and functionally off target that this past April, the burge be upgraded rapidly without replacing entire systems; personnel position systems can't update in real time; bo ouo intes or code so bug-riaden and functionality on target that this past April, the oureal million project, including \$105 million worth of unusable code. However, various governm Intimon project, including 3 too minion worai or unusaure coou, riowever, various governing a show that the FBI—lacking IT management and technical expertise—shares the blame fo ules governing the military's intellectual property portfolio use an antiquated rights structure where the s retains copyright, and therefore effective monopoly, control over taxpayer-funded software ideas. By age audit, released in 2005, Glenn A. Fine, the U.S. Department of Justice's inspector genu age audit, released in 2005, Grenn A. Fine, the U.S. Department of vublice simplection series that contributed to the VCF's failure. Among them: poorly defined and slowly evolving defined and slowly of that the defense industry will do right by the military. However, the defense That contributed to the VUP's ratiure. Among mem: poorry demined and subwry evolving dem mbibous schedules; and the lack of a plan to guide hardware purchases, network deploym for the history. costs and decrease adaptability and agility in military software. Examples and the recently canceled Future Combat Systems, where only one company can years after terrorists crashed jettiners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the J manipulate the software. Imagine if only the manufacturer of a rifle were allowed to clean, fix years aner terrorsts crashed jemmers into the workd intade Cemer and the memory of a for not "connecting the dots" in time to prevent the attacks, shill did not have the software at rifle. This is where the military finds itself: one contractor with a monopoly on the knowledge of a to require all taxpayer-funded software ideas to be licensed with an open source software copyright. ase Support system—which some agents have avoided using—is cumbersome e would define the rights, roles and responsibilities for the military and defense industry and simplify deas can be shared. To keep the U.S. military ahead of its adversaries, the DoD and defense is, and does not manage, link, research, analyze, and share vare intellectual property regime would broaden the defense industrial base by enabling industry ledge, thereby increasing competition and eventually lowering costs. Over time, DoD would evolve

ly or

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ure 1055 01 5-20 UNION III INAIREI CAPITAIZANON INAN dOES THE SMAIL INVESTOR absorbing a 30 percent loss in the value of stock purchased Gov't Software: A Legacy of Risk Management Failure!

ems are up and

Presentaux.

say on the legality of the Facebook offering, but in non-legal terms, how big a fraud was perpetrated on investors (and the American public) on May 18? American promoty on Man What was wrong with Facebook's initial public offering? " The initial public offering was not really "initial." It was a secondary offering. Before the company's stock was publicly traded, whom's variables, declare the company's stock was primery tables, eetin individuals were allowed to buy shares. In fact, 241,233,015 of the AN entries does not a store to a store of the s certain morvionals were anowed to only anales. In Tact, 241 (23301) of the 421 million shares traded on the day of the "initial" public

or use 4.21 million snares traced on use day or use "mulai" public offering were sold by shareholders who already held the stock. One offering were sold by snareholders who already held the stock. One Facebook board member alone sold 50 million shares going into Continued on page 2, FACEBOOK

LOU DUBOSE, Editor

JUNE 15, 2012

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bankers are expected to get as high a price as possible on

the first day a stock is publicly

traded. Institutional investors understand that. Some small

The courts will have the final investors do not.

ECTATOR

g Facebook:

rs Respond to

berg's Failed IPO

who can get shares of the Facebook IPO should

ny snares as possible. In Cramer's tout on his CNBC *Med Money* program,

s viewers "an in-depth look at Wall Street, stock, and

n's good fortune that he is not legally responsible for

e broadcasts. Trial lawyers who understand securities

ready filed lawsuits against Facebook in federal courts

teamy many mercures against mercure in react a roation is the foresenting investors who acted on the sort of hype

their verdict.

Morgan Stanley, the book runner. on Facebook's IPO.

