

Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity

Mr. Gary Hogue & Mr. John Stacy Navy A&E Facility Planning 7 August 2018



Issue: The Navy's ability to meet current and future mission requirements is diminished by: Current Navy infrastructure; the disconnect between explosives safety, planning, the weapons system acquisition process and fleet mission requirements; current explosives safety siting policies and practices; and the lack of clarity relative to risk to infrastructure, the public, and mission.



- 2015 Naval Audit Service evaluation of the Navy's Ammunition and Explosives Storage Facilities;
- DDESB Explosives Safety Management Plan (ESMP) evaluations of the Navy;
- Internal Navy evaluations FCAMS, AMHAZ Boards, ASPT Baselines, WSESRB, etc.



- 2015 Naval Audit Service evaluation of the Navy's Ammunition and Explosives Storage Facilities
 - Inaccurate Internet Navy Facilities Assets Data Store (iNFADS)1 data;
 - Ordnance Information System-Retail (OIS-R) explosives limits not matching approved limits;
 - Inaccurate explosives limits on A&E storage facility placards;
 - A&E storage facilities not meeting current safety standards;
 - > 52% of pre-May 1967 storage facilities did not have DDESB/Navy *authorizations* to use.
- Conclusion: "We found that the Navy's A&E storage facility infrastructure does not appear to sufficiently support its current and future needs."



- DDESB Explosives Safety Management Plan Evaluations of the Navy:
 - Master Planning Process;
 - Management of Pre-1967 Facilities;
 - Explosives Safety Risk Identification and Management.



- Internal Navy evaluations FCAMS, AMHAZ Boards, ASPT Baselining, WSESRB, etc.
 - FCAMS Identified storage magazine explosives limits based on the magazines locations which were not in some cases consistent with the Navy's storage requirements;
 - ➤ AMHAZ Identified disconnects between fleet mission requirements and weapon system acquisition programs, and planning initiatives doors on magazines not able to support storage of new weapons systems, actual storage capabilities of magazines not able to support new systems (too long to be stored in arch-type ECMs, etc.).



- Internal Navy evaluations FCAMS, AMHAZ Boards, ASPT Baselining, WSESRB, etc.
 - ➤ ASPT Baselining iNFADS not consistent with reality, facilities not located where depicted on maps, wrong polygons, incorrect limits and ESQD arcs, etc.
 - ➤ WSESRB Has also identified weapon system acquisition programs with non-quantified expectations of facilities at Navy bases piers not long enough to support new platforms, magazine storage capacity requirements beyond actual ability, etc.



The Corrective Actions:

- ➤ Establishment of NOSSAINST 8020.22A which combines and standardizes the submission of site plan and deviation requests along with risk characterizations;
- ➤ Vision 2022 which requires the siting of all A&E facilities by 31 December 2021;
- ➤ Commenced using ASAP-X for risk assessments. This addresses the consequence of a potential detonation, not the probability;
- Crossing "administrative" boundaries within NOSSA and collaborating with NAVFAC and the system program offices to support Master Planning to meet current and future Navy mission requirements;



The Corrective Actions:

- ➤ Development of a magazine study guide to better support Navy efforts to baseline our installations in support of meeting the Vision 2022;
- Ammunition and Explosives Facilities Support (A&EFS) will document and report the capacity and capability shortfalls and overages, where applicable, of existing A&E storage facilities and then use that in conjunction with Fleet mission requirements and weapons system acquisition programs to develop Master Plans to meet Navy mission requirements.



- Benefits to the Navy:
 - Resolve issues (appropriately) identified during external and internal evaluations;
 - Optimize planning resources and life cycle costs for both Facilities and Weapon Systems acquisition programs;
 - Improve the overall explosives safety posture of the Navy;
 - Support the execution of the Navy's missions.



Weapon Systems Characterization

Questions???