Software Assurance through DevSecOps

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Software Assurance in DevSecOps

- The DoD has rapidly transitioned to DevSecOps (DSO) in an effort to deliver software at the speed of relevance. Software modernization efforts include:
 - Standup of approximately 30 organizations providing infrastructure and platform services to programs
 - Updates to Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) policy and supporting guidance
 - Issued DoD Instruction 5000.87 Operation of the Software Acquisition Pathway supporting DoD adoption of DSO
 - Publication of standards and best practices to support program implementation
- The DoDI 5000.83, "Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," requires programs to employ system security engineering methods and practices, including software assurance (SwA), commensurate with technology, program, system, and mission objectives
 - OUSD(R&E) STPP is currently updating the Program Protection Planning Outline and Guidance (PPP O&G) to reflect changes to the 5000.83 and support software modernization objectives
 - The automation of manual assurance processes and standardization of risks processes continue to challenge the effectiveness of SwA implementation
- As DevSecOps capabilities mature, the Department and industry partners must ensure the implementation of DevSecOps supports both the broad application of SwA practices and can be tailored to protect critical software



SwA in DevSecOps

Completion of SwA in DevSecOps whitepaper with DoD/NNSA Software Assurance Community of Practice

CUI

Department of Defense Software Assurance

Alignment of software assurance practices with the DevSecOps lifecycle and generation of artifacts to support decisions





releasable only in accordance with the software lecress in subpart 2277 of Reference (o). In includes documentations that sture if or owner's manual, its simulation instructions, openning instructions, and other information that regimes 2018 Others of our provable instructions for Oddes of the Under Socretary of Defenses for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)), 3030 Defense Pernagon, Washington, DC 20301-3030.

CUI

Development of DAU WSA 002 – DevSecOps for the DoD: Security Focus (DSF)





Software Assurance Gaps 2020

Hardened Container SRG

Existing DevSecOps service provider capabilities use automated scanning (OpenSCAP, Anchor, Twistlock) focusing on cybersecurity STIG and known vulnerability assessments. Opportunity for enhanced assurance capabilities.

Assurance Baseline and critical function assessments

Pipeline adoption continues to utilize a small subset of assurance tools and lacks consideration of raised assurance level for critical components.

Software Threat Modeling

Iterative threat modeling established through development process and cadence. Limited automation and MBSE maturity to support CI/CD.

Analysis Data Strategy

Correlation of analysis findings and data strategy for pipeline data artifacts impact programs ability to effectively use assurance tools.

Risk Categorization/Tolerance

Standard process for risk categorization and process to establish risk tolerance based on assurance level does not exist. Does not support

Open Source Assurance

Limited understanding of Software Supply Chain for Open Source and COTS continues to be a source of risk.

The automation of manual assurance processes and standardization of risks processes impede SwA adoption for DSO



Scope of DevSecOps in the DoD





DoDI 5000.83 Technology and Program Protection



DoDI 5000.83, "Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage"

Programs will employ **system security engineering methods and practices**, including cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and cyber survivability in design, test, manufacture, and sustainment. Such methods and practices will ensure that systems function as intended, mitigating risks associated with **known and exploitable vulnerabilities** to provide a **level of assurance** commensurate with technology, program, system, and mission objectives.

Selection of DevSecOps tools supporting program protection must be informed by technology, program, system, and mission objectives



Relationship to Industry Partners (Infrastructure and Platform)





SwA in the CI/CD pipeline



CI/CD automation establishes gates where assurance thresholds can be evaluated prior to promotion of software builds. Vulnerabilities can delay deployment, or risk can be accepted and tracked.



SwA Tool Mapping to DSO



Security tools and capabilities integrated into common DevSecOps tools provide assurance across the DSO lifecycle



SwA Tool Story



Source: Software Assurance Tools Landscape – Levi Lloyd, 2020



Level of Assurance



Increased levels of assurance in DSO requires programs to establish more rigorous testing and pre-production environments, ensuring assurance is commensurate with technology, program, system, and mission objectives



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PPP 0&G SwA Table Mapping to DS0