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chased huge blocks of stock with the intention of creating the

Name and the state of the state

usion or ormani, it worked for a day, even it ne investment infers didn't get the huge IPO "pop" they were trying to create the defendent inside action on the electric measured at e.g. attraction of

names anna i Bes are ange are pop uney were usung to create, ney defended their price as the stock opened at \$38, climbed to 17 and almost as each of

One week later, the jug was up and the price was down. If you were a retail buyer on May 18, you were the sucker. Or

at you need at cents only a of a may any you need that answer and the zucker. You lost. Mark Zuckerberg won. A billionaire many and the transfer to transfer to the transfer to death

the zucker, You lost, Mark Zuckernerg won. A outionaire many times over, the Facebook founder and CEO finds it easier to absorb

unes uver, use racenson ionnor and CEU mus it easier to ausono the loss of \$20 billion in market capitalization than does the small instantic development of a second berrie in the ratio of an element of

The litigation will take some time.

And it will take Facebook public in

a way the company didn't anticipate,

as the discovery process opens up the

files and e-mail accounts of principals,

bankers, and traders who worked the

social network's initial public offering

The markets promptly delivered

Ten days after Facebook's over-

heated May 18 IPO, investors were

dumping the shares at a low of \$28.05.

That is \$14 a share below the high-

est quote on the day of the offering,

when the price was artificially inflated

was selling. (See "Legal Dislikes," page 2.)

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42, and closed at \$38.23.

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Morgan Stanley's juicin futures trader and analyst I have touched the Faceboc

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These contractors

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Let's talk about the corruption. What

har contracts for all the single largest alth-funneling redible amounts of vast streams of data, analyze and dis noney into a militaryseminate it-legally, without warrantustrial-intelligence-

within to produce a demonstration project in 26

Mexico Considers Legalizing Drugs =

Billions Wasted on DoD Software

The victors in battles are those who create, modify and deploy ideas faster and more nimbly than opponents. Regrettably miting the U.S. military's access to ideas risks failure.

years, the U.S. military has been losing an asymmetric battle that involves not improvised explosive devices, bullets Qaida, but instead swarms of defense industry contractors seizing control of taxpayer-funded ideas because governme icy and regulations were engineered to buy iron and steel, not to deploy a software-based military.

like the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rapid and continual evolution of technology demands that the military erate just as rapidly, and the only way is to manage the ideas it has funded.

imon theme since 9/11 is that the U.S. government lacks imagination. We have not misplaced our imagination; we mply unable to deploy new ideas as effectively or as quickly as we could. This loss of agility stands in stark contrast rate industry, foreign governments and nonstate actors, who are adopting and deploying software technologies once ively in the military domain

tance, China deploys advanced electronic warfare technologies, Iran builds unmanned aircraft, al-Qaida evolves e devices, and private companies like FedEx and eTrade create complex, redundant and failsafe command-andsystems

dly funding the same solutions or, worse, repaying to use previously created software

rcial industry ruthlessly exercises control over its own software ideas

ted on software radios that don't interoperate

nent has legisl

is the fabric that enables planning, weapons and logistics systems to function. It might be the only infinitely military resource. New software builds on the raw material of previous software, evolving capabilities. Software ve. from ground sensors to satellites; it is the final expression of a military idea transformed into human readable de and deployed to a battlefield

Intelligence Contractors' Complex by Barbara Koeppel

In our May 15, 2012 issue, National Security Agency executive In our Muy 13, 2012 OSUE, reasonal Security Agency Account nimes musicentimer i nomus terione stori nere in engency jammas final led to 9111. In part two of Barbara Koeppel's interview with Dealer de conservatione de commune commune commune and the p nut tea to 7111. in part two of Barbara Koeppers interview with Drake, the ex-spy reveals the agency's corrupt practices. -L.D.

kinds of numbers were involved? Billions. I have prima fade knowledge about a company called [Science Applications International Corporation, or) SAIC. NSA gave it a huge contract Trailblazer to produce a flagship program cal Trailblazer that was supposed to NSA's intelligence data-gathe analysis problems. But NS had an incredibly powerful pr called Thin Thread that could hat

less wiretapping. And it cost far less. Under Trailblazer, which was osten-Union Hammanda, when was observed.

est for its shareholders: maximize profit


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dysfunctional partnership of nonsharing.



