Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board



Explosives Safety Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future <u>UPDATE</u>

August 2018

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
Executive Director



Overview



- May 2015 MSIAC Article Documenting ESMRM History, Challenges, and Strategy to implement
- Operational use
- Strategy
 - o Requirements
 - Outreach and Implementation
 - Background and Problem Statement
- Actions Since Dec 2017, Remaining Risks, and Potential Outcome
- Conclusions





ESMRM: Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future


- May 2015 MSIAC Article Documenting ESMRM History, Challenges, and Strategy to implement
- <u>http://www.msiac.nato.int/news/newsle</u> <u>tter/download</u>
- <u>History</u> Events in Afghanistan (~2000-2010) created conditions that revealed lack of institutionalized processes or ability to address munitions risks in when two or more NATO nations were engaged in operations.
 - o Kanduhar Tri-national ASP





ESMRM: Compelling Past, Active Present, Uncertain Future

- Mar 2009 Report "*Challenges in Afghanistan*" identified chain of command challenges, importance of Lead Nation responsibilities and adhering to established NATO doctrine
- Report focused on tactical and operational levels and stopped short of addressing root causes (i.e. lack of requirements within NATO and lack of clear processes for deviations and chain of command responsibilities)




• Very important report that brought awareness to explosives safety "challenges" in operations



Salen Salen Altransactor

Operational Use

Munitions Risk Management in Consumer Logistics



Seven Phases of NATO Consumer Logistics

- er Logistics
- The NATO Consumer Logistics
 Process as detailed from Allied
 Logistic Publication (ALP)4.2(A), "Land Forces Logistic
 Doctrine
- Details the phases of logistics that support military operations


ALP-16, "*Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management* (*ESMRM*) *in NATO Planning, Training, and Operations*" details risk assessments, chain of command responsibilities required during each phase in the logistics process



ESMRM Strategy

1. Requirements **Development and** Harmonization

Developing and promulgating






ESMRM Smart Defence

Project1.32

AC/305 LC, ACO, ACT, and

AC/326



Closing gaps in 12 NATO Logistics documents

Harmonizing AASTPs 1 and 5 with ESMRM Requirements




ESMRM assessment capability

Imbedding training within NATO





ESMRM Strategy






ESMRM Strategy


1. Requirements **Development and** Harmonization

ESMRM Policy



Closing gaps in 12 NATO Logistics documents

Harmonizing AASTPs 1 and 5 with ESMRM Requirements







- <u>Background</u>. 2018 marks 3rd year of DDESB/NATO ESMRM Panel working with SHAPE to implement ESMRM into NATO plans, exercises, ops, and education and training processes
- June 2017 SACEUR requested DDESB:
 - Assess Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) program and provide results
 - Brief JFC CDRs and staffs to educate and inform about available level of support
 - Include ESMRM in SAGE 2020
- Jun-Dec 2017 minimal progress; staffs receptive but required intent
- Jan 2018 present significant progress (events and timeline slide)

<u>Revised Problem Statement</u>

- Although significant progress has been made to institutionalize ESMRM within NATO (HQ and ACO), risks remain.
- Unless action is taken to eliminate, risks will likely result in ESMRM not being institutionalized within NATO and recreating high-risk operating conditions in future operations, similar to those previously found in Afghanistan.
- More than conjecture we are already witnessing precursors...



Actions Since Dec 2017, Remaining Risks, and Potential Outcome



- Actions Since Dec 2017. SHAPE, JFC Brunssum and Naples engaged at leadership and staff level (J4s primarily)
- SHAPE, JFC, ACT Actions include:
 - Developing implementing instructions, hosting implementing forums within ACO and JFCs
 - o JFCBS integrated ESMRM guidance into revised Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) guidance
 - Incorporating ESMRM language into SAGE 2020
 - Working toward including ESMRM requirements from STANAG 2763/ALP-16 into Graduated Response Plans
 - Formalizing training process with ACT (IAW Bi-SC Dir 75-2, Global Programming)
 - Education and Training
 - ✓ Incorporating ESMRM into Annual Discipline Alignment Plan and Logistics Strategic Training Plan
 - DDESB developed and began teaching ESMRM module as part of NATO Log Officers Course at NATO School O'Gau (NSO) starting in March 2018
 - ✓ DDESB developing ESMRM Train-the-Trainer course in partnership with NSO and other NATO organizations/partners
- <u>**Risks</u>**. Although SHAPE and NATO HQ making progress toward institutionalizing ESMRM, two main risks remain.</u>
 - SACEUR departs before key SHAPE actions accomplished
 - NATO Log Committee (AC/305) leaves ESMRM out of Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3 and Log Handbook
- <u>Potential Outcome</u>. NATO operational planning continues without ESMRM processes and Risk Decisions in place; nations' munitions-related ops and supporting infrastructure create risk to each other, NATO mission, and HN lives



Conclusions



- Although important, ESMRM is currently a *niche function*
 - Importance waxes and wanes based on how recent catastrophes are in the minds of leadership and the public <u>or</u>
 - Senior leadership personal interest and engagement
- 2 Main ESMRM Goals (Integration into the NATO Enterprise and Culture Change)
 - Integrate into NATO planning, education and operations and as importantly...
 - Drive a culture change that results in Commanders, logisticians, and planners asking about munitions risk management and if ESMRM is part of plans, exercises, and operations.
- Integrating ESMRM and changing the NATO Culture requires:
 - Institutionalizing ESMRM both in NATO AC/305 (Logistics Committee) doctrine and supporting documents (Principles & Policies for Log MC0319/3, the Logistics Handbook, and other key docs) and for
 - Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) to publish (SHAPE and Joint Forces Command) level implementing instructions and
 - Add ammunition officer on SHAPE and JFC staffs to manage munitions-related issues (including ESMRM) in planning, training, and execution.




Conclusions



- <u>Bottom line</u> ESMRM is a systematic approach that when successfully institutionalized will result in a culture change directly contributing to:
 - \circ Improved readiness
 - Increased operational capabilities
 - More realistic plans and exercises
 - \circ Quantified/qualified (and often reduced) munitions-risks, and
 - \circ Increased commanders awareness about his/her ability to perform the mission


Questions?



Explosion of the USS Mt. Hood (AE-11), Admiralty Islands, 10 November 1944. While moored at the Manus Naval Base, Admiralty Islands, the Mount Hood's cargo ~2.3M pounds of munitions detonated. Damage and casualties were inflicted on ships anchored as far as 2000 yards away. Personnel casualties on Mount Hood and on other vessels totaled 45 known dead, 327 missing and 371 injured. Over 30 large ships damaged, including the USS Mindanao (ARG-3), pictured above. 13 small boats and landing craft were sunk, destroyed or damaged beyond repair and 33 were damaged but reparable.

Backup Slides







Operational

SAGE

COPD

GRP

Policy,

STANAG,


Guidance

SHAPE

ESMRM

Operational

Roadmap



ACO/SHAPE J4, J3, MILENG, J5

Key Orgs &

Stakeholders

Component

Commands

-Land

-Maritime

-Air

54, 55, WILLING, 55

Interim Standing JLSG JFC Brunnsum J4, J3, MILENG, J5

MILENG, J5

JLSG

AC/305

ESMRM Panel