PPP O&G 2011 SwA Section

tion Plan (PPP) Outline and Onlidence (O&G) V PETDOCUSIONAL Program Protection Plan DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE **Outline & Guidance** Program Protection Plan (PPP) VERSION 1.0 **Outline & Guidance** July 2011 DRAFT Version 2.0 January 2021 2011 Table 5.3.3-1: Application of Software Assurance Countermeasures (sampl Deputy Assistant Secrets Systems Engin 2022 Software (CPI, critical Code Test Desian CVE CAPEC CWE Pen unction components, other Inspect Coverage Analysis p/a (%) p/a (%) Test Inspect p/a (%) software) p/a (%) p/a (%) p/a (%) PPP O&G SwA Sections Two Office of the Under Secretary of Defens Developmental CPI SW 100/80 100/80 100/60 100/60 100/60 Yes 75/50 for Research and Engineering Levels Developmental Critical Washington, D.C. Two 100/80 100/80 100/70 100/70 75/50 Function SW Table 2-12 SW Infrastructure Other Developmental SV One leve 100/65 10/0 10/0 10/0 No 50/25 COTS CPI and Critical Vendor Vende 0 /endor Sw/ Yes UNK Function SW SwA SwA Table 2-13 Software Scope COTS (other than CPI and No No No 0 0 No UNK Critical Function) and NDI SV Operational System Table 2-14 Software Process Multiple Input System Element Fault Least SW load Supplier checking olation Privilege key Isolation validatio (%) Table 2-15 SW Methods Practices and Tools Developmental CPI SV All All yes Developmental Critica 50 All All yes All all Function SW None Other Developmental S none Partial none all all Table 2-16 SW Environments Summary OTS (CPI and CF) and NDI **Nrappers** none Partial All None all vironn Generated Table 2-17 SW Weaknesses and vulnerabilities Release code SW Produc Source inspection testing p/a (%) C Compiler Yes 50/20 Runtime libraries Yes Yes 70/none Table 2-18 SW Protections Automated test syster No Yes 50/none onfiguration management NA No Yes system Yes 50/non Table 2-21 SW Procurement Development Environme

PPP O&G 2022 SwA Section

Updated PPP O&G tables support tracking of assurance methods, practices and protections for infrastructure, environments, and assurance tools



Transparency, Data, and Confidence





PPP 0&G SwA Table Mapping to DSO



Table 2-12Table 2-13Software InfrastructureSoftware Scope

Table 2-14 Software Process Table 2-15 SW Methods Practices and Tools Table 2-17 SW Weaknesses and vulnerabilities

Table 2-16 SW Environments Summary



Table 2-18 SW Protections Operating Systems Language Selection Standards Security Sidecar Table 2-21 <u>Software Procurement</u> Vendor SwA Process SW Bill of Materials Protection Measures



Summary

- DoD Adoption of DevSecOps and the availability of automated tools are enhancing program's ability to implement software assurance
- Acquisition processes and the contractual relationship to industry partners create boundaries not present in commercial software development. These boundaries also impact program confidence in the systems assurance including:
 - Security and Configuration across PaaS and IaaS solutions
 - Tool customization to support technology, program, system, and mission objectives
 - Design of integration and test environments to mirror operations
 - Delivery of assurance artifacts to support risk decisions
- OUSD(R&E) STPP (Systems Security directorate) updates to the PPP O&G and supporting DIDs will enable the planning and execution of software assurance in a DevSecOps ecosystem
- Industry support, review, and feedback on Software Assurance DID is welcomed and appreciated



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Backup Slides



WSA 002 – DevSecOps for the DoD: Security Focus (DSF)

Defense Acquisition University Cybersecurity Professionals Software Engineers

The greatest impediment to DoD's transition to DevSecOps (DSO) is the use of manual, checklist-based security practices.

In DSF, brings together software developers, cyber professionals and program managers to tear down traditional DoD silos and provide students with an understanding of the capabilities required to secure software developed using a DevSecOps methodology.

In DSF students will learn the importance of security in DSO, how the DoD DSO reference design supports built-in security across all layers, the importance of automation in the development of security artifacts; and how these artifacts inform the continuous authority to operate.



Empowering students to begin leading cultural change within their organizations and programs through:



Virtual lessons provide a foundation in secure development, threat modeling, the "Sec" in DSO, and DSO automation, enabling confidence in security. **Pipeline demos** delivered by CloudOne full stack engineers, detail vulnerability scanning, end-to-end security testing, and the Security Sidecar Pattern.





A virtual **case study** walks students through the use of machine readable security artifacts and dashboards in a quest to develop a cATO package and deliver software to the Warfighter.



Continuous Verification of Assurance