Examples of Failure Similar to CREATE

DOE ASCI (Multi-Physics, HPC) < 50% Success





SOFTWARE PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY ENGINEERING PRACTICES FOR COMPLEX, COUPLED MULTIPHYSICS, MASSIVELY PARALLEL COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM ASCI

D. E. Post R. P. Kendall

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, NM, USA (POST@LANL.GOV)

Abstract

Many institutions are now developing large-scale, compli Mary instalacios are nov developing large-scala, complex, occupien multiphysics computational simulations for mas-terial prastie plasmins for the simulation of the partorm-and of nuclear weapons and certification of the stochysics and of nessach inclume and weather prediction, magnetic and nessach inclume ceasing, combastlon, biological and bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and boot bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and boot bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and boot bootwards svatems, and offer annow the surveyed and bootwards svatems and offer annows the survey of the survey of the surveyee and bootwards svatems and other annows the surveyee and bootwards svatems and statems and statemes and statemes and statemes and statemes and statemes and statemes and statem pacs, aerodynamic oesign, compusition, promption and schemical systems, and other areas. The successful de-alogment of these simulations is alded by attention to velopment of these stimulations is added by attention to soond schware project management and software engineer-ing. We have been solved to a solve and the solved and the other projects that the Department and more National As-celars through has acconnection to develop nuclear some, but out all, of the schware project management and development practices (inther then remained normalised development practices (inther then remained normalised). in-technical software add value to the de ment of scientific software and we identify those that we judge add value. Another key finding, con age and value, whome way tenang, component was ral software industry experience, is that the optimal act schedule and resource level are solely determined ments are

Key words: Software engineering, ver , management, computation

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Marco, Paul Dubois, Michael Gittings, Tom Gorman, Dale Henderson, Joseph Kindel, Kenneth Koch, Robert Lucas. Tom McAbee, Douglas Miller, Pat Miller, David Nowak, ames Rathkopf, Donald Remer, Richard Sharp, Anthony Scannapieco, Rob Thomsett, David Tubbs, Robert Weaver Robert Webster, Daniel Weeks, Robert Weaver, Robert Webster, Dan Weeks, Don Willerton, Ed Yourdon, Michael Zika, and George Zimmerman.

1 Introduction

In the middle of 1996, the Department of Energy (DOE) launched the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) to develop an enhanced simulation capability for the nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) were tasked with developing this capability for the physics performance. and the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) for the engineering performance of weapons systems. The ASCI prorenamed to Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC). It is an appropriate time to assess the progress and to develop "lessons learned" to identify what worked and what did not. This paper presents the "lessons learned" for successful code development during the ASCI project so far. The major points are summarized in Table 1.

In the absence of testing, improved nuclear weaponsimulation capability is needed to sustain the US defenannation capability is needed to sustain the US deten-sive capability. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the cessation of testing nuclear weapons by both Russia the cessanon or testing nuclear weapons by toon rotation and the US in the early 1990s, the US inaugurated the "Stockpile Stewardship" program to maintain its nuclear stockpile. Even though the Russian Federation poses a much reduced threat to the US compared to the Soviet have reascent tareas to the U.S compared to the Source Union, history, particularly the history of the twentieth century, has amply demonstrated that any nation that does not possess a strong defense based on modern milidoes not possess a strong derense based on incolern material tary technology can and often will - fall victim to an aggressor. The US and Russia have been in the process of reducing their stockpiles from the level of tens of thousands of warheads needed to counter a "first strike" to the and or warneaus needed to commer a transmission at the auclear weapons mission is to sustain and maintain the US reduced stockpile for the foresecable future. The os resultant anexpire to the presentate interesting stockpile consists of weapons systems highly ag stockpare consists or weapons systems ingra aized for specific missions and for the maximu optimized for specific missions and for the maximum yield to weight ratio. They were designed for a 15-30 year shell life with little consideration given to possible men nice with time consideration given to position get-term aging issues. The weapons program now has agenterin aging bases, the weapons program now this is challenge of adapting the existing warheads for difa characterize or accurating the characterize warmonus to un-rent missions, and extending their lifetimes to 40 to 60 without the ability to test the nuclear performaa strategy developed for "Stockpile Stewardsh

CREATE-Scale Project Cancelled



CREATE Core Risks

10 Core Risks Identified in 2008

1. Creating and inventing new, innovative software technologies within the existing DoD program and project management structure. 2. Loss of credibility due to defects or insufficiently accurate models in the software that result in inaccurate results. 3. Building and managing software development teams that are embedded in, and part of, the DoD customer organizations. 4. Significant losses of core development staff and their corporate knowledge, due to severe funding reductions and other institutional turmoil. 5. Program coordination within the diverse management cultures especially security management—within different DoD organizations. 6. Requirements creep and relevancy over the project's major development phases. 7. Rapidly changing computational and computer technologies especially rapidly changing computer architectures and environments. 8. Loss of DoD stakeholder and sponsor support due to frequent turnover of senior DoD personnel. 9. Loss of control of intellectual property rights In the absence of domestic copyright protection. **10.Supporting CREATE software users without impacting** development.

