International Explosives Safety Symposium & Exposition

IMESAFR Science Panel

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- Key Organizations
- Perspective on ATD/QRA
- Science Panel
 - Purpose
 - Work Examples
 - Current Work
 Work
 Output
 Description
 Second Content
 Content
 - Field Testing
 - * Future Work

Safety and Security







6,000,000,000 *lb yr*

98%




Acceptable Risk Criteria

 Requested an individual acceptable risk criteria of 1E-6 from ATF in 2017



Safety and Security of Explosives in Storage







American Table of Distances

- System is based on mid 19th and early 20th century explosives and storage.
- Cannot minimize the risk ATD is binary (safe/unsafe)
- There is no regulatory incentive for improvements in explosives or explosive storage



Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)


- Supported by testing (modern storage & explosives)
- It spatially quantifies the risk to the public and employees
- Credit is given to the industry for improving the safety of their explosives and improving explosive storage.



ATF and QRA

- 2014 ATF has accept QRA applications
- Handled as a waiver
- & 8-9 waivers approved since 2014
- Use a Risk Bank Method for criteria
- IME Requested ATF Accept 1E-06 Individual Risk Criteria
- * ATF Requested a Review of Pe Model in IMESAFR





Risk Bank Method

 Set risk based on ATD
 New storage must meet old risk level to use QRA.



APT Research

- Support contractor for the RBESCT¹ since its inception
- DDESB² chose to implement a technology transfer to help IME begin the IMESAFR project
- Developed IMESAFR Tool



1. Risk-Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team. 2. Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board



in providing safety services.

Lorem Ipsum Dolor

AN EMPLOYEE-OWNED COMPANY

Development of QRA for DDESB and IME # A-P-T RESEARCH, INC.



IMESAFR Science Panel









University of Science & Technology



Transportation Security Administration

IMESAFR Science Panel


- ISP was founded at the request of and funding from the ATF
- * Mirror the Science Panel role for the DDESB but for commercial explosives
- * The two components of that role are:
 - Identify potential improvements to IMESAFR
 - Provide technical evidence to support any proposed changes/additions
 - This is particularly true when the proposed change will reduce conservatism
- The ISP has provided significant benefit to/improvement of IMESAFR
 - Recommendation to add Bin G
 - Recommendation to add more debris blockage
 - Review of Probability of Event (in-progress)
 - Recommendation to maintain current uncertainty model
 - Will add more subjects, e.g. frangible walls
- The ISP provides support for testing

Conservation of Mass -Debris

- Test Programs Have Indicated
 - Not all Debris is Recoverable
 - Some Debris Too Small to be Lethal at Any Range
 - Dependent on Structure Type


Mass Distribution


Material Type % Total Mass	Bin 1	Bin 2	Bin 3	Bin 4	Bin 5	Bin 6	Bin 7	Bin 8	Bin 9	Bin 10	Bin G
Standard Concrete	0.00	0.43	2.49	5.63	5.81	5.82	4.52	4.66	4.62	5.24	60.78
Thick Concrete	3.64	3.35	4.63	6.31	7.56	8.1	8.06	7.77	7.51	7.52	35.55
Wall Rebar	0.00	57.6	29.7	10.1	2.00	0.50	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Composite Roof	45.6	17.0	10.5	8.10	3.70	4.60	3.50	3.20	1.90	0.90	1.00
AGBS	0.00	4.00	4.00	8.00	32.0	8.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	12.0	20.0
HCT Wall	0.75	1.50	2.25	3.00	3.75	4.50	6.00	4.50	3.00	0.75	70.0
HCT Roof	0.00	0.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	4.50	6.00	7.50	4.50	3.00	70.0
ISO	34.0	12.0	10.0	10.0	8.00	9.00	6.50	5.00	2.70	1.40	1.40
Ship and Steel ECM	50.0	12.5	10.0	9.70	6.30	6.20	3.10	1.60	0.50	0.10	0.00
PEMB	30.6	11.8	10.5	10.3	8.50	9.90	6.80	5.60	3.10	1.50	1.40



PTR Logic


Debris Barricades






Side Impact Debris Barricades

Allows the user to specify what percent of the sideimpact debris is blocked (up to 100%)



Vertical Debris Barricades

Allows the user to specify the KE "blocking power" of the barricade



Uncertainty

Numerical Risk Criteria

- * Just like Q/D, QRA requires a pass/fail (possibly with shades of grey) standard
 - Three level paradigms, e.g. Pass/ALARP¹/Fail, are recognized
- Science Panel supports:
 - Individual Risk 1E-06
 - & Group Risk 1E-05
- Catastrophic Risk Aversion criteria are not widely published/used
- The IME proposed individual risk of 1E-06 to the ATF
 - * The ATF has requested an external review of the Pe methodology
 - This has been completed and the SP will make a recommendation to ATF.

Test Program

- Whenever possible, the IMESAFR algorithms are either based on large scale test data or validated by such data
- The Development Team put together a Maturity Matrix several years ago
 - * The Matrix shows program areas where bigger or more critical gaps exist
 - From this a test program is generated
 - Large scale tests are expensive and difficult to organize and carry out
 - The assistance of the ATF on the ISP is hugely beneficial
- The current test program includes:
 - Iron Warrior IV (completed, IME 'piggyback')
 - AN Railcar (very soon, IME 'piggyback')
 - Overhead silo (blasting agent, ATF/IME, 2019(?))
 - Perforating guns (IME, 2019(?))
 - ATF Magazine

Questions