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
CREATE Risk Management Principles Addressing the Core Risks

Develop a compelling, credible vision and endeavor to communicate it. Develop a long-term strategic plan and define the essential processes required to execute it. Recruit the right team leaders and strong, multidisciplinary teams. Balance the need for development team empowerment with the need for accountability. Recognize that program management must extend to the risks most outside its control: stable funding, stakeholder support and deployment to customers. Protect the development effort from institutional turmoil. Implement a rigorous verification and validation program.



The CREATE Approach: Principles to Practices to Mitigate Risk

Development Environment Indicators



Notional Home Ground Chart for CREATE

after Boehm, Using Risk to Balance Agile and Plan-Driven Methods, IEEE Computer Society, 2003


"Principles" translated into shared "Practices", as opposed to "Processes", best fit the need for flexibility for CREATE operating within the three Armed Services



Risk 1: Challenge of developing new, innovative software within the DoD Program Management structure

 Mitigating Practice: Strive for flexible execution with risk-mitigating milestones





after Boehm, "Getting Ready for Agile Methods with Care", IEEE Software, 2002

CREATE Development Approach: A Disciplined Agile Workflow Management Approach based on Scrum




Risk 2: Loss of credibility

due to software defects or inaccuracies

Mitigating Practice: Implement a testing program compliant with National Research Council Guidelines; strive for continuous integration with automated regression tests for each commit, and test coverage measurements

Regression testing after every commit



CREATE-RF Continuous Integration Platform


Discover problems before they are hard to fix



Risk 3: Difficulty building software teams


under DoD constraints

- Mitigating Practice: Identify a principal developer within **customer** organizations (in CREATE's case, the Services)
- Mitigating Practice: Recruit lean (5 15 member) development teams lead by technical experts (typically from the DoD S&T community)



Risk 4. Funding Reductions

- Mitigating Practice: Reach out to the customer with Pilot Projects that demonstrate value






Risk 5: Difficult program coordination

in an environment of diverse management cultures—especially security-related

• Mitigating Practice: Establish browser access to CREATE software and support



Secure access without downloading software

Distribution A: Approved for Public release; distribution is unlimited.

Presentation Title Page-13



Risk 6: Requirements creep and product

relevancy

Mitigating Practice. *Express requirements as use-cases in language that customers and developers both understand.*

CREATE-Capstone Foundational¹ Capability Requirements

MG-06 Use-Cases

strand-mesning paradigm

		<u> </u>	MG-06-UC-01	Unstructured all-tetrahedral volume meshing
ID	Description			-
MG-00	Import Externally Generated Geometry (C	۱D, †	MG-06-UC-02	Unstructured hexahedral-dominated hybrid meshing
MG-01	Create Parameterized Geometry			
MG-02	Support Dependency-Based Associative N	od	MG-06-UC-03	Boundary Layer meshing with triangular wedge elements in the
MG-03	Repair Externally Generated (eg CAD) Ge	ome		viscous region transitioning to tet. No interference from other Bl
MG-04	Support De-featuring and Idealization of G	eor		
MG-05	Provide Robust Surface Meshing Algorithm			
MG-06	Provide Robust Volume Meshing Algorithm		MG-06-UC-04	MG07-UC04 with complex geometries and multiple intersecting boundary-layers
MG-07	Provide Geometry-based Mesh Generation	an	MG-06-UC-05	Boundary layer meshing with hex,prism in the viscous regin
MG-08	Support Multi-scale Models			transitioning to hex/tet
MG-09	Support Legacy Component Integration		MG-06-UC-06	MG06-UC05 with complex geometries & multiple intersections
MG-10	Support Analysis Model Attribution			
MG-11	Provide Accurate and Scalable Runtime G	eom	MG-06-UC-07	Volume mesh handing for high order element (first approach)
MG-12	Core Framework (Internal requirements to s	st pp	MG-06-UC-08	Matching volume meshes for periodic boundary condition
	above)			
			MG-06-UC-09	Exterior volume meshing up to a given truncation boundary
				1 SOURCES

The focus is on shared understanding of requirements for moving parts


¹ Established in 2008

MG-06-0C-



Risk 7: Anticipating and responding to rapidly changing HPC environments

Mitigating Practice: Ensure that the CREATE program maintains an awareness of evolving state of the art in high performance computing



BY NEAL SINGER PHOTOGRAPHY BY RANDY MONTOYA



Risk 8: Loss of sponsor support

due to frequent turnover of senior DoD personnel



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
- Mitigating Practice: Continually reach out to new seniorand middle-level members of the DoD acquisition engineering community.
 - **Examples of Outreach:**
 - **3 BAAs or CRADAs**
 - 60+ CREATE Pilot Projects
 - Dozens of training courses
 - 100's of technical articles(45+ in 2016 alone)



V-22



Strategic Airlift CP&A



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Risk 9: Loss of control of IP rights

HPCMP CREATE[™] Software User Agreement

Authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors in support of a current contract or technology transfer agreement with the U.S. Government

Distribution Control Number: 1313674496

Warning – This document refers to technical data, the export of which is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App 2401 et seq. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

1. Introduction

a. This Software User Agreement is made by and between the Department of Defense as represented by the High Performance Computing Modernization Program (hereinafter, "HPCMP") and the undersigned Software User Agreement Recipient

• Mitigating Practice: Require a standard software distribution agreement (a license for use).

Recipient has no right to receive, use or examine any source code or design documentation relating to the Product, except as specifically authorized by approved collaborative development and source code agreements. HPCMP retains all right, title and interest in the Product and any portion thereof and in all copies, modifications and derivative works of the Product and portions thereof including, without limitation, all rights the Government may have to patent, copyright, trade secret, trademark and other proprietary or intellectual property rights. Recipient has no rights, by license or otherwise, to use, disclose or disseminate the Product, in whole or in part, except as otherwise expressly provided herein. Recipient may not use any name, mark or designation of the Product except for the express purposes in this Software User Agreement.

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a. The Recipient shall not re-distribute, sell, or use the Product for any purposes not approved the HPCMP, in whole or in part. The Recipient may produce copies of the Product or portions of the Product for use solely by the Recipient, or for use by a U.S. contractor/sub-contractor organization authorized in writing by HPCMP. Recipient shall require each authorized U.S. contractor/sub-contractor organization receiving a copy of the Product or portion of the Product to execute and enforce the terms and conditions of this Software User, Aerorement, and Limit use of the Product to the specific numeons stated within this

Software User Agreement. A copy of the authorized copy of the Product or portion User Agreement requirements. In addition all authorized U.S. contractors/subcontractors/su

- b. The HPCMP may change the terms and co
- c. The Recipient bears full responsibility controlled material in or related to the Pro The Product is subject to the Arms Expor Act of 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., Ap penalties.
- d. The Recipient acknowledges that the Product may be controlled by the International Traffic In Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Sections 121 through 128, and may require an export distribution agreement before assigning any FOREIGN NATIONAL or FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE to perform work using the Product or before granting any FOREIGN NATIONAL or FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE to perform work using the Product or before granting any FOREIGN NATIONAL or FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE access to the Product, and/or technical data generated by the Product. Furthermore, such persons must be approved by the HQUSACE designated Forcing Disclosure Officer before beginning such

Practice: Acquire the necessary rights (DFARs) in contracts and licenses.


Act of 1979, as amended, Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401, et seq. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties.



Risk 10: Supporting CREATE users

without impacting product development

• Mitigating Practice: Look for scalable self-help solutions, like Web Forums



CREATE Program Management



What has made it work?

- Leadership beyond program management
- Balance between developer freedom and responsibility
- Embedded in CREATE's primary customer organizations
- Customer-defined use-cases
- Frequent product releases
- Browser-based access and Customer Forums

NDIA #19693



Richard P. Kendall, Ph.D.

Software Engineering Consultant DoD High Performance Computing Modernization Program (505) 660-0976 <u>Richard.p.kendall4.ctr@mail.mil</u>